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Foreword
By rvs w:kv NxrU_E, the space program is an activity that encompasses
a number of discrete projects, each aimed toward achieving specific
objectives within a finite period. Like many other advanced-technology
enterprises, NASA has relied heavily on the techniques of organizing
manpower and physical resources into project structures to realize goals
involving specified cost, schedule, and performance requirements.
In one sense, there is little new or unique about project management.
Much that has been accomplished in human progress has come by dedi-
cating and organizing human energies and physical resour(es to meet
specific goals. Modern industrialized society has become dependent on
this type of management to a higher degree than ever betore. Not only
in the areas o[ hard sciences but also in the fields of social, economic,
and political affairs, there is an increasing tendency to tackle problems
through a project approach.
Despite the lung history of project management, we still know
relatively little about its human aspects--what kinds of people fit into
at project organi_.ation, what effect project assignments have on profes-
sional development, how institutions and their employees are affected
by the discontinuities that are a necessary concomitant of project man-
agement. _,'_e still have much to learn about how to make the most of
the potential offmed by project management while minimizing the
side effects.
It may well be that one of NASA's most valuable contributions to
furthering the advance of technology in all earthly endeavors is the
application of viable, flexible management techniques of the space
program. This analysis draws lessons from management experience
gained over a broad spectrum of NASA projects. Ahhough there have
been changes in NASA's organization since the data were accumulated
for this study, the findings and conclusions reached are still valid.
DE_IARQUIS D. WYATt
Assistant Administrator [or Policy
and University Al]airs
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Introduction
THE EXTRAORDINARYSUCCESS of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in leading the United States from a position
of relative inferiority to one of world leadership in astronautics during
the 1960s has stimulated wide interest in the organizational and man-
agement systems which contributed to this feat. One area of NASA
organization and management which has drawn wide attention is
"project management." It has been looked upon as a "new" type of
organization. Interest in it has been reinforced by the public visibility
of its products: the Tiros Weather Satellite Project (which returned
widely published pictures of the Earth and its cloud cover) ; the Lunar
Orbiter Project (which produced the first dramatic picture of the
Earth from the Moon's horizon) ; and, most prominent of all, Apollo--
manned exploration of the Moon.
FOCUS OF THIS STUDY
Beyond the analytical description of the NASA project management
system, this study had three objectives: (I) to identify those elements
in NASA project management that contribute most to successful per-
formance; (2) to develop information useful in the selection, attrac-
tion, and development of project managers; and (3) to determine
what, i[ any, elements in NASA project nqanagement are transferable
to other settings.
The study focuses on both the structure and the men, but principally
through the perceptions of those men in two key positions--the pro-
gram managers and the project managers. If it were possible to single
out one person as making the greatest contribution to the success of
any particular project, it would be tim project manager. A major space
flight project involves the efforts of hundreds of individuals from a
galaxy of technical and administrative fields; it costs millions of dol-
lars. The manager must be supported by technical capability in depth,
such as that typically found during the aeronautics era in the NACA
Laboratories. Although innumerable individuals make substantial con-
tributions to any particular flight project, the final responsibility for
project success rests upon the shoulders of the project manager. He is
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responsible for the day-to-day operation of the projett. He has a coun-
terpart in NAS,\ Headquarters who is the principal focal point for
Headquartezs' interests, planning, and (ontrol o17 the projert--the pro-
gram manager. The men occupying these two pmizion_ and the quality
of their _elatiozzship, in large measure, determine the case or difficulty
of management and the relative success o17 the project.
This stud), 17ocuses more upon the human element and the organiza-
tional perspe(tives o[ the program and project managers than it does
upon the tormal structural alrangements, I;)lllrol, alld reporting sys-
tems. The literatme of project m,magement tends I_ place relatively
heavy emphasis upon the formal s)stems of _-(mt_ol and review. Al-
though these s}stcms contribute to the etlectiven_.>s ,)1 project manage-
ment, they a]e too frequently mistaken tot the key attributes of
proje{t management.
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
At the time of this study (1969-1971), NASA was organized into
four principal operating offices: The Office of Manned Space Flight
(OMSF); tile ()ffice of Space Science and Applkations (OSSA); the
Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OAR'1") ; and the Office
of Tracking and Data Acquisition (OTDA). This study is limited to
program and project management in the OSSA and OART. The Office
of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Tracking and Data Acqui-
sition were excluded for several reasons. Manned Space Flight programs
have been dominated by tile gigantic project Apollo (preceded by
Mercury and (;emini). They were the largest and most dominant proj-
ects in NASA but were not "representative" in _erms ot7 the number o17
substantial pr_}ects managed by NASA. Preliminary exploration re-
vealed that their clearly dominant priority and size resulted in a unique
style of management. In addition, the large Manned Space Flight proj-
ects do not olter suitable analogs for wide application outside NASA.
Ther,,.' were no significant project activities in the Office of Tracking
and I)ata Acquisition.
Since the p_oje(t and progranl managers play the key roles at NASA,
iri_,ght into their individual skills, motivations, management styles, and
perspectives on the organization and its enviromnent can be a key to
understanding what makes project management so successful in NASA.
In addition to the personal dimensions, those elements which constir
tute lhe. orgal_izational environment--both to_mal and informal--are
impoltant. The central hypothesis of this study is that the project
manager's (or program manager's) relative success can be ascribed
principally to tour elements: (1) his personal skill, (2) his personal
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characteristics, (3) his style or pattern of operation, and (4) the
organizational environnlent in which tie works.
The study also addressed several questions:
What [actors in the project management system lacilitate or in-
hibit success?
What characteristics, skills, operational styles, or experience do
the most successlul project managers (program managers) have in
common?
What convergence is there in the perspectives o[ senior sta 0 or
among project managers (program managers) about the criteria [or
success in project management?
How are the roles of project managers and program managers alike?
Different?
Data for the study were collected by personal interviews, question-
naire, and a review of NASA documents. Like most organizations,
NASA usually is realigning its component units. This study does not
cover organizational changes that occurred after March 1971.
The 149 interviews conducted covered 32 different projects in OSSA,
OART, Goddard Space Flight Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis
Research Center, Flight Research Center, Ames Research Center, Wal-
lops Station, and the Unmanned Launch Operations of the Kennedy
Space Center. Interviews were conducted with current and past project
managers, current and past program managers, senior field installation
and Headquarters officials, and project and field installation staff
members. Preliminary interviews were conducted as early as January
1969, but the primary interviewing began in November 1969 and con-
cluded in August 1970. The interviews ranged from one hour to two
hours in length and were directed principally at the project (program)
manager's perspectives on his job, on the project management system,
and on his operational style. Interviews with project staff focused on
these same elements in an attempt to corroborate the information from
the project manager, and to obtain greater depth of information about
the management system in the particular field installation. Interviews
with field installation officials treated their viewpoints about project
management and its relationship within the installation and between
the field installation and Headquarters. Attention also was given to
how project managers thought they were judged, what criteria they
thought were used by their superiors in evaluating them, and what
they anticipated as future assignments at the conclusion of their projects.
Senior officials were asked to specify the criteria upon which project
managers were judged, to name the two or three they considered most
successful, and then to explain the basis for their selections.
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A four-page questionnaire was left with each project (and program)
manager. Tile questionnaire solicited torced-choicc selections on project
management tunctions, project management skills, and personal char-
acteristics of project managers; a series of four hypothetical situations
was designed to elicit their role orientations. The questionnaire supple-
mented the data collected in the interviews and provided the basis for
qualitative evaluation of differences from one field installation to an-
other with respect to critical elements of project management. It was
made clear to the respondent that the purpose of the questionnaire was
to obtain his perspectives about functions, skills, and characteristics,
and that this was not an attempt at self-rating.
The NASA documents reviewed included NASA management instruc-
tions, field installation management instructions, and program and
project documents. Sample selections from _alious management, in-
formation, and control systems used for NASA projects were examined,
as well.
The combination of formal document review, questionnaire data
from the program and project managers, and interviews soliciting simi-
lar inlormation from program and project managers, staff members and
senior Headquarters and fiehl installation otficials provided a breadth
of data fiom which to analyze NASA project management.
PART I. THE SYSTEM:
Proiec÷ and Program Management

1. The NASA Conceptof ProjectManagement
IN SlXlI'LEsr TERMS, it project is a specific, time-constrained task, the
performance of which cuts across the traditional lines of structure and
authority within a given organization. It consists ol three principal
elements, the sum of which tends to distinguish it from more traditional
management structures. These are: (1) the project manager, who is the
single point of management responsibility /_or the conduct of the task;
(2) centralized planning and control, which are exerted by the project
manager and his organization; and (3) decentralized project executive
--i.e., much of the work is performed outside the project manager's
organization in other elements of his company or agency or by contrac-
tors, many of whom may be outside the direct administrative authority
of the project manager, but who take direction on project mailers from
the project manager. 1 This contrasts with more traditional management
structures which are organized for some continuous, on-going process
or purpose, rarely with a clear point of termination assigned at initia-
tion.
Project management can be classified broadly, in terms of the au-
thority and responsibility of the project manager, into four types: "
1. Projected Organization.--The head is characteristically called a
project manager; his purpose is to achieve the ultimate in _ity oJ
command; he has full authority and responsibility, with all employees
reporting to him directly within his own organization.
2. Matrix Organization.--tlere the head is also termed project man-
ager and his purpose is to achieve 7t12it), of direction; he performs the
full range of management ft,nctions, but those he directs usually are
located administratively in other departments according to their func-
tional specialties.
3. Coordinator.--The head may be called a project manager or a
project coordinator; his purpose is to achieve _tnity of co_trol; he has
independent authority for the project, and controls the disbursement of
funds from the budget; he does not actively direct the work o[ others.
4. Expediter.--The head may have virtually any title, including
project expediter; his purpose is to achieve uT_ity ol commzt_licalions;
he is the center of communications, deals with those involved, monitors
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schedulesand suppliesinformation Io top man;,g('meut; he has no
power to direct pcople other than by l_ersuasion or lcporting back to
his own superior.
Each el these types el project management can bt hmnd in NASA.
Most NASA projects follow either the matrix o1 ploje_tized type of
organization. {rnder a matrix organization, em[)lo_,ee_ may be assigned
temporalily Io a project, but they remain on Iht' i_[[_ el their parent
organization ',rod are under that organization's imisdiction [or merit
reviews, plOmOti{ms and similar lormal supelxisolx ;u lion. They may
be physically huated within their t)alent ,>rganizati,m /atber lhan in the
project location. The matrix organiz,_tion has the ;ulvantages of more
efficient use el specialized talent, ficxibilil) in appi._ing that talent to
the most urgent problems, and a broader pctspcitive for supervising
and eva]uati_)g tel hnical personnel. Bciause thc pr,_jt:_ t manager lacks
direct, formal COIItI'O| ovel tlHllly (It lhe team incmbers, managers tend
to consider the matrix less lesponsixe than projectized organization.
Tim matrix does sllt[er [rolu problems associatc<l with dual allegiance
and it formally uns)stematic or t tHllbelsolnc ;itlthority structure. This
type of plojeet organization usualh is prelell_d by the senior manage-
meut of agen(ies or _ompanies where several major projects are under-
way at the same time. a The matrix is the prelected ]noject organization
in NASA.
In its purest lorm, a projectized olganDalion gives the project man-
ager direct ((mtrol and full authorit} ovct all _Jl the people assigned
to the projc<t. This form tends to be tavo_t'd b\ _mnagers of large
projects. It permits ease ot control, clear local ion el icsponsibility, quick
reaction [rent the project team, and a simple ]):_llcl I1 o[ ¢omlnunications.
It is less flexible and not so economical in _lili_b_g personnel as is the
lnatrix organization because it m_ } plovc d[flt_ult o_ganizationally to
transter a spe(ialist to the project for onl} that I_<qi(_d of time when he
is most needed. Projectization also tcllds it) isolate the project group
from the rest of the installation, t-cdiuing tt'ih_li_a] interchange and,
possibly, te(hnical innovation.
The NASA concept of project lllallagetllClll is l)aS('([ upoll a philosophy'
el inte<,tating the tethnical and m;magcti:tl {,:m/l>vtcnte ot industry,
,_ ( , •
NASA labotatories, and university s<ientists within a sxstem that could
best be called erie of participative lcsl)ol_sibili_ }. Most NASA flight
projects a_e oi such scope that they tonstitule haiti)hal projects, and this
requires that national competence, irrespective el iis location, be ap-
plied.
NASA senior leadership recognized the w:c_! to improve upon the
prevailing slxlc ol project management most t)pi_allv found in major
engineering development programs tllroug]eoul lhe 1950s. That ap-
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proach was characterized as writing specifications for the development
program, letting the contract, and depending largely upon the contrac-
tors for the resulting product. The weakness in this system was that it
did not provide for satisfactory, positive intervention by the customer
(here, the government agency) in the solution of and decision on the
technical problems wllich inevitably arise in a development program.
Too often government project managers lacked the supporting organiza-
tional system and in-house technical support necessary to manage con-
tractors most effectively.
The NASA project management concept is that no single company,
regardless of its excellence, has all of the skills and experience required
for the execution of a large space flight project. Therefore, although
it relies predominantly upon the aerospace industry to build, integrate,
and test flight hardware, NASA uses its in-house management and
technical competence--which it has in considerable breadth and depth
--to monitor closely, and to work with, the contractor. NASA retains
the authority and the means for tapping a much wider variety of tech-
nical competence to overcome problems confronting a contractor on a
project.
For example, NASA can bring in experts from its field installations,
from universities, or from other government laboratories easily and
without the contractor having to "lose face" institutionally in tackling
an intractable problem. The concept is to manage the project on a team-
work basis in order to avoid unnecessary delays that might be occasioned
by working across organizational boundaries separating public, private,
and semi-private organizations. The same practice applies to NASA's
field installations and project groups--organizational boundaries are
not,to,interfere with the application of needed talent.
This concept, requiring teamwork and central control but decentral-
ized project execution, respects the semi-autonomous status of the
NASA field installations which are the locus of most of NASA's tech-
nical talent in depth. It requires a different organizational construct
from that of previous project management.
As former NASA Administrator James E. Webb characterized it, the
system must assure that the project manager have specific instructions,
understand what he is to accomplish, and have support for those re-
sources essential for success. But the senior management at the field
installation (where the project is located) and in NASA Headquarters,
while providing intelligent support to and understanding of the prob-
lems of the project manager, can not accept blindly the project man-
ager's requests.
Thus was built a system which, it was hoped, would enable all re-
sponsible officials to follow progress, contribute their know-how when
needed, and provide the essential support to the project manager--yet
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balance that support against the requirements _t hroader institutional
and program goals of NASA. A dual s}stem of l_r_:_iect control evolved.
Responsibility l_w lo_king after NASA HeadqtlzJrte_s" broad interests
was vested in a fJrogram manager, while the reslmz_sibility for the actual
conduct and execution of the project was vested ill ,L project manager
t,vpically located at one of the major NASA field installations and
subject to the general supervision of the installation director.
NASA ORGANIZATION
When NASA opened its doors as an operating agency in October
1958, it consisted ahnost entirely of the National Advisory Committee
on Aeronautics (NACA) organization which it absorbed. The technical
leadership and the operational style of NACA subtly influenced the
newly created NASA. NACA had a 43-year history c)f technical leader-
ship in aeronautics and a reputation for working intimately and effec-
tively with other aeronautical research organizations in universities,
industry, and the military departments. NASA pursued fundamental
as well as applied engineering research, but it was not isolated from
either contact with, or appreciation oL operational problems confront-
ing user organizations such as the airlines, the aircraft industry, and the
military air services.
The NACA organization featured three major aeronautical labora-
tories-Langley, Ames, and Lewis--and a small Washington-based head-
quarters which exercised a minimum of control or direction over the
laboratories. In NACA, technical initiative and depth of technical
competence were located in the laboratories. Under NASA, greater
strength and authority had to be placed in Headquarters to provide the
direction and control necessitated by the expectdtions o[ Congress and
the public. During its early years, NASA Headquarters drew heavily
upon the former NACA laboratories to staff its growing programs.
NASA's approach to project management was influenced in two
important respects by its NACA heritage. First, there was a determina-
tion to continue the partnership style of opet-ation, whereby NASA
and industry worked closely together on technical problems, in contrast
to the more typical government-industry arms-length relation of cus-
tomer and vendor. Second, most of the technical initiative and detailed
technical decision making was left to the field installations.
From its beginning NASA has been organized by: (1) top manage-
ment (the Administrator and his immediate Ottlce), (2) functional
support for top management and the agency in general, (3) program
offices (developing and controlling the major program activities), and
(4) the field installations (largely responsible for the day-to-day conduct
or management of the programs and their components--whether in-
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house, ;it universities, or at contractors). The 1970 organization is, in
most respects, tile same (fig. 1).
The Office of Organization and Management, the Associate Ad-
ministrator, and tile Associate Deputy Administrator and their organi-
zations directly support the Administrator and his Deputy in their
executive responsibilities and NASA generally, in functions ranging
from planning, through contracting and budgeting, to legislative or
international affairs. These activities are considered "functional" sup-
port.
The Offices of Manned Space Flight, Space Science and Applications,
Tracking and Data Acquisition, and Advanced Research and Tech-
nology were responsible for the development, justification, and manage-
ment of NASA's programs in each of these area_. These activities are
considered "progranl" or substantive activities. During most of NASA's
life the field installations have reported to the Associate Administrator
for one of three program areas--Manned Space Flight, Space Science
and Applications, or Advanced Research and Technology.* The assign-
ment of particular field installations for purposes of "institutional
management" (i.e., broad supervision of the total health and activity
of the field installation) tended to match technical program areas of
the Headqualters program otfices with those of the field installations
assigned to them. These assignments have not changed fundamentally
since NASA's creation.
Althot_gh each field installation reports to a particular Headquarters
office [or general institutional management, all carry out projects or
research tasks under the direction of other than their parent office.
For example, Ames, Langley, Lewis, and Flight Research Centers,
though reporting to OART, have made substantial contributions to
projects of the Office of Manned Space Flight.
All the former NACA laboratories, except Wallops Station which
was an outgrowth of Langley, have continued to report to the Office of
Advanced Research and Technology (OART). The Office of Space
Science and Applications (OSSA) has responsibility [or Wallops Sta-
tion, Goddard Space Flight Center, and Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
Goddard was NASA's first newly created field installation; it drew a
large part of its original complement from the P_oject Vanguard team,
and associated activities were transferred from the Naval Research
Laboratory. NASA acquired Jet Propulsion Laboratory from the De-
partment of the Army, which had developed it as a contractor-operated
facility at the California Institute of Technology.
°These program areas were not always so organized, at',d for a short period, the
field installations reported directly to the principal Associate Administrator. See
Robert L, Roshoh, Au Administrative History o] NASA, 1958-1963 (Washington,
D.C., 1966), NASA SP-4101.
NASA PROJECT MANAGEMENT 9
That OART largely carried over the NACA mission, principal labora-
tories, and headqvarters group into NASA continues to influence tile
organizatiort and practice of project management in OART and its
field installations, in contrast to OSSA and its field installations. _
Each major area of NASA's activity--manned space llight, space sci-
ence and al)plications, and advanced research and technology, supports
broad NASA goals. The organizations responsible for these activities
have a continuing obligation to develop capability and to carry out
research, development, and operations within their respective assign-
ments. Projects constitute an important part of these activities and
tend to be separately identified, tllough each one contributes to broader
programs and institutional goals. Therefore, project organization cuts
across and SUl)plements the more permanent organized activity in
NASA.
THE PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGER ROLES
In NASA terminolog), a program is a related series of undertakings
which continues over a period oI time--normally years--and which
is designed to accomplish a broad scientific or technical goal in NASA's
long-range plan, such as l,un,n and Planetary Exploration. Program
responsibility is assigned to the apt_ropriate program office, such as
OART or OSSA, within NASA l leadquarters.
A project is an undmtaking with a scheduled beginning anti ending,
within a program. It normally involves the construction anti operation
o[ one or more aeronautical or space vehicles, and necessary ground
support in order to accomplish a scientific or technical objective; or
the design, develolmlent and demonstration of major advanced hard-
ware items; or tile design, construction and operation of a new launch
vehicle. 5
NASA has identified the program managers role vis-'a-vis the project
manager's role as follows:
A program manager is the senior NASA staff official who serves as
the focal point of all NASA Headquarters activity bearing directly upon
those projects and other activities which his program comprises. He is
responsible for developing and administering the Headquarters guide-
lines and controls under which those projects :ire conducted, including
keeping tile basic organizational tapahilities healthy. 6 He is not to push
his projects at the expense of NASA's broader goals. On large space
liight projects, the program manager frequently has cognizance over
only one project, such its Nimbus, the Applications Technology Satellite,
or Surve) or.
2\ profc'('l t,'la,,_a,_er is the senior official :,t the NASA field installation
exclusively responsible for the execution ot a project within guidelines
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and controls prescribed by NASA l teadquartcl_ and his field instal-
lation's management. Tile project manager is tim I,_cal point of all field
installation ac ti_ity bearing directly on his project, tte caLries out these
responsibilities within his delegated authority in the name of the field
installation director, r
in essence, the project imtnager can be characterized as "Mr. Inside,"
responsible [or the day-to-day supervision and the execution of the
project as carried ()tit by industrial contractors, NASA and other gov-
ernment laboratories, and university ext)erimentc_. "Vim program man-
ager is "Mr. Outside," fighting the battles of rcsom(c allocation within
NASA Headquarters; preparing testimony and ,iustifi_ation for Presi-
dential and congressional authorization; wolkil/g with other government
and non-govermnent mganizations interested in o_ participating in the
project: and monitoring the project execution, to relate it to NASA as
a whole, and to _ontrol significant variations frcml the t leadquarters'
approved Proje_.t Plan. Each has a critical and specitic role to perform.
The roles are sometimes conlticting, but. in the positive sense, they are
mutually supporting and, when pertormed concctly, constitute a critical
axis of relationships.
THE FORMAL PROJECT REVIEW AND APPROVAL SYSTEM
The Project Approval I)ocument (PAl)) (on>fitutes tim principal
element in the agency-wide review and aplm_val s_stcm. No project has
operational status ttntil the Administrator has put his signature on the
PAD. It contains a broad description o[ the projc{t, what it is to
accomplish, specific tectmical goals, how it fits into NASA's program in
general, bow it will be organized and managed, s_bedule and principal
milestones tor measuring progress, the estimalcd b_dget for its entire
life cycle, and facilities and personnel requiled. 'lhe PAD is the re-
sponsibility of the program office concerned (e.g., OSSA or OART), but
the planning, data collecting, and development ol the PAD usually are
the result of a joint venture between the lfe,_dquarlers division having
substantive cognizance (e.g., OSSA's Physics and Astronomy I)ivision)
and the field installation which has been condmting preliminary studies
and to which it is proposed to assign the project (e.g., Goddard Space
Flight Center). The PAD receives a thorough technical and management
review by both program and functional otti¢cs in NASA Headquarters.
After approval by the Administrator, i_ constitutes a "(onlract" between
NASA executive management and the initiating lnoglam otfice (e.g.,
OSSA) on the technical objectives, schedule, financial resources, and
management plan of the project.
The Project Plan is a much more detailed _ersion of the PAD. It
is prepared by the field installation (usually the project manager and
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his stall) assigned tile project for approval by the Associate Admin-
istrator (e.g., OSSA). A draft Project Plan usually is the basis for
writing tile PAD. The Project Plan is reviewed carefully within the
field installation responsible for tile project, as it is in tile Headquarters
program office to which it is directed. Project Plans receive close atten-
tion fi'om line managers and functional organizations in the field
installation and NASA l Ieadquartcrs. Upon approval by the Associate
Administrator the Project Plan constitutes the "contract" between
NASA Headquarters (e.g., OSSA) and the field installation (e.g.,
Goddard) for the project.
During the course of a project its progress is monitored closely by
various levels at both the field installation and NASA Headquarters;
the PAD and the Project Plan are used as bases for assessment. When-
ever some problem necessitates a change in either the PAD or the
Project Plan, that daange must be reviewed and approved by the same
process used in establishing the project,
At critical points during the life of a project, detailed technical
reviews are conducted to expose any problems or potential malfunc-
tions before committing the project to the next step. These reviews
draw on tile principal managers directly involved in the project from
[Ieadquarters (tim l_rogram manager) ; the field installation (the project
manager and Iris principal assistants) ; the contractor (his project man-
ager and assistants); and technical specialists in testing, reliability,
quality control, electronics, mechanics, thermal systems, propulsion
systems, and communications from ohtside the project organization;
or other specialists pertinent to the particular project and its stage of
development at the time of the review, tlere the Project Plan, test
resuhs, and experimental data will be the principal points of reference.
Where problems are revealed, it becomes the project manager's re-
sponsibility to demonstrate to his field installation management and
the program manager that the problems are being solved effectively.
Each person involved in these reviews represents a particular technical
or managerial competence and perspective. None can satisfy his interests
full),; each must compromise. A great deal of energy and skill are re-
quired to solve problems arising in these reviews so that there is only
necessary compromise, and the interests of each specialist are served as
much as possible.
VARIATIONS IN NASA PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
No two projects in NASA are identical in organization o1" manage-
ment. This study took as its ntodel, if onl_ for a convenient point of
reference, tile space flight project as found in OSSA. The following
chapter uses a hypothetical tiight project to describe the project system
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more graphically. Most of tile organizational and managerial differences
from one project to another can be attributed to one of or a combina-
tion of these four variables:
1. The IIeadquarters program office to which it is assigned--for ex-
ample, OSSA pla_es technical and managerial responsibility in the
prograul manager, while this varies in OART.
2. The fieht installation to which the project is assigned--the man-
agement enviromnent differs [roln one installation to another.
3. The type of project (space tlight, aeronautics, ground-based ex-
perinlent, or other)--there is even substantial difference in satellites
and launch vehicles among space flight project._.
4. How the work is accomplished--it could be totally under contract,
totally within a NASA laboratory, or some combination of tile two.
The concept of project management is certainly not new with NASA,
Project management is probably as old as major public construction
projects like the erection of the pyramids by the Great Pharaohs of
Egypt. NASA, however, has developed some featmes unique to its type
o[ project iuanagement.
First, NASA _onsciously structured the broad concept of project man-
agement into its general management organization. NASA's manage-
ment systems are virtually identical to the stru¢tm e and control systems
for tnojects.
Second, NASA management has recognized structurally within the
project management system the differing roles of the central agency
(NASA Headquarters) and those where the responsibility for daily
operations is vc_ted (the NASA field installations).
Third, NASA endeavored to develop a system whkh facilitated the
timely and successful attack on technical problems by any available
competence ir_espettive of whether that competence was located in a
particular field installation, contractor organizatiun, or university.
The result could be described as an accommodation of technical
innowition, decentralized project decision making, and adequate project
control within the context of general agency goals and responsibilities,
The essence has been a kind of ethos of proje¢t management which has
permeated the organization from the Offite of the Administrator
through the field organizations.
2. Project "Cosmic'°mThe Evolution
of a NASA Space Flight Project
Tint NASA sYs1l-xl for organizing and managing projects varies flora
project to ploject, though there are common elements in all. Project
"Cosmic" is a h)pothctical example ol a large space llight project in
OSSA. It is typical I)ecause it represents the kind o[ scientific space tlight
project undertaken in OSSA. Cosmic serves here as a model o[ how the
management system generally operales--h'om project _onception
through the first ltight--on those major projects which are subject to
the Project Approval l)ocunient i)rocess.
The project passes through stepped phases, involving conceptualiza-
/ion, study, preliminary design, engineering design, and development---
each with illcreasing detail and broader review, to tap the/Jest available
talents and to avoid both technical and managerial errors. The process
also is designed to keep projects aligned with NASA goals, within
available resources, and to preclude unnecessary or unwitting prematme
commitment to particular courses of action.
Assume that one of NASA's long-range goals in its Lunar and Plane-
tary Program (located in OSSA) is the collection and analysis of
geophysical and other measurements of the major planets in our solar
system. A number of Goddard Space Flight Center scientists recently
have completed some theoretical studies about the planet Mercury.
They are interested in pursuing further analyses on how geophysical
measurements of Mercury might be taken. These scientists have been
in touch with scientific staff members of the Lunar and Planetary
Programs Office of OSSA.
THE INITIAL STEPS
Recognizing that there is indigenous interest at Ooddard for pur-
suing these analyses, and having discussed the question informally with
the Director of Goddard, the Director for Lunar and Planetary Pro-
grams asks the Director of Goddard to undertake a preliminary analysis
(Phase A) of how NASA might, through a space flight project, send
either a prohe or an orbiting satellite to Mercury to conduct geo-
physical measurements. The Director of Goddard appoints a study
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director and, with lfim, assigns eight other scientists and engineers to
the study team, including the two scientists who completed the earlier
theoretical work. At the time of selecting tile study director, the Di-
rector of Goddard has in mind an individual who will welcome the
technical challenge of leading such a study team and who can head
a fullblown project, if the early analyses prove favorable. In this case,
the man selected to head the study team is spacecraft manager of a
geophysical observatory satellite project which is being completed.
At about the same time, the Director for Lunar and Planetary
Programs in OSSA assigns a member of his staff for liaison with the
Goddard study group. He discusses his selection with the Director of
Goddard in an attempt to avoid an undue clash of personalities and to
assure as smooth a working relationship as possible. If the preliminary
analysis is favorable, this liaison officer may become the program man-
ager.
The purpose of Phase A (four defined phases in Phased Project Plan-
ning) is to look at alternate overall project approaches or concepts for
accomplishing a NASA technical objective, s It is aimed at identifying
those project approaches which are worthy of further refinement, as
well as defining such project elements as facilities, operational and
logistic support, needed advanced research or technology development
--generally determining whether or not the mission is feasible and
worthy of further definition. Phase A preliminary analyses are nearly
always conducted in NASA field installations by NASA personnel, with
some occasional, supplementary contract help if necessary.
THE START OF A PROJECT
The preliminary analysis proves favorable. The Goddard manage-
ment approves the study team recommendation for a project proposal
to establish a project formally and proceed to Phase B. Phase B is the
definition stage, which involves detailed study, comparative analysis,
and preliminary systems design.
The study team leader works informally with the OSSA liaison officer
in the development of the project proposal and of the PAD. The liaison
officer completes the drafting of the PAD and supervises coordination
of it with other program divisions in OSSA; with other Headquarters
operating offices, such as OART and the Office of Tracking and Data
Acquisition (OTDA) ; and with Headquarters functional offices, such
as the Office of Organization and Management. Once the PAD has been
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Space Science
and Applications, it goes to the Associate Administrator for Organiza-
tion and Management, whose office ensures that all necessary coordina-
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tion and approvals have been completed. It is then submitted to the
NASA Administrator for his decision.
Upon approval, the PAI) is the written authorization to begin the
new project Cosmic. It outlines the resources assigned to tile project;
specifies the field installation, Goddard (usually, as in this case, the
installation specified is the one where the preliminary analysis was
accomplished); and defines the number of spacecraIt, type of launch
vehicle, and plan for the allocation of funds and manpower. It also
specifies the particular constraints within which the program office has
to operate. This PAD is for the Phase B effort only; it will be reviewed
annually in conjunction with the NASA operating budget, related
closely to the budget cycle, in essence, the PAD is the contract between
the Associate Administrator for OSSA and the Administrator of NASA.
Upon this formal authorization, a Cosmic program manager is named
within the Lunar and Planetary Programs Office, and a Cosmic project
manager is designated by the Director of Goddard. The project manager
assembles the skeleton of a project team from operating divisions and
other projects, and the project team proceeds to develop the necessary
specifications for study contracts which will provide data for the NASA
in-house analysis to determine whether or not to proceed further with
the project. The I'hase B analysis includes estimated schedules and
resources through total project completion. The project team works
closely with those representing major project functions such as tracking
and data acquisition, launch vehicle, reliability and quality assurance,
and launch operations. Even at this early stage, it is important to
develop a wide network of informal and formal relationships to provide
the necessary planning lead-tilne for equipment manufacture or modifi-
cation (including facilities), ground testing of major components or
systems, and launch operations. (At the conlpletion of Phase B, usually
less than ten percent of the total project costs have been incurred.)
The Phase B definition efforts result in a Project Plan for Cosmic.
It is a detailed plan for implementing the project, outlining the tech-
nical specifications, manpower, funds, the management plan, schedules,
milestone charts, tracking and data requirements, and launch operations
needed to meet the project objectives. The project manager directs the
group preparing the Project Plan, with advice and assistance from the
program manager.
Upon approval by the Director of Goddard and the Associate Ad-
ministrator I_or OSSA, this Project Plan becomes the contract between
the program office and the installation for the project. After the issuance
of the Project Plan, the financial resources are made available formally
from the NASA Administrator to the Associate Administrator of OSSA
through the issuance of a NASA Form 506 (Green) with the resource
allocation made by the Associate Administrator to Goddard by NASA
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Form 506 (White). These docmnents (the I'AD, the l)roject Plan, and
tile 506 Green and White) constitute the [nincipal authorizing and
resource allocation docunlents ill project management.
Now that Cosmic is torlnally recognized, it is picked up in the formal
information and control system. For example, the [noject manager
writes a brief Project Manager Report (PMR) tol the Director of
Goddard at least monthly, and then weekl} as 1he ]no iect activities
pick up. 1t he has good rapport with the program manager, he h_rnishes
a copy of that repmt to the program manager. This permits the program
manager to be in a position to act quickly aml with adequate knowledge
i[ the project encounters difficulty. For example, lhc definition study
may have uncovered some unanticipated problem which will require
supporting lesear_h and technology tasks not budgeted previously. The
program manager, forewarned, can start the pr.,t:ss ot obtaining new
funds or reallocating other tunds in support oI the pr_je{t.
The project al_o appears on tim Management Information and Con-
trol System (M1CS), with monthly reports on fina,{ial, schedule, and
technical progress. On the financial and budget _ide, (:osmic activities
begin to appear in the Project Operating Plan (l'()P), a financial
review ,rod budget request system which leeds into the NASA operating
budget and the budget cycle on a semi-annual ba_i_. The POP includes
detailed project items down to the work-unit level, or those having a
cost of $5{i(}0 or more. This means that it is l)ossibh_ to track the progress
on a finan(ial obligation basis at the systems stI[)s}rslcIltS, lll;Jjor corll-
portent and wolk-unit levels, depending upon lhC need fol detail.
COSMIC ENTERS THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT,
AND OPERATIONS STAGES
By the time the Phase B definition studies trove been completed,
considerable updating and changing IlltlSt be dOriC ill the Project Ap-
proval Doctm_ent. This requires going ba(k tbr_nzgh the PAD review
process and receiving approval for the technical, s(hedule, managerial,
and resource changes. The PAD which emerges lit)ill this process may
include authorization only for Phase C (design). ol tor both Phase C
and Phase D (development and operations). MoJc_ontla_torpersonnel
are now involved in the detailed engineerin_ design, development of
mock-ups and critical components, and the virtual completion of de-
tailed specitications on all the major s)stems aiR{ subsystems of the
Cosmic spacecralt.
During Phase B, OSSA solicited potential experiments and selected,
through tompetition, those experiments considvred most appropriate
for the three proposed flights of Cosmic. The design phase includes the
more detailed design and integration studies of those experiments
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,_electcd lot tlight. Upon completion ot the design :rod supporting
stt,dies I)y various (ont):,ttors, the l)rojett teztm--supplenacnted by
systems or sul)systeuts exl)erts front other lZUts of Goddard or fl'om
other NASA tiehl installations--pertorn_s an analysis and develops a
Request For Proposal (RFP). The RFP prescribes the perlormante
specilh:,,tions for contractor proposals to tmdertake final hardware
design and development, lalnication, tcsl, ;llld pro.iect operations.
Throughout lllis period the project manager has one pri,_cipal stalt
member who fa<ilit,ltes <oor<linatio,i between the project and the
experimenters (including those in university laboratories). A second,
the launth vehicle manager, is resl)onsil)le for liaison and exchange of
information with the launch vehicle I)rojett manager on the modifica-
ti(m of the latmch vehMe (an Atlas-Centaul) to meet the proposed
three tlights. In this case, the laun(h vehicle project manager is at the
Lewis Research Center, requiring i,_ter-installation liaison. An Un-
manned Lzmnch Ol)crations representative from Cape Kennedy pard(i-
pates in planning and disct,ssions on modifications in the launch
equipntent, the kinds of resources to be provided for spacecraft prepara-
tion and testing at the Cape, and UllUsual ]attach. tlacking, and safety
requirements. Another proje¢t team member works with the .Jet Pro-
pulsion Laboratory's I)cep Space Network, which handles the tracking
and data acquisition on deep sp:,ce probes. Again, inter-installation
liaison is called for, involving the prep:mttion of requirements docu-
ments and negotiating modfications based on technic:d, financial, and
management considerations.
As the spacecralt fabrication proceeds, the project manager and team
members spend a great deal of time in design and test reviews, visits
to contractor plants, and conferences dealing with problems uncovered
by quality assurance checking, component testing, and systems integra-
tion. Meanwhile, the program manager keeps daily tabs on the general
progress of the project, lie develops statements and other backup
material for each annual lmdget cycle; he keeps the project "sold"
within NASA, to tile Ottice of Management and Budget, and, ultimately,
to the congressional authorizing and appropriating committees.
Over the course of tile project, up to the first launch, both the pro-
gram and project managers participate in a variety' of scheduled formal
reviews designed to avoid major mistakes by catching errors at critical
points in the life of a project. The usual series of reviews is as follows:
1. Conceptual 1)esign Review occm's at the end of tile study phase
to evahtate the preliminary design and the design approach.
2. Detailed l)esign Review occurs after the design is frozen and belore
assembly; its emphasis is on the design approaches and plans for systems
and prototype testing.
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3. Flight Qualific:,tion Review octurs alter Ihc _lualili_ation testing of
tile protot)pc Sl)a_ctr'alt to deternfinc the qu;dilitation status of tile
hardware and to evaluate tile tlight a{tcpt;mte tcnl plallS.
•t. Flight P.e;tdiuess Review occurs beIolc IIw s])acctralt is shipped
to the range', , it emphasizes pertormantc u[ the sl):.ctlatt dming ac-
ceptance testing v '
5. Flight Operatiol_s Review occurs when the tlight .pcrations plan is
ready; it cvalt/ales the plan lot orbital opctali,ms ;rod the interface
between the sp;.e_ratt and grotmd-stq)polt cquipnlcm.
Numelous other reviews may be held for p;irli_t,l;u subsystems or
ftmctions. For example, several leview_ are tondmtcd to deternline the
state of readiness of lhe conmmnications nctwo_ ks, g_otmd slations, and
the SUl)porting pc_s¢mnel and equipment. The lic/d installation group
responsible for s}stcms reliability (reliability and quality assurance)
sponsors a series ot formal design _cviews to :tsstuc the etfectiveness
of the Ovmadl program of design, testing, rcliabilit,,, and quality assur-
ance activities. There also may be _eviews th:_t fotus upon financial,
contratting, or other administrative issues.
Finally, the project manager comes to the tirst launch of the Cosmic
spacecratt. The NASA project manager, unlike his industrial counter-
part, carries the management lesponsilfility tor all aspects of his project
trom its plamfing tlnougll the fabrication and inteV,,ation of the space-
craft and its experiments, to tire successful laun{h into the desired
orbit, the subsequent acquisition of data flora the experiments and
ultimate disposition or use of that data. No industrial project manager
working on a NASA project has such broad responsibility.
Gathered at the lamtch are: (l) the NASA launch team, consisting
of the Unmanned Launch Operations Groul). Kennedy Space Center;
(2) the NASA project manager and membms ot his staff, who have
responsibility for this specific mission, and who wish to see tire success-
ful orbiting of their spacecraft; (3) the Ns\SA program manager, repre-
senting NASA lleadquarters' interests in the mission; (4) the Launch
Vehicle Manager, who is the NASA project manager for the particular
rocket being used to boost tim spacecraft imo orbit; (5) the principal
investigators, whose experiments are being flown cm this mission; (6)
the prime contractor and associate contr:lctors who tabricated the space-
craft and the e:q)eriments; (7) tbe prime contractor and associate con-
tractors who built the launch vehicle; and (8) representatives of the
Air Force, which operates and controls the two prm<ipal long distance
rocket ranges (Eastern Test Range at Cape Kennedy, Florida, and
Western Test Range at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California).
Both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft are inspected and tested
by contractor and supervising NASA launch personnel. The spacecraft
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is "mated" atop tile launth vehicle and final tests run. As the count-
down l)roceetls over ,t peliod of two to lottr d,lys, :lily Of tile principals
(tile Latmctl Oper,_tions I)ire(tor from tile Unmanned Launch Opera-
tions (;rtmp, the Latmch Vehicle Ma/lager who is responsible for the
rocket, and the Spi_cecraft Project Manager) can hold the countdown
il_ order to chetk or recheck any anomaly which has not been satisfac-
torily explzdned or torrected. In the last few moments before launch,
however, only the project manager has the authority to make the final
irrevocable decision to go. With that decision may rest the success or
the laihne of the mission,
The point of ignition and liftoff of the launch vehicle is truly an
emotional experience, ;ts is the nerve-racking interval between the time
tile launch vehicle disappears down range and the time when the space-
craft is injected into orbit or satisl'actorily placed on the first leg of its
jotnney to another planet. All unusual events are recorded and analyzed
and a follow-ttp review is carefully conducted so that problems or fail-
ures will not be repeated a second time. It is at these points of difficulty
or failure when the vast, complex documentation system proves to be
most useful. It determines exactly what happened, and when, where, and
why it occurred.
When the Cosmic I spacecraft is in its proper orbit, the communica-
tions ;_re working, and the scientific instruments are returning usable
data, the project m:mager turns his principal attention to the detailed
preparations for the flight of Cosmic ll--now in the early fabrication
stage. Yet he must also keel ) an eye on the operation of Cosmic I and
its return of data to the experimenters, as well as those design changes
for Cosmic lll stimulated by the experience with Cosmic 1.
3. ProgramManagement in the Office of Space
Science and Applications
'I'm.:pI<_¢_x\, v,xN.x(;i.:i_sclxcs as the focal point IoI all OSSA I-lead-
quarters a_ti_i,_ I)e,,ing directly on 1he project oi ploic_ts his program
¢omp_i_cs. !lc sc_vcs a varic U ol _ole_. He is tbc p_ie_ts's ,_mrogate in
NASA I lcadqu:ulcls, lespousible lot representing the project in the
processes o[ decision making and rcsomcc a[lo_ati,m, and protecting
the best intcrc_ts of tile project, hl _l_is same r_,lc dw program manager
is lc_pm>ildc tot prClr, u'ing testimony, St,l)povling do_umeiltation, and
similar matelia] tor such dc_ision p,fints inside aml _n_tside NASA as
tile ,\snot iatc :\dlllilliStliltOl o[ OSS.\, tile ()ttit t' (JI ()lganizatiol_t and
Management, the NASA Administ_atol, the Execuli_e Ottice of th.e
President, and Congress. The proglanl mana e,el still in this role, serves
its ;| [.illleI\ SOUl(C o[ [ll]Ollll;Iti{lll alld ad\i{c _b, mt congressional or
to/) management actions on the project's p_oq_ctls, and about how
pressure nlight be applied by the l)ivi,sion l)i_c{to_ o_ Jield installation
director with beneficial results.
A second important role o1 the t)ro_ram manaRe_ is l}lat of lhe princi-
])al l|ead(luartcrs monitor and inspector on Ill;_t proicct for top NASA
nlanageruettt. In this role, the program managc_ keeps in daily touch
with I}lc progress of the projc(t, i_(']u(ling ti_m.-ial _ta_us; he __ritically
reviews _eques_s horn tile proje(t m:mage_, _i:_ the field installation
director, |or changes in schedule, [unding, ln.je_t (.,bjectives, space(ra{t
or vehicle performance, and other te(hni_al or mam_gerial standards
which are controlled by NASA }leadquartcrs. t lerc the program man-
ager carefully reviews the reqtte_t, based upon his intimate contact
with the project, and proposes recommendations tot a_tion to his l)i-
vision Director and the Associate .\dmi_fist_ator to_ decision and action.
Once tile decision has been made, it be¢_m_es tile prograln manager's
responsibility to do the stat[ wolk necessarx [or execution o[ the de-
cision.
In responding to the demands of these sometimes tontradictory roles,
the ptograln manager is expected to maintain his l)Vrsl)ective--neither
to become a captive of the project, ignoring broader NASA goals, nor
to try to lun the project from Headquarters. In none of this activity
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does the l)rogr:tm manager have the independent organizational au-
thorit} to decide an issue requiring NASA l lead(tu,ntcrs de¢i,qon, or
to give [olmal dire(lions to the ticld installation direttor or the project
manager. Each instance o[ lormal ddegatiou or direction from Head-
quarters requirc_ the signature el his Division Director (e.g., the 1)irec-
tor t0r lmnar and Planetary Programs) or thz,t el the Associate Ad-
ministlator. In the formal sense, the lnogram manager fills a staff
rather than a line lUnction. Ills du,H roles of project re/nesentative
in 11ead(luarters an(1 1 iea(lquarlcrs project re(miter can I)esl be fulfilled
if he sees himself as a l leadqu:tvtets metal)or of the proje(t team who
(onsistently seeks the best interests of the project, while understanding
alld apple(taring broader NASA objettives.
THE OSSA PROGRAM MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE, 1971
NASA's OSS.\ is headed hy an Associate Administrator, SUpl)orted by
a Principal Deputy and 1)eputy Asso(iate Administrators {or Science ;trial
[or Applications. The organizatiou consists o[ six "line" or l)rogram -
matic divisions (Laun(h Vehi(le and l'tol)ulsion l'vogv;m>, Plauetary
Programs, l'hysics and Astronomy l'loglams, Earth ()l)scrvations Pro-
grams, Communications Programs, and Apollo Lunar Exploration), an
Adv:mced Programs (;roup, and a I'rogram Review and Resources
Management Group _esponsible for fin;w, cial analysis, program report-
ing and tomrol servi(es, and admini._trative support. Figm'e 2 shows the
management structure of OSSA in 1971; it does not show Ileadquarters
institutional management responsibility h)r (;oddard Space l:light Cen-
ter, Jet Propulsion l,d)oratory, :rod Wallops Station. The Apollo
Ltmar Exploration l)ivision leports jointl} to the Office el Space
Science and Applications and to the Office o[ Manne(1 Space Flight. A
Sl)ace S(ience and Apt)lications Steering Committee, chaired by the
Deputy Assodate Administrator for Sticn(e, acts as a screening and
recommending body in the selection o[ experiments to be tlown aboard
OSSA flight projects.
Each of tile OSSA prograln (livisions contains flight pro_'ams related
to a (ommon objective. The division is responsil)le for an integrated
program of llight projects, research, an(I other activities 1elated to the
program area. In addition to the program manager, the division con-
tains the scientific discipline groul)s primarily serving the division's
programs, an advanced programs and technology group, and a small
program review and resources management group.
The Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications is
the |Ieadquarters manager responsible [or three o[ NASA's field in-
stallations: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight Cen-
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FXC.U_E 2,--Management structure of the Office of Space Science and Applications, 1971.
ter, and Wallops Station. The Director of each of these is responsible
to the Associate Administrator.
In a program and project managetnent structure typical of OSSA (See
fig. 3.), the formal line of authority flows from OSSA to the installation
director (here Goddard Space Flight Center), to the Assistant Director
for Projects, to the project manager (here the Applications Technology
Satellite (ATS) project manager), to the ATS systems managers, and to
the Principal Contractor. In a legal sense, the authority relationship
with the contractor is from the Goddard Space Flight Center contract
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I
FIc, tT_E 3.--A typical OSSA program and project management structure, taken from
the Applica|ions Technology Satellite (ATS) program. (Modified from OSSA
Program Review Documel_t, June 22, 1967, p. 23)
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otficer to the torl)oration holding the contlnet hn :\IS and thence to
the COlltI-,ICIOI"S oWII p_oject office.
In actual practice, the Associate Administrat,n (lelcgatcs to the op-
erating divisions within OSS.\ the aulhoJitv m ;,t to_ him on pro-
grams falling within their jm-isdietion. In the [ig,urc 3 example, the
Director o[ Communications Programs has tli_cclivc attthority over
Goddard Spate 1,'light Center (signing lot the .\s_ocialc .\dmini_trator)
on those matters affecting the .\TS plogtam. The .V1S ptogram man-
ager arts ;is the princip,d stall man and assi_laHI t_ the Director of
Commmlicatio_s Programs in (avl}iE_g out these _c,spolJsibilities (and
will commonl) excrtisc a sttl)stantial, it not detelmining, intluence on
the l)irector's dccision_). Nornlally, the l)lO_l:m_ manager works in-
[Ol'ltla[ly Oil it d,lil} basis dire(d} with his (oumcllmlt at t}lc Goddard
Space l:light Center, the A'IS project manager. lhe i)logram manager
receives SUl)po_t and assistantc flora his i)t_)g_am _¢icntist (not netes-
saril) in his lnogram office), who is skilled in Ihc,ii_ipline related to
the principal s¢ientific nlis_ion ol his projc(t. lhe ])logram scientist
assists in liaison with expclimcntels itlld lllOllilOl ", plt)glCbS toward the
scientific goals oi the project.
REPORTING AND CONTROL IN OSSA
Figure ,t graphi(ally characterizes the man;i_en.:ut _)stem govmning
delegation, rcj)olting, and communications ill the ().',S.\ plograln nlan-
agement s},qcm. lhc left arrow (pointing down) illustrates the delega-
tion ol authorit_ and the disscminatioll o[ iuslltttti,ms from level to
level in the process ol program excct,tion. The .\dministrator delegates
authorit'y to OSSA (the Associate Adndtlislral,n) xi;/ the formal OSSA
full(:lJol_s alld authority slatcmel_t (NMI ]lNS. Jl_) ;rod through the
PAl) on spccili( projects. Resources arc allo( atcd t_ ()NS.X (the plogram
man',_gemcnt level or Level 1) by NASA l",)_m 5_16 (Green). (The
e\d/zlJnJ_lialov nlay rcscrxc lov himselt lilt azztlloiJl) 1ot solzrcc selection
in the (aseot m;tior flight program proi tttelllCnts.) "lhc PAD acts as the
contract 1)ctwccu the Administrator and ON,h,\ [¢_I a pa_litular program.
The PAl) ou_liuc_ l_rOgram ohjecd_cs, gcnc_al tc(hni(al >[)ccifi(ations
and operations, lnitlla_C]llCllt ;u r;mgcmc,ns, and lin;_u¢ ial and personnel
rcsomccs to a¢(omplish the l)rOg_am objectives.
(.)SSA delegates authority to t/it fit:hi iu>tallalion lh_(mg/i the Project
Plan, whith is similar to the PAD but mole dci:dh'(I tcclmi(ally and
tinau(i:dly, h)¢usin,g upon project execution. 1 he l'lojcet Plan con-
stitulc> the tonlla(l with the tic/t[ insti_llation, whi(h bc(omcs _esponsi-
bit tof t]w /,ojc(t. 'lhe Project Plan is used, in lurn, at the field
installation l, ojcet management level (l_cxcl 2) as the contractual
instrument with other NASA installations whc_c the\ act its s)stcms
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managers. OSSA allocates resom-(-es for the execution of a project to the
field installation through NASA Form 50{i (D/bile), This resource
allocation follows no set pattern; it is an administrative device to
release funds for hmger or shorter periods, depending upon OSSA's
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26 PROJECT ]_IANAGEMENT IN NASA
confidence in the project manager or field installation with respect to
willingness or capability to carry out the proglam pl:m. Finally, the
commercial contract is the instrument for &'legating 2esponsibility to
the principal contractors working on the flight project.
The middle arrow (pointing upward) illustr;ites the formal report-
ing system used in OSSA program management. Contractors report
to the systems managers and project managms at the field installation
financially through NASA Form 533, and with _cspect to technical,
managerial, and schedule elements through va_iou_ Program Evaluation
and Review Technique (PERT) or milestone lcporting systems.
The Ihojcct Operating Plan is the financi;d management document
used from the major systems management level ttp through OSSA to
report funding history and [unding _equircm,nts oI a project from
inception to _ompletion. It represents budget _equJrements, both
commitment and obligation projections, by month tot the current year,
by quavtm for the following fiscal )'e;u', and by fiscal )ear for the
succeeding [our years.
The principal reporting system in the IHanagcntent o[ programs is
the Management Information and Control Sxstcm. This reporting
system summarizes technical, managerial, and iinan( ial status; problems;
and prospects, compared to the Project Plan baseline. It is put together
at the project manager's level and submitted by him (using a common
format) as the Project Manager's Report to the installation director
where it is reviewed, perhaps modified, and sent to ()SSA for analysis
and review. The MICS is more than just an iMo_-m;_tion system because
it carlies with it recommendations and rcqtlc,',ls [Ol the project manager
to each succeeding level for the authority to take those steps considered
necessary in the pmsuit of the proje<t for which the _equesting level
lacks the needed authority or resour_cs.
In addition to the formal written system ot reporting, there is an
extensixe stoles ot [ormal management meetings, t:o_ example, weekly
management meetings are heht at all levels lrom that o[ the Administra-
tor (Level 0) down to the project m,magement o1 to the systems manage-
ment levels. Such meetings in NASA HeadquaJtels Irequently use tile
MICS Iormat ;is the basis for reviewing inoglam status. Once each
month OSS.\ {onducts a full day of p_oje_ sJatus reviews: this is
followed by :l similar though shorter meeting at the Administrator's
level. Program managers represent ()SSA nt ploje(t qu;irtcrly progress
reviews, project design reviews, and other _titical project meetings.
Fovm;d reporting also takes the l¢nm of co_esp, mdcnce and memo-
randa from the (ontrz_ctor to the project m;itl:tg(T, , hom the project
lnzlnligel tO the installation dire(tor, lronl the inMilllatioll dive{tor to
the l)rOgr;Im dileltor or .kssociatc ,\dministtatot [ol OSSA. The in-
tovrnal _stcm ot icporting valics 11otll ptojc{t _o ploject; it is the
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pzincipal me:ms hw the quick passing of data, pioblems, and sugges-
tions back and forth between tile program and projc_t management
levels, llere the ihiel niezlns is the telcl)hone (oliversation, followed
closely by illfOrlll;li l;itc-to-tate lneetJllgs _lllll vi,_its.
,Mthoug, ll tilt' I'OP and the MICS llcquently serve ,is Ihe principal
refereiice i)ohlts in lel)Olihlg and tomilninhathig lietwcen tile lirogialil
and lnoielt lc_els, inm>t hlhnnlation {s passed outshlo o[ tile [ornlal
lines, _)[ ,lutholity. 1;of cxanli)lc, lilost ()l tile iniollllatioll llowing hc-
tween tile l)lojcll lll,illa<_-Cl ,llld tile ])l_/)gr,lln lil{lllilgor |lows directl)
rattier liiiill tlllOli_4h the toinl;i| chaiii el (oninl;ind. A piogr;iin iii,inager
hequently llas in[l/llllitlil/ll ;llJotit ;i projc(i prolJhqll iicl01e the director
of tile field inst;i]l;ltion wiiere the projeit is lol;itcd, it is not illltlSllal
fol the project in;lii;iger, lnoviding lie /l<l_ a (:liisc iiiid ainiziblc working
leiation_llip with the pro<g-i;iill in;ill;ig, ei, to _Cllll the ilrogr;iili inan;lgcr
copies el the project iiliili_i_Cl'S weekly lepolt lit tile S;liilC time it goes
forward within his OWII Ol'gillli,':3til)ll. This gives the lle,ldquarters
[)rogr_ilil lll_lll_l<ger _lil opl)oitunity 1o review the le[Jolt lllore ttioroughiy,
to seek (hllili/ation or addiihJnal iniorlnation intolinaliy and to be well
l)repared to lnilkc :i (_tse (ill behalf (if tile project hi _.onjun(tion with
tile l)roje<:t lllRililg, Cl. O117 SellhJr OSSs\ nlallltgcl ohservcd that progranl
,ind projcct illalla<g(,is frequently team up against fiehl installation
llllin_igeilient or i It, adqUaltcrs top lnlin',lgenlent.
The MICS is illsl) a vahiable leedb<lck device; the lnontilly MICS re-
port not only c,lrries tile snlnlllitry status of tile various projects and
their principal problenls but, at Level 1, indicates what action was
taken. These reports are sent back to the respective fiehl installation
and project offices where they lan serve as docunlentary confirmation
and a reference point for further action.
4. ProgramManagementin the Office of
Advanced Researchand Technology
()AWl" msl())(i(:.xl.[,Y HAS m:PEXl)H) H'O.',' the NASA ticld installations
for much o[ the initialive in plOposin_ llcw st:ul_ _)_ (hzmged directions.
This man;,gcmcnt appro;_(h glew out of the _t)lc <,_ ,)l><:tatiot_ common
to N,\C,\. wh()_c htbovatoties l)ccame the OAI>,I installations. UpOll
the creation ()t NAS:\ and. the sul)se(lttcllt th:muc in emphasis from
aeronautits to Sl);tte, OART becatnc lhC lnin(il):d lleadqualtcrs of
ganization idcntiticd with {o))tinuing i)l(>,l Ot tl)c NACA work.
The major-it\ ot O.\I>,T activities ave dcvol(2tl 1() lclafixelv low-cost
tasks compared to the space ttight ploie(ts c)i ()S";.\. (),\RT has cog-
nizance (:)ve_ some ,i0()0 research and tcchnol(Jgx lask,,, 111o',,,I.OI which
;.ae c()mh_cled in lhc labor;)tories and tatJli)ies ¢)t N\S.\ fic]d installa-
tions. Onlx lal'et_ do experiments or invcsti_ztlions g_(,w to the size
where projc(t-tst)(: m:tnagemcnt 1)roves usclul. "Ihi., does occur: (1)
when :m :tttixit\ is (arricd to tile proot-()f-(o)_CCl)t 'qage and a major
system ,)r llighl _chicle is built in full s(alc to lest it; (2) where
ground-hascd cXlmlimcnls arc inadequate ;tnd t}wx _)_ust I)e ltown on a
spacecrat.t to ,tcc()ml)lish thci_ ptup()sc; ol (!;) whine, ill the field ot
aeronautics, llight tc,ts ave essential to a<hi<'x< ¢_c propose of tile
investigations. In suth instances, the tonl])lc×il\ and t()sts t)f the ae-
search effort sul)stantially expand, and ().\RI' ma\ institute a lorm
o[ project-type m;magcment.
OART ORGANIZATION, 1970
Until O(tobct- 26, 1970, ()ART was o)g:mizc<l it_u) seven l)rogram
divisions, a I)tt)grall/s and Resources Division. _t _Ii,,,i(m Analysis Di-
vision, a Spctial I)v()grams Olti(e, and a Sl)a(t' Nutlear Propulsion
()tii(_e. (See fig. 5; the rc(nganiz:ttion and it,, k)otcntial etlccts are dis-
t ussed later.)
The seven l)roglz)m divisions (Biotc(hnolo:4y :_mI t lmnan Research,
Electroni(s and (5omrol, (_hemital Plopulsio)|, Spate 1)owe) • and Elec-
tric Ptt)lmlsion, SI)a(e Vehicles, ikelonattti(a/ \'chick's, ;.tilt[ Research)
acted princip:)lly as st;d[ arms to the Asso(iatc .\du)iuislrator for plan-
ning, programming, and monitoring lcscalth alld tethnology etlorts
28
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within thc_e l)r(md discipline-oriented areas. In a formal sense, tile
plogvam dixisi(m dire(tots did not have tile atttholitx to direct or control
lese,uth and tcthnology activities at NASA field in_taltatiol_tS. In actual
pratfite, the capatit} el the directors el tlle p_¢,g_am divisions to in-
[[uen(c or (onttol these ,tttivitics at field iu,/allations varied sub-
stantially hom lnOgvam otIite to p_ogram olIitc and lrom field installa-
tion to liehl installation.
The Mis_i,m Analysis Division, located at Ame_ Research Center,
petiovmcd mluh like an adv.:tn(e(t planning operation and general
ev;th,alion group; it had the responsil)ilit) t(_i as>csshtg potential re-
search :ueas :lIld loF coordinating O.\RT elhnts on advanced studies.
The Plograms and Resotu-ces Division hottscd tile plincipal general
m:tnagement funttions for OAR.T in tin,_l_ti,_l m:magcment and of
ganizational mattel_,, including liaisotl pohlts t¢_1 OAI,'T personnel,
contlacting, and other otlice-wide Junctions. I It,.: SlmCe Nuclear Pro-
pulsion Oitice was a .jointly ttttldcd air.| jointl} _t:_lted e[lort "with tile
Atomic l{neJgx (2ommission for the dcxclopm_.J_! of nutlear rotkets.
"File Spe(ial Programs Otlicc had the rcspo,sibilit_ lor ()ART liaison
and st_pfxnt in the area el deteuse lnojc(ts, and also tnoxided ;t central
progtam nt,magemeut locus 1or ()ART sp',t(t: tlight pJojects and space
tlight experiments.
TYPES OF PROJECTS IN OART
OART uses the tormal title "Program Mar_,lgcl"' sparingly. Until the
()ctober 1970 leorganization, there, was no (:lose ()AR.T counterpart--in
the tormal organizational sense--to the typital ()55,\ program manager.
Inste:ld, several variations developed based upon their organizational
roots and tilt! substantive nature of the _c_,pt!ttixc programs. Large
OAKT projects can be classified roughly into one ot tout categories:
(1) space flight projects, (2) aeronautics t)r,,i(tts including flight test.
(3) large glound-based exlmriments, and (t) the space shuttle studies.*
Space Fligh÷ Projects
"I'he s)stem lov handling spate ttight proic'cts, suth as Meteoroid
*No aUempt _as made 1o sur_cy all lalge (ill time m C()S') OART projects. Based
upon discussi,ms with senior OART officials, 16 ploj,._ts wc_,. sclcctcd as the basis for
Ibis stud\. "l'hcx mr': the Melcoroid "lc(hnolog} Sal{llitc (\ITS, Planetary Entry
Palachutc I'rojctt (PEPP), Planetary Atmosphere Entt', It, sis PAET), the Lifting
Beds' YI" 12. X 15, B-70, the Orbiting lqog Otolith ()1, O), SNAP-8, Bra,_t(m C)cle
Engine. ,SER'I" 1I, {]It' Quiet Engine, Noise Reduction ProjccI, Reentry F, the Space
Shutlle, and the Supmcritical Wing, Sc',eral ]algc Inojt'(ts haxe been omitted--
NERVA, the R.\M-C, Large Solid Motor l'rojett, and tlw more reccm SFOL and
ATE[" p_(_g_ams. "]'ht, ptn'posc in this selection _as to (,_xtr the ;ariel', of large
OART programs x_hich might offer important Oues al..mt lhe characteristics of
OARI" pmg_am management to compare with those of OSSY,.
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"Fechnolog 3 Satellite (MTS), evolved within tile Space Vehicles Di-
vision. "l'he lnoad l)log_,un m,m,_gemcnt Imutious were split. The gen-
eral m,magcli,d, tinaucial, aud _hcdulc aspects were handled within
a small managctncnt ollice, and the tc<hnical or scicntilic mission ob-
jectives wcrc t,ndcr the cogniz,mcc of a Technical Associ,ttc or Program
Otficcr. This bifurc,ltcd system o[ progr,ttn management was toutinned
when the small mat_agcntcnt group within the Spate Vehicles Division
I)ecame a part of the ,";pecial Progr,nns Ollitc (SPO).
The division prograul chic[* (sonmtitnes officially called a Technical
Associatc) tttonitms ,J _ollection ol lclatcd suppolting rcseatch and
technology and advamcd lesearth and technology tasks (e.g., in the
MTS, all tasks related to meteoroid hazards). These tasks ma) be
comlu_tcd within the laboratories at various field installations, under
grant or contract managed by an ()ART Proglatn Division, or under
grant or contract managed by tile fiehl installation. The Technical
Associate also monitors the tnission-relatcd technical aspects of those
space flight projects or experintcnts which fall within his :uea of tech-
nical responsibility, l:light CXl)critncnts may be flown on OART, OMSF,
or OSSA sp:tcccraft. In any case, tile progrant chicl's technical interest
is more in the experituents, the data derived lrom them, and tlle data
utilization, than ill tile spacecratt aboard which tile experiments are
carried.
The "l)rogram manager" designated for such spate llight l)lojccts is
located in SPO. Like his Technical Associate cotmtcrpart ill the pro-
gram divisions, tile program ,nat_:,ger will have responsibility [or
handling several ct[orts--in the *ITS case, as many as five or six space
flight projects. His job is to nmnitor the execution o[ the project. He
helps the Technical Associate and the field installation assigned the
project develop the PAD. He ensures that NASA Headquarters' re-
quiretnents 10r tile tnan:,genlet_t plan, schedule elctnents, financial plan,
and technical plan are met in the Project Plan. As is tile case in OSSA,
the Project Plan entails negotiation among the field installation, OART,
and other Headquarters elements. Once the Project Plan is decided
upon and accepted, the progratn manager located ill SPO becotnes the
person responsible within OART for project execution (in the same
sense that a prograna manager in OSSA has staff respo,tsibility for
project execution). Of course, tile project manager ,tt the field installa-
tion has the line authority and responsibility for project execution. To
some extent, once the Project Plan is accepted, the Technical Associate
*For purposes of this study, these program chiefs or Technical Associates were in-
cluded as prog,am managers. They tend to see themselves in that role in spite of the
fact that they do not carry formal responsibility for project execution.
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in the OART proglanl division [unctions like t}lc project scientist in
OSSA.
There are several intportant dillerentes ill this st}le o[ t)rogram man-
agement [rom that o[ OSSA. One o[ tile most lnolninent is that although
SPO has tile responsibility for overseeing proje(t execution following
the acceptance ot tile Project Plan, it is tile lnOu,_:ml dixision, not SPO,
that provides the lunds tor the projett and mu>t juslil} tile use o[ those
funds to the NASA hierarchy, to the Otlite ol Matl:lgcment and Budget,
and, finally, in tile congt'essional autholizalioH and appropriations
processes.
Tile l,'oje(t manager perceives and accepts the ploglanl manager in
SPO as tile lleadqumtcrs management authoril} tol tile project. The
project manager recognizes that hc is expected lo keep in close touch
with tile SP() program manager and to be able to satisfy him on all
aspetts o[ project execution including tosts, project schedule, and tech-
ni(al progress, qhe project manager knows, howcvel, lllat he must sell
not only tilt! SPO program manager, but tile pvogl am division Tedmical
Associate le_l_onsible for tile project, on its ,neliI_ and objectives. Thus
he has two primilxll points ot liaison i1_ NASA l le/id_tua_ lets. "]here is a
_ontinuing liaison between tile SPO plogl,mt nlau:%el on a particular
llight project and tile Technical Associate in the plogl:un division. (See
tig. 6.)
There is one important exception to the general lule that all space
tlight i}roje{ts are handled in this f, lshi{m. l-he 151ling Body t}roject
was h;mdled more like aeronautical test tti-hts: tllc },(_lanl division (at
that time Spate Vehicles Division) kept both tile gcnelal management
alld tile te(htlital management [ttll(tions within lilt: responsibility of
the Program Otticer in the division.
Aeronaulics Proiecfs
This _alew)l } lovers such 1)loje(ts as tilt: YI"-12, the Sulmrclitical
Wing, tile X--IS, tile I{-70, tile Ouict Engine I'logl,lm, and tile Aircra[t
Noise Redu(ti(m Plogr:un. Full m:m:lgement aud te(hni(al resl)onsi-
bilit_ ave ve_ted in the Proglam ()lticcv l(_(atcd within tile program
division. For lmlposcs of this stud}, we ((msi_lt'v him a 1)rogr:un man-
agel, ,thhough his olgalfizational title Ina\ t>e Ihamh (:hiel, Program
Chiei, l'too+:un ()lliter, or Teehnital ()llicer.
}'logr;ml m:ma_evs of ael(m:tuti_s [>l+}jc(ls m:l_ t}o! ])e recognized by
tile [ield installation 1)rojett btat[ as tile tnitl¢ilxll p(_int of contact tor
action. Those in the field installation restxmsible h)l tile project may
look upon .t lhan(h Chiel or Division Dire, to1 ;ts the point to whom
they address leqttests [or specific action, in (,mtl:_st to the point to
whith the_ nut_ dire(t information and lcpo_ts, qhis varies Irom
project to }nojcct, depending upon both the p_:vsoualities o[ the indi-
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viduals involved and the historic organizational development of the
respective program and proiect groups wi/hin OART and the field
installation.
There are no typical paths for information anti decision on such
projects between the field installation and tteadqu.arters. For example,
a project manager may leave tile relationships with OART to his field
installation director, in which case the field installation director may
l ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR ]
DIRECTOR ]FIELD CENTER
1
ASST DIRECTOR ]POWER AN MATERIALS
I
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
DIVISION
SNAP-8
PROJECT MANAGER
KEY:
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l"1*;lgl_ 7.--Diagram of program management rclatio_lshil_s foi aeronautical flight test
and large grouted-based projects.
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work with the program Division Director (e.g., Space Vehicle Division)
or he may work directly with the Associate Administrator or one of
his deputies. Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the program manage-
ment relationships for aeronat, tics projects and large ground-based
projects. It shows the formal organizational relationship and the in-
formal ties which developed in SNAP-8 between the project manager
,rod the OART program manager.
The management of aeronautics projects from the OART program
division level teuds to be informal and persuasive rather than directive.
Schedule is less relevant than on OSSA space flight projects (though it
is not ignored) and reporting tends to emphasize the technical over
schedule and financial considerations. Since these projects are not tied
to launch dates, there is less emphasis on nleeting deadlines. Another
factor which tends to reduce the importance of schedule is the fact that
large contractor efforts rarely are involved. As a result, a substantial
amount of the planning, experimentation, systems work, and testing is
accomplished by NASA personnel at the field installation. Throughout
NASA the Rg:l) budget (i.e., contract money) is separate from the
operational budget of the laboratories (in salaries and maintenance).
The Rg:I) costs represent ,i much smaller proportion for most OART
projects than is the case in large spacecraft projects, so formal reporting
tends to be limited, occmring at less frequent intervals titan on space
tlight projects.
Large Ground-Based Experimenfs
Projects which exemplify this category are large, ground-based experi-
ments such as the SNAP-8 and the Brayton Cycle Engine. As is the case
in the aeronautics projects, the person responsible within the progxam
division has cognizance over both the management and technical aspects.
The fiehl installation-OART relationships tend to follow a pattern
similar to that in aeronautics projects. But betause these are large
grotmd-based experiments involving proof-of-concept and development
hardware, there is more structure to the formal reporting, and greater
importance is given to both schedule and costs. In both of these projects,
unlike most of the aeronautics projects, a modified MICS is used for
reporting.
The Space Shuffle
The space shuttle effort within OART was given formal recognition
through the establishment of a Shuttle Technologies Office. This pro-
vided mganizational identification of tlm elfol't formerly termed the
"Space Transportation System Technology Program," which had been
statled on an addition;d-duty, part-time, or limited-assignment basis.
'lhis program is coordinated closely with the Office of Manned Space
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Flight (()MSI:), where thercquirenmnts were miginall} laid out by an
OMSF task gloup on the space shuttle. OAR'[ had the responsibility tot
providing alteinative solutions for tile space shultte lequilements speci-
tied by OMSF.
The OAR'I" program had three principal objctti_e_: (1) to develop
a body of tedmital inforination to serve as a bast> lot design definition,
configmation selectiou, materials (hoiccs, and lain ic ation methodology;
(2) to provide the teclmical basis tot assessing altclmttives; and (3)
to establish a (adre o[ consuhing experts to guide the development
ettorts. These purposes are similar to those o[ the more typical program
divisions within ()All.T, but they are most to(ttsed: flmy are directed
toward requirement_ to meet an imreasingly bcttcl defined space
transportation s) stem. The space shultle tcchnologic_ program, organiza-
tionally and m;m;_geriall)', tends to lall between the spa{e flight project
and broadel, lcss-detmed advanced re_em{h aml t{{lmologv,. In terms
of the type ol tasks, the program was (oll_cl)llalt'd primarily upon
experimental engineering and advanced development, with some tech-
nology development and some hmdanmlmd rcse:_l(h.
The tnogtam was olgani/ed into a selies ol _,_mJittees which drew
scientists alld engineers with particular skills tlom all the NASA field
installations. The heart of this organization (onsistcd of seven working
groups, each handling a major area of tedmolog} (liti{al to the develop-
ment of tile sp/t(e shuttle. A field installation was given the principal
responsibility for leadership in each ot six ol the working groups. The
groups were: (1) Aerothermodynamics all(] (:Ollfi_urations (Langley),
t2) Structure and Materials (Langley), (3) l)_namics and Aeroelas-
ticity (Langley), (.t) Propulsion (Marshall), (5) Integrated Electronic
Systems (Manned Spacecraft), (6) Biotechnology (fleadquarters), and
(7) Operations Maintenance and SMety (Kemw,lx).
Ea(h o[ these working groups was composed ol approximately 15
experts in the discipline (h-ore those iiTstall:_ti,.m_ wolking in relevant
areas), representatives of other government l:d)or;ttories with related
expertise, and at least one representative ho,n NASA lleadquarters.
Each working group was responsible within its alea for: (1) recom-
mending appropriate technical proglams aud determining requirements
in each discipline involved, (2) carrying out research and technology
programs in-house and under contra(t, (3) re,tailoring and reporting
the In'ogress o{ the work, and (4) disseminating the lcsults and con-
clusions through reports, (on[etences alld cons_Jltatit,ns. The working
groups used sub-panels to accomplish specilic tasks.
A Technology Steering Grou 1) tacilitated toordinatiou among the
working glottps and provided continuity tlndel the general direction of
the Shuttle 'l'ethnologies Otficc. The Steering (;_oup consisted of the
chairmen o[ the seven working groups plus ke_ managers from the
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installations and the NASA Headquarters elements carrying out tile
program. Tile Steering Group attempted to balance programs recom-
mended by working groups within available funds, recommended assign-
ments to field installations, and identified additional tasks or needed
efforts that may have slipped between the boundaries of the seven
working groups.
It should be emphasized that this was a planning, coordinating,
monitoring, and recommending operation. These groups were not in a
position to allocate resources di,e(tly, although they had a substantial
inttuence in that process. The Director of the Shuttle Technologies
Office, acting as program manager for this eltort, was responsible for
budgeting available funds to best fulfill a balanced technology program,
for justifying and defending progranl budgets, for seeking out sources
of necessary funds, for developnmnt future program plans, [or soliciting
field installation responses to program requirements for manpower, for
broadly reviewing the progress of the work, and for coordinating the
technology work with current planning. Ahhongh these efforts were
essentially research and technology efforts, they were more time-con-
strained than similar OART work because their purpose was to develop
solutions within the time reference o[ the OMSF space shuttle program,
which had schedule restraints like those found in other major space
ttight programs. Since this program received significant funding from
OMSF, it required additional coordination and sensitivity to OMSF
user needs in terms of schedule as well as technical parameters.
REPORTING AND CONTROL
Since OART projects represent onl_ a small portion o_ the organiza-
tion's 4000 research tasks, there has been no necd for an OART-wide
project management system. And no such project management system
has been developed, l lowever, some project management systems have
been used in modified forna, and there is a general, though not project-
type, management system in operation for broad reporting and control
purposes.
The PAD as Used in OART
The principal use of the PAD within OART is as the annual au-
thorizing document between the NASA Administrator and the Associate
i\dministrator for Advanced Research and Technology to cover the
general program in each area; this becomes the basis for congressional
authorization. These are broad, discipline-oriented areas, _uch as space
power or electronics. Unlike the PADs for OSSA space tlight programs,
these do not have completion dates; they are of a continuing nature,
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reviewed and amended annually in the pro_ess of the Administrator's
program review.
As in OSSA, the PAD also is used for such space tlight projects
undertaken by OART as the SERT-II. The PAl) se_ves as the contract
between the Administrator and the Associale Administrator [or Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, while a lhojt'ct Plan serves as the
contract between OART and the fiehl installation designated the
project responsibility.
Changin 9 +he General Repor÷in9 System
Until fiscal year 1970, OART used the l;',esearch and Technology
Resume (Form 1122), or Work Unit Statement, as the principal formal
reporting device for inonitoring work at the field installations. Since
the ()ART program consisted o[ approximately ,1{100 such work units,
the capacity o[ the program divisions to review and manage these tasks
varied considerably from task to task and from division to division.
Attempts to control work at field installations at the work-unit level of
detail produced uneven results and substantial resistance in the field
installations.
OART management recognized that the wink-unit level was too
detailed for [teadquarters planning purposes, so the Research and
Technology Objective and Plan (RTOP), which covered a broader
technical area, was developed. Under this system, there are approxi-
mately 500 RTOPs in the entire OART program. The RTOP is the
basis for program planning, and also is the tormal agreement on the
program hetwec_l the Director of the field installaticm and the Associate
Administrator. The RTOP is the formal l)r_)gram documentation in
terms of technical objective directly related to agent) needs. It includes
the technical at)t)roach, contracting plan, and resource requirements in
detail appropriate to the nature and size of the efl_nt. These 500 RTOP
documents cover the 4000 work-unit statements, whi/h ;ire now used at
the fiehl installations as a subsidiary implementation document. Field
installation directors have the authority to rclnO._lam iunds among the
RTOPs as long as there is no significant chauge in the technical ob-
jective or scope. Space flight projects su(h :is SERF-11, the MTS, and
the Orbiting Frog Otolith (OFO) ;ire ot su{h magnitude that each
constitutes a single RTOP. Generally, efforts of the magnitude of the
projects covered in this study would rate a single RTOP.
Financial Repor+[ng
The POP has not been used extensively for l)rooram management in
OART, mainly because of the large number of work units and the
relatively small dollar totals. Program divisions occasionally have moni-
tored field installation efforts on the financial side through the use of
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Form 1122. This is not possible under the new RTOP system, since
Form 1122 is used principally to notify Headquarters that a work unit
is being activated. Financial reporting (including resource allocation)
in the RTOP routinely does not include specific information below
tile level of the "unique project." Included in this term are tile principal
space flight projects such as SERT, MTS, and OFO. Aeronautics projects
like Supercritical Wing, however, have been substuned under a broader
title of "subsonic aircraft," so RTOP data are not adequate for cost
control monitoring on such projects.
Each month the program divisions receive a financial report on
accrued costs and disbursements covering tile major cost elements of
research tasks or projects. These reports are available on the 10th day
of the month and are current through the last day of the previous
month. They represent the most timely data available to OART pro-
gram managers in the formal reporting system.
Projecf Gon÷rol
MICS is the principal tormal reporting and control system used for
space ttight projects. In modified form, it is used for the large ground-
based experiments and for the space shuttle. No such combination cost,
schedule, and technical status reporting system is used for aeronautics
projects, with tile greater emphasis on focused technology programs
in the reorganized OART, some system similar to tim modified MICS
probably will be applied to these elforts. The RTOP does offer a means
of technical monitoring, but program managers agree that the technical
detail in the RTOP is not sufficient ior keeping on top of their projects.
Tim informal telephone and man-to man relationship between the pro-
gram manager and the project manager continues to be the most im-
portant channel for the exchange of information and ideas in the
planning and execution of a project.
THE OART REORGANIZATION
On October 26, 1970, OAR]" was reorganized as one of several steps
designed to focus research and technology efforts and to strengthen
OART control. The seven program divisions and the Space Nuclear
Propulsion Office of tile previous OART organization have been re-
constituted into seven progrant divisions emphasizing major technology
areas, and five program offices that are more project or proof-obconcept
oriented. See figure 8.
The seven program divisions under reorganization are Space Propul-
sion and Power; Environmental Systems and Effects; Guidance, Control
anti Information Systems; Materials and Structures; Aeronautical Op-
erating Systems; Aeronautical Research; and Aeronautical Propulsion.
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Tile realignment o[ the pmgr,un divisions provides considerably greater
emphasis on ,_eronzmti_s. The progranl offices are Shuttle Technologies,
Space Nude,H" Systems, Short Take-Oil and Landi,lg (ST()L) Program
Oltice, Advanced Technology Experintetmd Tr;msport (ATET) Pro-
gram Office, and the Lifting Body Proglam Office. The new Space
Nuclear Systetns Office combines the old Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office and some elements o[ the oltl Space Power and Electric Propulsion
Division. Three program offices (STOI,, ATI"T, and Lifting Body)
represent new organizational focttsing in these areas of application.
The Technology Applications Office subsumes the activity ot the older
Special Programs Office, placing greater emphasis upon liaison with
those organizations, both within anti outside NASA, that constitute
the users of the advanced and supporting research and technology
programs.
The Resources and Institutional Management Division essentially is
a redesignation of the Programs and Resources I)ivision. The Advanced
Concepts and Missions Division incorporates the responsibilities of the
former Mission Analysis 1)ivision. A new Research Council which re-
ports to the Associate Administrator was established. The responsibility
of' the Council is to insure a coordinated, well-balanced basic research
program b,v reviewing NASs\ basic research activity, preparing annual
sunnnaries of such activity, and ntaking recommendations to the Asso-
ciate Adtninistrator.*
The new OART organization provides greater emphasis on: (1)
NASA application antl atlvanced research and technology, (2) or-
ganizing advanced research and technology to meet user needs, and (3)
a more structttred rationale in the selection and direction of research
and technology ettorts.
One change in the management system that has accompanied this
reorganization of OART is the greater attthority of the directors of the
program divisions. In the past, not all division directors were in a
position to issue instructions to field installations--even within their
own program areas--over their own rather than the Associate Ad-
ministrator's signature. Under the reorganization, the Associate Admin-
istrator has formally delegated program management responsibility to
the directors of the program divisions, within broad gttidelines. This
provides the division directors with an authority similar to that exer-
cised by the division directors in OSSA, and provides them a stronger
organizational position in relation to the field installations than they
previously enjoyed.
*This responsibility has always been vested in the Associate Administrator for
ART, but the Council is a means of gising gtcatm institmional l-ccognition to it, and
provides machinery that should strengthen this NASA-wide role,
5. Field Center Organization for
Project Management
THE OSSA AND OART Flt'LO INSTALLATIONS nlay be classified, according
to their principal purpose, into five categories: (1) space ttight, (2)
applied research in space and aeronautics, (3) applied research in
power and pcopulsion, (,t) aeronautical flight test, and (5) launch of
space flights.
The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) tocuses upon space flight.
From its beginning in 1959, GSFC has been the leading NASA field
installation in those space science activities USUztlh linked to unmanned
space flight. Goddard also has served a principal suppolting role to the
manned space et[ort through its communications, tracking and data
acquisition network, and advanced research and technology activities.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, not covered in Ibis stud)', has served
llltlch the same lmrpose ill tlnlllanlled lunar aud planetary programs.
GSFC has been the principal field installation fm applied satellite
technology, and consistently has been dlarged with the respon._ibility
for managing more large unmanned spacecralt lnoictts than any of the
other lick[ installations.
The Ames Research Center (ARC) and the Lang[% Research Center
(LaRC) comentrate upon applied resezuch ill spate and aeronautics.
The bulk of the work at these installations totals to be in advanced
research and technology or supporting rese:uch and technology; much
of it is conthuted in-house. Each has had responsibility for the manage-
ment of lmge space flight projects, lint typically not more th;m one or
two at the same time. For example, ARC h,_d the management re-
sponsit)ility for l)oth the Pioneer and the BiosaMlite Projects. LaRC
currently has responsibility for the Viking P, ojcct and for the Scout
Launch Vehicle (NASA's smallest operational satellite launch vehicle).
LaRC also had responsibility for the Lunar Orl)iter Satellite Project,
which came to a conclusion about the time the early planning work
was being accomplished on Viking.
The Lewis Research Center (LeRC) concennz_tes upon applied
research in the areas o[ power and propulsion. 'Ihis lovers a range of
everything hom jet engines through rocket moto, s to the nmre exotic
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electric and ion engines for deep space flight. Like Ames and Langley,
Lewis has been assigned nlanagement responsilrility for a nrunbcr of
large space ltight projects. I_eRC managed the SERT-II satellite projett
(most ot which was done in-tmuse), and it has responsibility for NASA's
medium launch vehicle l)rogram (the Atlas-Agena, Atlas-Centaur, Titan
Ill-C, and Titan Centaur). Lewis also manages such large ground-
based experiments on the application o1 nuclear power in space as
the SNAI)-8 and the Brayton Cycle Engine.
Aeronautic,d flight testing activities are concentrated ;it the Flight
Research Center (FRC). Flight testing (whith may also include fabri-
cation of the tlight test model) is Inal_aged on such projects ;is tire
Supercritical Wing, the Lifting Body, the X-15, B-70, and the YF-12.
Although trot so deeply involved in laboratory research as Goddard,
Ames, Langley, or Lewis, the Flight Research Center does carry out
research on flight instrulnentation, data acquisition and reduction, and
other flight test related areas.
Rocket launch activities are conducted for the unmanned l_rograms
by _Arallops Station, which launches principally Scout rocket launches
and sounding rockets and the Uinnanned Launch Operations (ULO)
organization at Kennedy Space Center, which has another operating
division ;it the Western Test Range, Vandenberg Air Force Base. Both
Wallops and ULO concentrate on planning, pre-launch checkout, and
the launching ol; space flights.
All of these field installations have responsibility for managing solne
flight or aeronautical project, except ULO.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION BY MAJOR TYPE
The four types of project organization descril)ed by Flaks and Archi-
bald (projectized, matrix, coordinator, and expediter) are fonnd to
some degree in one or another of the OART or OSSA field installations.
Of the 32 projects covered in this study, only one clearly qualifies
for the expediter classification: the Space Shuttle Coordinating Office
at ARC. In keeping the field installation director inforlned about the
status of the work of the various shuttle task or working groups, the
head of the office performed primarily a communications function.
This particular organization is the result of the OART Space Shuttle
effort's being organized on a task force or committee basis under the
direction of NASA Headquarters, and the high priority given to the
component tasks by the participating field installation directors.
The coordinator-type project organization is approached by some
projects in the Technology Directorate at Goddard, at the Flight Re-
search Center, at Wallops, at Langley, and at Lewis. In each of these
instances, however, the project manager exercises supervision, other
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than funding tontrol, over the work o[ those personnel outside the
project manager's own stall who partitipate in the project. These tend
to be projects whose design, testing, and sommimcs even fabrication are
done in-house. In the strictly formal sense the_e lwoje_ Is fall within the
matrix category of project organization, since the project organization
is not administratively self-contained, and sin(e groups outside the
project staff are responsible to tile project manager tor accomplishing
agreed-upon tasks.
Three proje(ts are organized according to a highly pvojectized struc-
ture-the Pioneer and Biosatellite projects at ,\mc_ Research Center,
and the Centaur launch vehicle project at tile Lewis Research Center.
The other two launch vehicle projects included in tile study--Delta at
Goddard and the Scout at Langley--are only slightly less projectized.
These project mganiz,ttions are sc[l-tontained and icteive virtually no
support, other than administrative, h'om other gloups at their field
installations. The Pioneer and Biosatellite conslitute Ames's two large
space tlight projects. They make up two l)rim il)al elements of tile De-
velopment I)ircctorate, whose lmrpose is to lll_llldgC llliljOl" development
projetts. (The third (Oral)Orient of the DevelolmWUt l)irectorate is a
Systems Engineering Division which providc_ s)stem_ engineering sup-
port to both tlight projects.) The Centaur ptojctt organization is
located within tile I,atmch Vehicles I)ivision at I_cu is :tnd receives only
o_casiona] tonsuhing as_islance from groups outside the division. The
Delta and Scout projects follow similar patterns.
Launch vehi(le projects have one peculialit} whkh tends to set them
apart organizationall,v. They have no scheduled _outlusion. Therefore,
they are less temporar_ ovgzmizationally than most p_oject organizations.
The vehicles are fabricated and tested by cont_attors, and modified to
meet the needs ol each satellite spate mission; 1he NASA P,oject Otfice
responsibility is one of monitoring control, and liaison with some
limiled systems improvement work. The managcnlt:Ht job on a launch
vehicle is no less tlemauding, but it tends to h, k some of the research
excitement associated with other space [light plojects.
TYPICAL MATRIX ORGANIZATIONS IN NASA FIELD INSTALLATIONS
I'lojccts It)lit)wing a matlix t)l)C ol organization lellcct notable varia-
tions hom onc tieltl in_tzlllation to anothcl. lhc f,_llmving descriptions
illust_ale how u::_tlix-organized l)vojects gencl,tll} _rc structured in the
OSS.\ and ().KIUI' ticld insl:tllations. ARt; is n()l included because only
two o[ the live lnojects toxelcd thmc wclc _)1 /he inatlix type, anti the
installation has no pattern--either by polic} _t l_atlite--that is fol-
lowed in plojcct organization.
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Langley Research Cenfer
A typical matrix project at LaRC is shown in figure 9. General
management, key milestone decisions, and liaison with supporting
groups outside Langley generally are handled by the project manager
or his immediate assistants, if he has any. For example, the project man-
ager usually handles liaison with the Launch Vehicle Project Office
rather than designating some member of the project team outside the
Space Technology Division to manage this task.
The technical details of the spacecraft and its related systems, in-
cluding mission-peculiar ground instrumentation, are left to project
engineers assigned from three principal supporting divisions: Flight
Instrumentation, Flight Dynamics and Control, and Systems Engineer-
ing. Tile project engineers are not physically located with the project
office, but remain with their respective parent organizations where the
project work is accomplished in the case of an in-house project, or
where systems design anti contractor technical monitoring is handled
on a day-to-day basis on work contracted out.
Communications among project engineers anti with the project man-
ager are informal and unrestrained. The project manager receives
analytical support for financial management, scheduling, and procure-
ment as needed from the Directorate of Administration. Projects are
reviewed at least monthly at the division level in conjunction with the
PROJECT MANAGER
(SPACE TECHNOLOGY DIVISION)
LAUNCH VEHICLE I II I FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT I
SYSTEM I = AND PROCUREMENT I
.__I L .............. a
FLIGHT DYNAMICS
PRINCIPAL ENGINEER
(FLIGHT DYNAMICS AND
CONTROL DIVISION)
[ ,.sT.o-E.'A.,o.1 lPRINCIPAL ENGINEER*(FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATIONDIVISION) TECHNICAL PROJECTENGINEER(SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DIVISION)
*MAY INCLUDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRACKING AND RANGE SUPPORT.
FIOURE 9.--Typical Matrix project at LaRC.
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monthly MICS report and the monthly PMR, both ofl which routinely
go to the LaRC Direttor. High priority and major flight projects are
reviewed by tile LaRC Director and his top managenlent associates at
least monthly in a full-scale briefing.
kew_s Research Cen_er
Figure l0 shows tile general pattern for projects at ttle Lewis Re-
search Center. The manager of a matrix-organized project is appointed
from one of the operating divisions. The pJoject oftite is organized at
the branch level. For example, the Quiet Engine Plo)ect Office is or-
ganized at the equivalent of the branch level within the Special Projects
Division of the Aeronautics Directorate, and the SN.\P-8 and Brayton
Cycle Projects both are organized as branch-level operations within
the Space Power Systems Division.
A subproject manager is appointed by the chic[ of each division
supporting the project. Each subproject manager (usually responsible
for a system, subsystem, or similar project eleznent) is the point of
liaison tor all ot his division's work on the projelt ;rod is managerially
responsible to the project manager for that workY
in a forlnal sense, the subproject manager is responsible to his branch
and then to his division chief for project wolk. Both are kept informed,
and both must be consuhed if the bran(h ol division is called upon
for further rcsottr(e (ommitnlent. But, practically, st_blnoject managers
report directly to and accept the leadership ol the Project Manager.
[DIVISION [ DIVISION i I DIVISION ]
i i
BRANCH
CHIEF
PROJECT MANAGER(PROJECT OFFICER)
II
I
.... " { 1
KEY:
SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY
!
I'-ICHIEF
i
SUBPROJECT
MANAGER
PROJECT RESPONSIBILITY .- .-- .--_ .......
][VIf,URE 10.--General pattern for projects at LeRC, with OIll_' tree branch of several
in each Division shown.
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Subproject managers typically are given substantial autonomy as to how
they will accomplish their responsibilities.
LeRC officials prefer a heavy in-house invoh, ement in the projects
assigned to them. They want those responsible for the project to be
close to the hardware and so, where possible, they like to see the project
team invoh, ed in the systems design and systems integration. Generally,
their philosophy is that a project team can do a ill'st-rate job of moni-
toring a Phase D contractor effort if much of the detailed design and
systems work has been accomplished by, or under the close supervision
of, the project team.
Flight Research Center
An FRC matrix organization is shown in figure 11. Project managers
are assigned to the Projects and Program Management Office, which is
on the staff of the FRC Director. They report directly to him and
receive their authority from him. Normally, the project m_nager is
assigned on a full-time basis, though he may be given responsibility for
two projects at the same time. He is selected by the FRC Director,
usually from among the more experienced project engineers. All other
members of the project team, whether full or part-time, are assigned
by their respective division directors and continue to be responsible
to their immediate supervisors, frequently remaining physically with
those organizations.
CENTER 1DIRECTOR
I
I PROJECT MANAGER
I PROJECT ENGINEER
I
r..... [ ..... 1 I...... J..... I r..... k__._ ,_..... L ....
I I II I I I I FLIGHT
II BIOMEDICAL II I DATA SYSTEMS I, : OPERATION I I RESEARCH It
L ,_- ! -- --. J I j
I "1
I !
I ADMINISTRATION :I
F]cuRz ll.--Typical organization of an FRC flight project--a matrix type of organi-
zation. (Dotted lines denote project-assigned functions over which the project
manager has supervisory responsibility for his project tasks, but does not exercise
traditional line authority.)
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Project managers work closely with tile members o[ tile project staff,
providing guidance and direction without going through the staff
member's line superior. However, tile project manager is not in a posi-
tion to place additional requirements on meutbe_s oti the project team
without at least informal clearance with that ttwml)er's organization.
The Projects and Program Management Offic:e bandies overall fi-
nancial matters tor the projects. Some o[ the installation management-
level coordination with other agencies--such as the Department o[
Defense, the l)eparttnent of the Air Force or its major Commands,
contractors, other NASA installations, and NAS:\ t leadquarters--may
be perlormed by this office. The Projects and Ptogr:m_ Management
Office does allocate [unds for contractors and [or personnel costs in the
FRC operating divisions from the project hudgets. The project engi-
neer acts as a coordinator and principal trouble shooter for the technical
activities on ttle project in his role as chief assist:rot to the project
manager. The FRC Director invoh'es himself closely with projects,
reviewing thetn every two weeks and setting or re-adjusting support
priorities depending upon project progress and need.
Goddard Space Fligh¢ Cen÷er
Figure 12 shows the GSFC project organization. All large Goddard
flight projects have a Spacecraft Manager, an I'_xlJetitnents Manager,
and an Operations Manager administratively _lssigned to the project
staff. Most also have a Project Coordinator who is _esponsible for such
PROJECTCOORDINATOR
! TRACKING
I AND DATA I
I ACQUISITION I
t J
r--- ]
I RELIABILITY
I ANDQUALITY IASSURANCE I
L J
[ t r-i PROJECTPROJECT MANAGER ! SCIENTIST IL. --J
t BUSINESS IREPRESENTATIVE !t _-I
I
I SPACECRAFT [MANAGER
!
k EXPERIMENTSMANAGER
OPE RATIONS
MANAGER
LAUNCH ]
VEHICLE
MANAGER
Fxt;vv,a_ 12.--GSFC project organization. (Dotted lines dei_ote a project function that
is performed by a group outside the project manager's direct control.)
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,_dministrative lunctions as m,dntaining and servicing tile formal chan-
nels ot communications (coordinating technical and adminisuative
documentation) and acting as general managerial trouble shooter. The
Launch Vehicle Manager may or may not be a lull-time melnber of
the project manager's stall:.
The Reliability and Quality Assurance Manager and the Tracking
and Data Systems Manager may spend nearly full time on a particular
project, but they are responsible administratively to the Systems Re-
liability Directorate and the Tracking and 1)ata Systems Directorate,
respectively, Business support is provided by the Administration and
Management Directorate, but tile Business Representative and his staff
assigned to the project ,,re collocated in the project o/flee. The Project
Scientist is a member of the Space Sciences Directorate. lte provides
the pri,_(ipal scientific guidauce to the project manager, and formally
is viewed as co-equal with the project manager. The Project Scientist is
not located in the lnOject office and he does not report to the project
manager. Many ln-oje_t mzmagers see his function as purely advisory,
though he makes important coutribt_tions during the development of
the Project Plan and technical specifications for the contract.
The above description represents the organization of kuge, contractor-
built space ttight projects within the Projects Directorate at Goddard.
Smaller llight projects, which are essentially in-house, are located in
the Space Applications and Technology Directorate and tend to be
organized much like those at LaRC.
MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Management environment, as used here, means the collection of
discernible influences a¢ting upon tile project organization, but external
to it. Management environment is perhaps the greatest influence upon
the structtue of NASA project management, and its influence is most
evident in the fiehl installation.
One of the most pervasive factors in the managelnent environment
has been the reluctance, during NASA's earl), years, of the former
NACA laboratories to engage in major tlight projects where most o[
the work was done under contract: _ Many senior engineers and sci-
entists, formerly with NACA, believed strongly that a kind of Gresham's
Law takes effect when the management of large contract development
efforts are thrust upon organizations engaged in basic and applied re-
search, The pressures attd publicity attendent to these projects create a
virtually unlimited demand for technical and managerial talent; this
intrudes upon or displaces the laboratory's own research--research
which had attracted and fostered the talent in the first place. A former
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Ames engineer observed, "Tile danger ol i)c_mting mere contract
lnonitors rather tllan research lllen was of COl](Crll [() lUOSt .... ,, 11
In spite of these reservations, the pressures for, and attractions of,
major tlight p_ojects eventtt:tlly proved overwhehniug. By the fall of
1962, the Centattr launch_ vehicle project had been assigned to LeRC,
and the Pioneer and Biosatellite projects to ARC. In November of 1958,
LaRC had at:ttuiled the Space Task Group (ST(;), the predecessor to
Mercury and the entire manned space effort. ITpon activation of the
Manned Spacecraft Center at tlouston, the bulk ,)t the STG activities
were transferretl there. LaRC was assigned the I,ttnar Orbiter, its first
major unntanned Sl)a(e flight project, in the Spring of 1963. GSFC
was created to handle major space flight projects, brat, as it acquired
and fostered an extensive basic and applied r(_cmth capability, the
sanle tensions arose tllere between the dentand.s ol an euvironment
facilitative of research and one which envelops major development
projects. These tensions have been less noticeable at Wallops Station
and FRC, because they were established to I)roxide rocket launch and
flight test support, respectively, and continue plimatily in those roles.
Project activities at Wallops and FRC do not iq_olxe projects of tile
same magnitude as those at Ames, Langley, and Lex_is, and the projects
for which they have responsibility are viewed as sharpening and ex-
panding the talents of their staffs.
A consistent organizational response by the ficltl installations to tile
assignment of ;t major flight project eventually was to establish major
projects within a separate organization haxina _t:l,ttively prominent
management visibility. In some instances this was x lowed as a necessity--
it aggregated project support demands and avoided the feared aggressive
incursions on research activities which migltt have occurred if big
projects were scattered among research divisious.
In the matter of research contracting, the itll{.itsls ot tilt: Center differed
considerably from those of N?,SA as a whole. 'I'_, NASA, the practice gave
access to talent, facilities, and a sheer volume of technical manpower that
could not feasibly be assembled within the contincs of a (;_ernment labora-
tory. It was probably the only way tile huge task _,mfionting the agency
could he accomplished. From the standpoint of the CclltCl. whose interest
lay mainly ill basic research, such contracting was in many respects debil-
itating. It would, of course, inhibit the full development _)f the Center and
would dilute lhe quality and reduce the morale ot the stall. It would render
more difficult the problem of acquiring and Ielaiuin_ lesearch men of the
highest quality and would be particularly harmful if it lvduced the Center's
best research men to mere contract monitors--assumJl_g that they would
accept such a role. TM
There is a substantial difference between the smaller flight projects
upon which much or all of tile engineering design and fabrication
are accomplished within tile installation (i.e., in-house projects) and
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those kuge projects where these functions arc under contract. At GSFC,
LaRC, FRC, and _,Vallol)s, the mall;tgement of tile snlall tlight projects
is centralized within a major installation subdivision, ln-llonse flight
projects at Goddard ;ire located in the Space Applications and Tecli-
nology Dire(torate. At Langley, the in-house space tlight projects are
assigned to the Space Directorate, though two other Directorates--
Electronics, and Systelns Engilleel'illg and Ot)eratious--consistently
provide substantial supl)ort. At Lewis and Ames, tile in-house projects
are located within the technical division having principal substantive
responsibility. For example, the SNAP-8 project is assigned to the Space
Power Systenls Division, which is responsible for nuclear and other
systems lor use in space power applications.
The large space tlight projects at Godd:ud, such as tlle Orbiting
Astrononlical Observatory (OAO), Nimbus, ATS, Orbiting Solar Ob-
serwttory (OSO), I)elta, and Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS), :ire
collected in a Projects Directorate. Unlike the Development l)irectorate
at Aines, the Goddard Project Directorate has not technical support
capability outside the project staffs. Principal project SUlq)ort has to be
obtained tronI the Space Applications and Tetlnlology Directorate.
The Centaur at Lewis is lnore or less self-sufficient within the Launch
Vehicle I)ivision where it can obtain needed support. Reporting
directly to the LaRC Director, the Viking proje¢t at Langley is tOt,lily
,separate froln other activities organizationally, t lowever, nearly half ot
the project staff are assigned from other Langley organizations on a
temporary basis. SERT-II at Lewis is the largest in-house project
studied; it constitutes an entire branch of the Sp,tcecraft Technology
Division.
Tile organizational separation of the large tligbt projects tends to
isolate them. There appears to be less technical intercllange between
project staff and their colleagues in discipline or systelns-oriented
branches elsewhere in the field installation, than is true on the in-house
projects. As suggested in the passage quoted above, there also is less
enthusiasm or willingness by engineers or scientists in the technical
divisions to accept even short assignments with a project. On the other
hand, lnanagers of large projects frequently view techniizal divisions as
unresponsive to their s¢hedule and funding problems. This has en-
couraged some project managers to seek needed technical support from
contractors in order to avoid haggling with their i,l-house colleagues.
Where project staffs are kept small, this alternative is especially attrac-
tive, and it carries with it the advantage of more positive control in the
project manager's hands.
6. The EssenceoFthe NASA Project
ManagementSystem13
ALTItOtJG[I THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM for managing projects in NASA
varies from project to project in details, and vmies institutionally be-
tween OSSA and OART, there are at least five conlln(in features, which
most projects share, and which can be considered tile essence of the
NASA project management system. They are: (1) an iterative, sys-
tematic decision process; (2) emphasis upon the constant flow of
connnunications, open to all participants; (3) shared authority among
levels and functions, but focused responsibility; (i) the concentration
o[ resources at key points or events; and (5) creative responsibility (or
tension) among participants who frequently sought conlticting goals.
AN ITERATIVE DECISION PROCESS
The major decision points structured into the Phased Project Plan-
ning cycle and the cascading series of systems reviews, as a project moves
through the various phases, result in a series of incremental decisions.
But all elements o[ the project remain open [ol _eview, depending on
status and performance. The need to integrate many s}stems and sub-
systems upon which work is proceding indel)endently requires that
decisions respecting one aspect o[ the project sim,ltaneously consider
the impact of that change on other elements. The decision is made in
the context where all interested and al[ected parties have the oppor-
tunity to make their views and arguments heard. This places consid-
erable talent and inlormation at the disposal o[ the project manager,
but it also places substantial demands on him in terms of perceptive
assessment, skills of negotiating and persuasion, and tolerance for a
welter of/ conflicting advice.
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES
The NASA project manager depends upon the capacity of his or-
ganization (and in the larger sense, all of NASA) to respond with a
concentration of resources and talent at opportune points during the
course of the project. The overwhehning prelercnce by NASA senior
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officials tor tile matrix type of project organiz,,tion attests to its tlexi-
bility in meeting this requirement. The insistence that o_ganizational
boundaries _lot inhibit the llow o[ needed assistan(e has been more
than a management principal; it has been a state o{ mind embedded
solidly in the NACA tradition and promoted by NASA project team
members .unoug their counterparts in contra(tor organizations. This
flexibility depends to a lmge extent on a pervading sense of trust and
good will, and on a large dose of common sense among project managers,
so that they do not panic and exercise the s)stem needlessly. _fhis
capahili_y to respond rests upon a comhination of broad technical con>
petence in the field installations and the ability ol project managers to
develop a rapport between their team ,rod members of the installation
technical statIs.
SHARED AUTHORITY, FOCUSED RESPONSIBILITY
The program-proiect manager and t leadquarters-fieId installation
axis illustrates an anomalous but essential fealure o1 the NASA project
management system. Rcsl)onsibility for project per[ormance clearly is
[ocused on the project manager, , vet, he finch, has the authority,• without
concurrence t'rom several other levels, to de{Me a major issue. Nearly
every de(ision is the resuh of successive reviews and negotiations _ith
systems managers, experimenters, functional managers, and head(luarters
representatives. But this shared authority brings the advantages of
broader participation to cover technical and other problems in greater
depth, as it lnings a sense of responsibility by those participating to
work for the common goal and re[rain tronl aggrandizing their own
interests. Ideally, the sharing o[ authority helps maximize innovation
while minimizing error.
CONSTANT, OPEN FLOW OF COMMUNICATIONS
An important key to project success is for the project manager to
know the true status oI p_ogress on every element. Formal reporting
systems cannot assure this, but NASA requires such a redundancy of
information flow, including even those peripherally involved, that
errors and schedule slippages usually are well publicized. These help
prod those who otherwise might accept delay or minimum solutions.
In addition, project managers are expected to institute their own
infmmal means for obtaining needed information and passing it along
to atfected parties. If anything, there is a surfeit ot information, lliding
problems is frowned on and considered more of an evil than the faihne
to solve a problem.
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CREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
Elnphasis is on prol)lem solving and balancing o1 interests, not upon
assessing blanm. The competitive atmosphere ol intc Rrating the ohen
conflicting requilemcnts of various s)stems (reatcs tension, but it also
keeps the l)arti(ipants conscientious: they must })lit hnward their best
arguments ,rod reasoning in support o[ their requirements. Negotiations
and complomise are important elements in the s)_tcm. The fools,
charlatans and irresponsible are quickl) weeded Otlt. Success depends
upon mutual coopmation produced by hard tought technical argument
and the weig, hing of alternatives.
The NASA ploject management system integrates the formal and
informal in such a manner that they lmgety are mulually dependent.
The formal system is structured to help skilled, highly motivated man-
agers succeed, lint it requires uniquely qualified imli_iduals in the key
project positions. Success seems even more dependent upon the men
than it does the [ormal system.
PART II. THE MEN
Project and Program Managers

7. What the Man Bringsto the Job: Experience,
Perspective,Skillsand Characteristics
THERE ARE SEVERAL ATTRIBUTES which a project or program manager
brings with him to tile job, and which inflnence his performance in
tile joh. These are: (1) his past experience, (2) his expectations o1
views upon the principal functions of the project- or program-manager
role, (3) his personal skills, and (4) his personal characteristics (per-
sonal behavior within the organizational context). The data relating to
past experience were collected both from personal interviews and from
summaries of personnel records. The information on principal project
or program manager functions, personal skills, and personal chdracter-
istics was obtained fiom a questionnaire administered to most project
and program managers. They were asked their views on the importance
of the functions, skills, and characteristics of project and program man-
agers, and to rank thenl in order of their importance. Much of the
following discussion is based upon the perspectives of the project and
program managers on the importance ol these various elements; it is
not a measurement of the presence or absence of these skills or charac-
teristics among the managers themselves. They do represent important
influences on the manager's approach to his role.
PAST EXPERIENCE
NASA project managers cannot be fit into a mold, but they do share
some common characteristics in professional training and work experi-
ence. Of the 36 project managers interviewed, all but two were engineers,
based upon their undergraduate degree. Most had previous project ex-
perience as a principal member of a l)roject stalt, an assistant project
manager, or a project manager in NASA, the Department of Defense,
or the aerospace industry. However, this varied considerably from field
installation to field installation. All of the l)roject managers surveyed
at LaRC and FRC had previous project experience. Ten of the fifteen
project managers interviewed at GSFC had worked on project staffs
immediately prior to taking command of their projects, as had three of
the five project managers interviewed at LeRC. The project manager
interviewed at Wallops Station also had previous project experience.
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Only one ot tile five project manztgers imhuled ill tile study at ARC
had l)vevious projett experience, The low late of previous project
experience among Ames's managc, s may t)c due largely to the fact
that, except tot large spate llight 1)lojctts. Ames has developed no
particuhtr institutional approach to project-t_pe attivity. The recent
development ol scverzd rcsearth-tyl)e activities into small project-type
activities was ot an evolutionary nattnc: the _csca_thcr heading the
study became the de [aclo project manager.
The projett managers ranged in age from the mid-30s to the early 50s,
with the average in the mid-.10s. All the plojett managers showed
evidence of substantial phssical vigor ,rod en_ltnztn(e.
Most o[ the project managers at the former N.kC,\ Centers (Langley,
Ames, l,ewis, Flight Researth Cenler, and \Valh_ps Station) joined
their respective installations shorlly alter having _c<eived a baccalaureate
degree in aeronautical, mechanical, or elettlical engineering. By con-
trast, there :ire relatively more projctt m;tna_c]s ;it Goddard with
extensive military or industrial plojett experience. Proiect managers
consistently held senior civil service grades at the GS-15, GS-16, or
excepted levels. On the avelage, project managers had front 15 to 20
years of engineering rescarth experience at the field installation where
they were project managers.
NASA program managers, for llle most part, have backgrounds and
experience similar to their project manager colleagues, though there are
some distinguishing differences. On the average, program managers are
three to five yc,,rs ohler than their project-manager counterparts. Fewer
have deglees in engineering although the maiorily are mechanical,
aeronautical, or electrical engineer.s. Others have degrees in physics,
mathematics, or other physical sciences. About three-quarteIs of the
program ntanagers have adx;mced degrees or have taken graduate work.
Most o[ the program managers have 20 ot mmc \ears ot Rg:I) experience
--all have had supervisory and managerial experience in government,
industry, or the military. Slightly more than 25 percent of the program
managers have industrial experience in the aerospace industry as plan-
ning, program, or systems managers. Mo_t ot dlosc ill ()SSA have missile
or rocket development experience dating back to the early 1950s, and a
substantial minority of OSSA program managc_ s arc ex-military officers
who began their space-oriented careels t]n-ough _arious technical or
command assignments related to military locketry. All are at grade
level GS-15 or above.
One noticeable difference between the program managers in OSSA
anti those in OART is that, whereas three-fourths of the OART pro-
gram managers have had working experience tit a NACA field installa-
tion, [ewer than half of the OSSA program managers had such experi-
ence,
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Two obserwttions are in order about the apparent relevance of various
elements considered to be past experience, and project or program
manager per[orman¢e. First, most NASA senior oOficials at either the
Headquarters or field installation level agree that a project or program
manager must have at least ten years o[ research and development ex-
perience in a variety of settings to prepare him for the scope of technical
and managerial challenge to be faced as a project manager. They be-
lieve that it takes personal experience with hardware design, testing, and
fabrication in order to build the engineering intuition which may spell
success or faihtre in technical decision making under pressure.
Second, it is the (subjective) evahtation o[ senior officials that ex-
perience in the organization (that is, the field installation or major
Headtlt_arters program office) is more important than past program
or project experience outside NASA. The value of an insider's knowl-
edge of the organization is most obvious in management of a matrix-
organized project. In such circumstances the project manager must rely
upon in[ormal channels of communication and control, so that his
understanding of, and capacity to operate within, the organizational
environment are critical.
PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS
Project and progr_ml managers were asked to rank the relative im-
portance of the four principal functions * of project or program man-
agement. The functions were:
1. Project Planning.--Developing and establishing technical perform-
ance specifications and plans for budgets, schedules, organization, per-
sonnel, reporting, and changes
2. Project Information and Control.--Maintaining an awareness of,
evalu:_ting, antt acting to control such critical factors in project progress
as the quality of the project, as measured by the technical and per-
formance specifications, and keeping the operation within project
schedule and cost parameters
*This group of fnnctions and their descriptions was selected after reviewing the
project nlallagell|ellt liter,'lture and NASA management issuances, and evaluating the
results of exploratory interviews with NASA project managers and senior field installa-
tion and Headquarters management otficials. These sources provided several dozen
project and progranl mattagcment activities which were then consolidated into the
four general u|anagement functions described above. During the initial administra-
tion of the questionnaire, about three dozen respondents were asked to comment
upon the adequacy and inclusiveness of the_" management functions. None of the
responth'nts cousidcred the functions described as inappropriate, nor did any of them
offer possible alternatives. Therefore, the author oilers them, not as definitive func-
tions of project or program management, but as a workable set of functions which
is useful and at least as authoritative as any other described in the literature.
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3. Pro)cot Team.--Colle(ting, organizing, directing, and motivating
tile project team--including the project stall, supl_orting elenmnts of
the tiehl inst;dlation, other agem} compoimnts, ;rod the ],roject con-
tractors
4. Tec/mical Consultation.--Advising, p_oblemsolving, and tech-
nical de(ision-makiilg through committees arid ad hoc groups
The pro.ie(t and program managers were l)rC_(_ntcd this task: "Listed
below are tour project manager functions. "lhev represent one way o[
viewing the colle(tion o[ a(tivities that ;! lnOic_t m:m,,ger usually niust
perform or manage .... Rank their order ot imluntance .... " The
managers then p_oceeded to rank the tunctions (me through four, giving
the numeral one to tile most ilnportant ltm(tion :rod the Iltllller;.ll /our
to the one they considered least important.
Collectively, OSSA proje(t managers rank the Ploje(t Teanl tunction
;Is most important, followed by Pro.je(t ln[otm;ition and Control,
Project Planning, and Technical Consultation. In (ontrast, OART
project managers rank Proje(t Planning as m(,st important, followed
by Project Team, Project Information itlld (;(lllll()l, ;ll-ld Technical
Consultation. (See tab. 1.)
:\ltbough, the numeric rankings,. Jndi{ale a link ot strong consensus
among either ()SSA or OART p,'oje(t mare,gels, they do highlight
important institutional differences..ks a group, the ()SSA projects tend
to be larger _.tlld O[ longer duration, have a mole t,unlal olganizational
structure, and tlle project manager generaI[} cx(q(ises gleater organi-
zational authority. T/ms, OSSA project mailag{qs yank the Project In-
formation and Control activity higher than d_) ().\R'I project managers.
One reason that OSSA project mzmagels yank P_oject Team as most
important, in spite of the fact that the OSSA p_(jcct organization tends
to be more formal, is that they probably have to work harder on the
TABLE 1.--l:lelative lmportal_ce of Pri_l¢ipal Pro]oct Ma_lager
Ftmctions
Average rankings
Function
Project team
Project information and control
Project planning
Technical consultation
OSSA OART
project mgrs project mgrs
(N 2o) (Y =: 16)
12t8 2.09
2.22 2.59
2,35 1.62
3.,t5 3.69
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Project Team function because o[ tile size of tile organization and tile
relative lack of informal intevpevson;d relationships among project team
members which existed prior to the establishnmnt of the l)roject. OART
projects [requently hring together project team members who have
worked together on previous projects or in connection with research
tasks, or who have previous personal relationships growing out of their
activities at the field installation. This is less likely to be true of OSS,,\
projects. Both O,.\RT and OSSA project managers enlphasize the im-
portance o[ a strong, well-integrated project team.
OART project managers appzu'ently rate Project Planning high in
comparison to OSSA project managers for two reasons. First, thorough,
detailed planning--specifically laying OUt the detail of what is to be
accomplished and the relationships among the principal component
elements, including the personnel and organizations involved, in con-
junction with those who will have a part in the project--is considered
to be the cornerstone for a successfld project. This helps to avoid mis-
understandings later during the execution of the project. Since OART
projects are smaller and of shorter duration, it is easier to include the
affected and constituent parties early in the planning process. The long-
term duration and size of many OSSA projects frequently preclude
bringing together l or planning purposes all parties or organizations
taking part in or affected by project execution. Second, OAR.T project
managers more frequently are personally involved in the early stages of
planning for the projects which they will manage than are OSSA
project nlanagers. The majority o[ the OSSA project mauagers surveyed
had been brought into the project either late in the planning stages
or during the execution of the project.
Both OSSA and OART project managers agree that Technical Con-
sultation is the least important of the four management functions.
Although most project managers are inclined to spend time on technical
details, most accept the principal thrust of their responsibility as man-
agerial in nature. On the large OSSA projects, with rare exception, the
project manager cannot hol)e to have the same technical grasp in depth
on any subsystem as do his principal subsystem managers.
The rankings o[ the program managers emphasize their principal
flmctions of Planning, hlformation, and Control. OSSA program man-
agers rank Project Inlorm;_tion and Control as most important, followed
by Project Planning, Project Team, and Technical Consultation; OART
program managers rank Project Planning as most inlportant, followed
by Project Information and Control, Project Team, and Technical
Consultatiou. (See tab. 2.)
Like their project manager counterparts, OART program managers
more frequently are engaged in the early processes of Project Planning
than are their colleague program managers in OSSA. This may be due
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TABLE 2.--RelativeImportance of Principal Program Manager
Functions
Function
Project information and control
Project planning
Project team
Technical consultation
Average rankings
OSSA OART
program mgrs program mgrs
(x: l:_) (N = 12)
1.85 2.0
2.0 1.67
2.27 2.63
3.89 3.71
to tile [act that OSSA projects are of longer duration and, therefore,
there is a greater likelihood of turnover among tnogram managers over
the duration of a particular project than is true in OART. As a rule,
program managers in OSSA do participate in the early stages of Project
Planning. ttowcver, when a project may run to_ as long as seven years
or mo,e, tile plogram manager is more apt to see P_ojett information
and Control dtning tile execution of the project as more important than
planning--which would take a relativel) _hort pmiod of time.
Both OSSA and OART program managers recognize the importance
of the Project Team [unction, but they have little i,Jlluence in the selec-
tion or operation of the project team, given their p_ogram management
role. Both see Technical Consultation as the least important of their
functions. Most OART program managers believe, however, that they
make technical tontributions to the success of the project. This view
was less frequently stated by OSSA program managers. With few ex-
ceptions, neither project managers nor their statl_ (or_oborated the view
that the program managers contributed tedmicall_ to project success.
PERSONAL SKILLS
Every projet t or progrdm m:mager brings to the iob an individualized
aggregation of skills which he has ,,:quired, extended, or sharpened
through a combination of training and expericm c. l'roje(t and program
managers were asked about the relative import:role ol a series of skills *
relevant to project and program management.
The question was posed as follows: "Listed below are the four major
skill categories and subcategories that are usually considered relevant
"These skill categories and subcategories were dc_eI.ped and tested in the same
fashion as were tim project manager functions. The stal ting point for the four prin-
cipal categories was Robert L. Katz, "Skills of an Ettecti_e Admiuistrator," Harvard
Bminess R_vieu , (January-February 1955), pp, 33-42.
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the:
for project managenmnt. What is tim relative importance of each of tile
four major skill areas t() the l)roje(t m;mager? . . . what is tile relative
importance o[ each sul)categor) within the major {ategories?" The skill
categories and subcategories are:
1. Technical Stcills
--well founded in the fundamentals of technology
--capacity to al)ply technical knowledge
--breadth of teclmical knowledge in areas related to his specialty
Ma,mgcrial Skills--knowledge of and capacity to operate within
--organizational system (its goals, structtnes, procedures)
--control systenI (scheduling, qu,llity control, technical reliability)
--financial nianagenlent system (budgeting, cost control, account-
ing)
--personnel s)stem (recruitnlellt, training, promotion, separation)
--contracting systeni (selection, negotiation, administration)
3. tluma_l Skills
--communication of ideas, including advocacy
--ability to work with others, generate enthusiasni, win respect of
others
--ability to encourage peer-group loyalty identification with
project
--capacity to encourage initiative, responsibility, and serf-control
--ability to coordinate group eltort, to niediate dit[erences
't. Co_zceptual Sl_ills
--integrative: capacity to perceive and assess interrelationships
--evaluative: ability to identify and assess problems
--problem-solving: capacity to develop potential solutions
--decision-making: ability to effectively weigh and choose among
alternatives
--creativity: capacity to develop new ideas and perspectives
When ranking the relative importance of the fotH" principal project
manager skills, OSSA and OART project managers generally agreed
that tluman Skills are most important and Technical Skills least im-
portant. OSSA project managers rank Managerial Skills second and
Conceptual Skills third, while OAP, T project managers reverse the
order. This ditt'erence may rellect the institutional differences which also
accounted for dilierences betwen OSSA and OART project managers
on the management functions of Planning vis-'a-vis Information and
Control. That is, the size and duration of the project, in conjunction
with formality of the project organization, may be important intluences
in OSSA project managers' ranking Managerial Skills (which support
Information and Control functions) more important than Conceptual
Skills (which would tend more to support Planning functions). But
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both ()SS,\ and (),kRT projeCt ntan:tR¢'rs tanked .\lanagcrial and Con-
<C})lUa] .";kill'+ .,+_ c l<+_c togcthcr that thctc max lw little real difference.
(Scc tab. 3.)
"l]tc lack _l a+_x _t(';l[ ntmtcti_+ Sl)+catl in lhc a'+ctagc ranking reflects
thc lark ol a '-.tlt:,It_ (<)IISt'IIStIS HIIIOII_ tlt+.' l)lt)jt'tl III_IIHIOCI'S. The raw
tal.uilat tlala ,l_,,w It+at, ol tim 20 )t'sp,)llt]itt_ ().SS \ pt,,jcct mana qtrs,
seven tank I lttutan Skills Ihst, ,,ix tank Nlan:t+.acviatl Skills first, tour rank
(iontcl_tttal Skills litst, and thlc(.' i;ltlk Tcthni_al Skills litst. Of the
16 (),\RI i)toicct ltl__tll.:tgCl+S rcsptmding, live tank J ltllll:ttl Skills first,
six tank Managerial Skills first, tlncc tank (:,m(cl)lu;tl Skills first, and
two l:.tnk +I'cchnical Skills first.
In inter\lows, projc{t managers _ttcss the inq),+_tamc ol adequate
tcchtti{al skill, [)lit they discriminate betwccu ttsinX Tcchnical Skills in
the Ili,tlhtgClllCllt SClISC ['Ol I)toad dc{i,,ion ,naking where critical trade-
ui[s have to 1)e nlade anlotlg systems or stll)sxstcms, and the actual
engagenlent ol the project tnan,lger in dot',tiled to{ hni(al work. Unques-
tionably ptojc<t ntanagers have to l_toxidc tc(Imi_al leadership. The
greater strcss upon Iltttnan Skills prol);tbly ix :l rt'suh of the fact that
most project ttt:magcrs ¢onte equipped with the 'lctlmical Skills, but
|tot all ¢omc equipped with fIttman Skills. No matter how brilliant
they me tccltJncallv, their project _annot be lull) sttcccssfttl without
their pto_idine, lc:tth:rship lor diverse pc,)ph:, _:n_mraging initiative,
coordinating mediating, and developing the h+cc t+xchange of in[or-
mation and ideas,
+l'ltct(? i', il _l'Cgtt(!l + _.'OllSetlStlS alllOltg" ()+'5.'_,\ [J, tt+_l'gtltl managers about
the relative iml)ortance of the [our ])rincil)al 1)l<)gtam management'
skills than there is among OART 1)rogrant m;tnagcrs, and there is a
greater dispersion among the tour skill c.:ttcgl)l its for tile OSSA progrant
ntana_crs than for the OART progrant man:lgers+ (See tab. ,:t+) The
t,tbulatiotts show th;tt seven ot Lthe thirteen rcsl)onding OSSA program
lnanagcrs rank Managerial Skills first, two rank t I tttn,tn Skills first, three
TABLE 3.--Rclative Importal+ce ol Pri?.it).l Project Ma_tager Skills
+\v(:l ;tgc ranking
( )SSA OART
Principal skill projcct mgrs project mgrs
(x: e0) (N= 16)
Human skills 2.10 2.17
Managerial skills 2.'t5 2.33
Conc eptu,d skills 2.55 2.30
Technic al skills 2.90 3.0
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TABLE 4.--Relative Impo)ta_lce of Pri_2cipal Program 5la_mger Skills
Average ranking
()SSA ()ART
Primipal skill program mgrs program mgrs
(,_ 13) (X: 12)
Managerial skills 1.70 2.75
Human skills 2.16 2.09
Conceptual skills 2.54 2.50
Technical skills 3.62 2.67
rank Conceptual Skills firsl, and one ranks Technical Skills first.
Three of the tweh'e responding ()ART proglam lllilllagcrs rank Man-
agerial Skills first, five rank I Ittman Skills tirst, three rank Conceptual
Skills first, and one r,mks Technical Skills first.
The avcr:_ge low ranking I)y O,\RT program managers of Managerial
Skills, in conjunction with their ranking [tuman Skills first, is not in-
consistent with O,\RT tn'ogram management practices. Most OART
projects operate within a relatively informal lnlormation and Control
system--one which places more reliance upon informal personal con-
tacts than does the more structured OSSA program management system.
This climate of program management in OART can be expected to
change toward stronger emphasis on management, as OART moves
toward more highly toct,sed advanced technolog,v programs under the
1970 reorganization.
The relatively high rating by OART program managers for Con-
ceptual Skills could relate to the broader function of most OART pro-
gram managers. They are responsible for monitoring a relatively wide
range of adv:tnced research and technology, in addition to acting as
the principal project officers on one or more small projects.
Among the subcategories of Human Skills (ability to coordinate
group elforts and mediate dilt'erences; communication o[ ideas, includ-
ing atlvocacy: ability to work with others, to generate enthusiasm, and
win the respect of others; capacity to encourage initiative, responsibility,
and self-control; and ability to encotuage peer-group loyalty and iden-
tification with the plojett), OSSA project managers and OART project
managers rank their respective firs{ three choices rather closely. (See
tab. 5.) ()SSA project managers rank Coordinate and Mediate first,
t ollowed closely by Communicate, and Work with Others. There is a
consider;Jble ga 1) between these three categories and the two others--
Encourage Initiative and Encourage Loyalty. OART project managers
rank l,Vork with Others first, followed closely by Communicate, En-
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TABI.E 5.--R.latiz,c Importance o[ Subcatug.J.',_ _,I It.man Skills
to Project M.m_gcrs
.\x c_a_c ranking
tluman _kills
Goordinate, mediate
Commtmicate
D/ork with others
Encourage initiative
Encourage loyahy
()SSA OART
tno.ictt m_l_ project mgrs
(X 20) (N 16)
9.75 3.19
2.8O 2.41
2.85 2.12
3.O 2.81
3.6 ,t.47
courage Initiative, and Coordinate and Mediate, with Encourage Loy-
alty a distant fifth.
The gcuclal pattern which emerges tends, again to reflect institu-
tional dil[ercnccs between OSSA and ()Ai(T plc, je(ts. Except for En-
courage Ix_yalty wnkh both OSSA and OART p_ojctt managers rank
last, ()SSA project managers tend to emphasi_e those t tuman Skills
which (an be associated with more formally organi/cd, more organiza-
tionally complex projects typical ot OSS.\. OAI,UI project managers
emphasize Human Skills more closely associated with a small team-
oriented project. For example, while the OAR'I ptojc_t manager usually
works closely on a lace-to-face basis, with lhc members of his project
team, the OSS,\ project manager is more likclx to spend a greater share
o1 his time in hying to coordinate group efforts and to mediate differ-
ences amotlg groups rather than individuals.
OSSA and O.\RT program managers agree 011 the top three cluster
in the 11tmhm Skills tatcgmv: they rank Communicate first, followed
by Coordinate and .Mediate, and \Vork wilh Others. (See tab. 6.)
OART program managers rate Encotuage Initiati_ c closer to this cluster
and a good deal higher than Encourage l,oxaltv, while OSSA program
managms tend to cluster Encourage Loyalty and Encottrage Initiative
closely.
OART program managers probal_ly tend to be more sensitive to
problems o[ encouraging initiative because, il, those instances where
programs are originated in OART fteadqualtels, they must be creative
in encotuaging initiative on the part of fieht installations where they
hope to place the assignment. Otten, they mu_t plant ideas in appro-
priate pla(es ;,t a NASA installation and cultivate initiative, so that it
appears to come from within the installation rathe," than fiom without.
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TABLE 6.--Relative Importance of Subcategories o[ Human Skills
to Program Managers
Human skills
Average r;mking
OSSA ()ART
program mgrs progranl mgrs
(Y _- 13) (Y = 12)
Corn in un ica te 2.54 2.25
Coordinate, mediate 2.62 2.46
Work with others 2.70 2.84
Encourage loyalty 3.54 4.55
Encourage initiative 3.62 2.92
The agreement between OSSA and OART program managers on the
two most important subcategories of Hmnan Skills accurately reltects
their roles as defined by the orgzmization--i.e., as communicators, co-
ordinators, and mediators.
There is considelable dii[erence of opinion between OSSA project
nlanagers and OART project managers about the relative importance
of subcategories of Managerial Skills except for the ones ranked most
and least important--Organi/ation and Personnel, respectively. (See
tab. 7.) The subcategories (the knowledge of and capacity to operate
within the: orgalfi/ational system--its goals, structm'es, procedures;
control system--scheduling, quality control, technical reliahilit_'; con-
tracting system--selection, negotiation, administration; financial man-
TABLE 7.---Relative Importance o[ Subcategories o[ Managerial Skills
to Project Managers
Managerial skills
Average ranking
OSSA
project mgrs
(N =20)
OART
project mgrs
(N = 16)
Organization 1.75 1.88
Control 2.65 2.91
Contracting 3.0 3.25
Financial 3.70 2.88
Personnel 3.95 4.16
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:tgcment s}stcm budgeting, cost control, at(otu_ling; and personnel
_xstem--re(ruitme,lt, uaining, pr<mlotion, scpalation) are ranked by
OSSA lnojc(t ilhtll:.lgers ill the [ollowing older (hganization, Control,
Contracting, l"inal, ial, and Persomlcl. OAR'I i,_,@(t managers rank
Organization [nst, [ollowed by Finantial, Contt,J], Contracting, and
t'crson,ml.
Whele M I(;S _x_tems are not used in OAR'[, the project managers
tend to use [imm(ial in[ormation and control _}_tcms for similar pur-
poses: ,lctol(lingly, ()ART project managers rank l"imm<ial very close
to Control. Their relatively lower ranking el ('.onlla(ling than OSSA
project m:m:,gcrs p_ob;d_ly rcllccts the (ompal-ativcl} larger amount of
in-house projtxt attivity in ()ART, which does not involve, or inini-
really involves, contractors.
There was complete agreement between OSS,\ and OART program
managms on the order el importance el the five _ub(atCgOlies of Man-
agerial Skills. (See tab. 80
Both Contlacting and Personnel s}stems arc lated tourth and filth,
consider,d)ly behind third-ranked Financial. This is consistent wi_h the
relatively minimal contact ov responsibility that either OART or
OSSA t)roglam managers have with these two ]nin(ipal s}stems within
NASA. Neither program nor project managers have much leeway in
selecting members ol their respectivc statls, and bol h _,,FC,UDS.,tend to view
the persomml sxstem as a relativel) inllexible one ovm which they have
minimal intlucnte. Although the NASA pe)_onncl >_tem can be char-
acterized as [iexible, project lllanagers probal)ly rate knowledge about
it as least iIlll)()ltal_t to their inmlcdi;tte (on(eJn., I)ctause they have
relatively infrequent formal (ontact with the sy_t('m, and there is the
tendem:y, within the field installation, to t:.klc pclsonnel problems
through the management system.
TABLE 8.--Relative Importance el Subcatcg.rie,s el MaTmgerial Skills
to Program Mam_gcrs
_\_('_ agv ranking
( )SS \ ()ART
Managerial skills program mgl _ program mgrs
(N- 1.3) (N = 12)
Organization 1.93 1.17
Control 2.43 2.50
Financial 2.66 2.75
Contracting 3.70 4.21
Personnel 4.31 4.38
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TABLE 9.--Relativc Importance of Sltbcategories o[ Co_weptual Skills
to Project i_lanagers
Conceptual skills
Average ranking
OSSA OART
project mgrs t)ro.iect mgrs
(N = 20) (N = 16)
Decision-making 1.58 1.91
Evaluative 2.42 2.53
integrative 3.25 3.44
Problem-sol vi ng 3.65 3.41
Creativity 4.10 3.71
In considering the relative importance o[ Conteptual Skills (Decision-
Making--the ability to weigh and choose among alternatives; Evalua-
tive-the ability to identify and asse_s problems; integrative--the
capacity to perceive and assess interrelationships; Problem-Solving--the
capacity to develop potential solutions; and Cteativity--the capa,ity to
develop new ideas and perspectives), OSSA and OART project managers
agree that Decision-Making and Evaluative are most important, and
Creativit) least important. (See tab. 9.)
Since both OSSA and OART project managers are close in their rating
of Integrative and Problem-Solving Skills, there t)robably is little if any
real ditIcrence in their relative rankings. These choices suggest that the
project mall;tgt:ls see their role as more managerial than technical, since
they pla(e Dc{ision-Making, I:valuative, and Integrative above what
could bc considered the more technically oriented skills of Problem-
Solving and Creativity. These at-e skills that project managers expect
from their project team members. Uniforml?, proje(t managers empha-
size the importance o[ decisive,ross as critical to the project-manager role.
There is similar agreement among OSSA and O:\RT program man-
agers, who rate l)ecision-Making and Evaluative as most important.
(See tab. 10.)
OART program managers may rank Creativity ahead of Problem-
Solving because of the strong planning role they have in developing
advanced rese:mh and technology programs, which encompass a variety
of nonproject-like tasks. It is ditticult to explain the ranking by OSSA
program managers of Problem-Soh'ing above Integrative Skills since,
in the interviews, OSSA program managers put considerable importance
on the Evaluative and Integrative functions of program management.
There may be a tendency lot" OSSA program managers to equate
Problem-Solving with Decision-Making.
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TABLE lO.--Relative Importance of Subcategories of Conceptual
Skills to Program Manager,_
Conceptual skills
Average ranking
OSSA OART
program mgrs program mgrs
(Y 13) (N=12)
Decision-making 2.16 2.42
Evaluative 2.31 2.42
Problem-solving 3.00 3.67
Integrative 3.31 3.09
Creativity 4.23 3.42
OSSA and OART project managers agree on the relative ranking
of subcategories of Technical Skills (capacity to apply technical knowl-
edge, well-founded in the fundamentals of technology, and breadth of
technical knowledge in the areas related to hi_ ._pecialty). Collectively
they rated Application first, Fundamentals second, and Breadth third.
(See tab. 11.)
Given the broad span o[ knowledge that project managers are ex-
pected to emompass, it is surprising that Breadth is lated so clearly last
among the subcategory of Technical Skills. it may be that, from an
operational viewl)oint, project managers believe they personally must
have the capacity to apply technical knowledge and be well-founded in
the fundamentals, while they can look to the project team members
to provide the breadth required. Interviews with field installation senior
officials and Headquarters senior officials indicate, however, that they
place greater importance on Breadth. In all except the largest projects,
TABLE 11.--Relative Importance of Subcategories of Technical Skills
to Project Managers
Avel age ranking
OSSA OART
Technical skills project mgrs project mgrs
(N-:: 20) (N = 16)
Application 1.70 1.62
Fundamentals 1.9(1 1.81
Breadth 2.45 2.56
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TABLE 12.--Relative Importance o/Subcategories o[ Technical Skills
to Program Malingers
Average ranking
OSSA OART
Technical skills program mgrs program mgrs
(N = 13) (N -----12)
Application 1.89 1.75
Fundamentals 1.97 2.59
Breadth 2.16 1.65
they expect the project manager to have a full working comprehension
ol tile teclmical breadth of the project.
There is no agreement among OSSA and OART progra,n managers on
the relative importance of the sub(ategories of Technical Skills. OSSA
program mangers rank them in the same order as the project mauagers,
while OART program managers rank Breadth most important, followed
by Application and Fundamentals. (See tab. 10.)
Their proximity to the research end of the spectrum may cause OART
program managers to view Breadth as more important than any other
Teclmical subcategory. Since their responsibility goes be)ond projects
to include advanced research and technology, OART program managers
have to extend their activities over considerable technical scope covering
both research and development.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Personal char,lcteristics are a fourth element of personal equipage
which the project or plogram manager brings to bear on his job. These
overt manifestations of the manager's personality have an important
effect on his ability to apply his skills and to perform the functions of
his rote. Based on a review of the literature, discussions with program
and project managers, and reactions from the administration of the
questionnaire, 11 personal characteristics were selected as being relevant
to project or program management. TM
The respondents were asked, "If you were to select the Manager for
a NASA flight project, to what extent should he possess the following
personal qualities? Assume that all have some relevance or desirability,
and make your selection upon the basis of their relative importance.
Select the most important five and rank them in the order of their
importance .... " A simil:u" question was asked of NASA program
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managers. The 11 characteristics hom which the managers were asked
to select five are: *
1. Directs others, ,tssunms responsilfility for deci,ions and judgmcnt of
others without displ,tcing their function, persuades olhcr_ (Dominltnce)
2. Flexible, adapts to change, tinds dittelcnt ways to do things
(Change)
3. Vigorously attacks problems, ovmcomes obstacles without hesita_-
tion, sells his program (Aggression)
4. Develops feeling of loyalty on the part of tilt: p_oject team (Affilia-
tion)
5. Organizes and plans progr,ml ope_ation_ without difficulty (Order)
6. Remains cool, unemotional when contloJ_ted with unexpected
problems (Stability)
7. Makes own decisions (Autonomy)
8. Understands and appreciates the l_roblcln_ _t others such as sub-
ordinates, administrators, contractors, superiors (lntlaception)
9. Meets challenges, exhibits pride in projc<:t mission and individual
performance (Achievement)
10. Takes technic:ll or administrative risks to mcet project goals
(Risk-Taking)
11. Sticks with the problem, devotes the hours ne(essary to accom-
plish the job successtully (Endurance)
A combinatilm ol factors was used in ev,duatil_g the rankings of the
project managers on this question. An index wll_ used which combined
two [actors: (1) the number of times that a cha_;lttelistic was selected,
and (2) the frequency with which it was sole{ ted as a first, second, third,
fourth, or tilth-place choice.* The higher the _c_tllling index number,
the more important is the ranking of the parti_ ular dlar,ateristic.
OSSA project manzlgers reached substanti;il agreement that Domi-
nance is tile most important personal charactelistil tor project managers.
They generally agree that Aggression is second, tollowed by Change.
(See tab. 13.)
Note tim _lose ranking by OSSA lnoject managel s of those character-
istics following fourth-ranked Attiliation. Tim OSS:\ project managers
• In the parentheses following each description is a single key word for the per-
sonality charactmistic--this did not appear on tile lcspondcnt's questionnaire.
• For example, l)ominancc was selected I)} 18 of Ihc 20 OSS.\ p_oject managers;
thmcforc, the construction of this index I)cgan by assigni_g 1,_ p(finls (one for each
time sch'clcd) to lhc characteristic. Five of tile 18 ranked il inst, tire ranked it sec-
ond, threc Jankcd it third, four ranked it fourth, and one lankcd it tiflh. Points were
assigncd to c:.tch lanking as follows: li_e points fro (,ath lnst-place ranking, four
points fol` each second-place ranking, three points for oath Ihird-place ranking, two
points for oath fourth-place ranking, and one point for cath fifth-place ranking. The
total proxidcd lilt: index nmnbcr of 81 for this palticulal chanactcristic.
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TABI,E 13.--l'¢rsomd Characteri_tic,s Most Important for
Profl!ct Ma migcrs
()SSA OART
project mgrs proiect mgrs
(m: ',0) (Y :::16)
Dominance 81 56
Aggression 51 23
Change 42 '10
Affiliation S4 11
Order 32 37
Autonomy 31 25
Intraception 30 41
Achievement 27 23
Risk-taking 25 7
Stability 23 20
Endur;ulce 18 35
(]hal',l( I{:risli(
tend to view these 1 I characteristi(s in fOl.ll" duster._: the top three which
represent doniinan_e, aggressiveness, and tlexibility; the next four which
represent affiliation, order, autollonly, alld intrateption (the under-
standing ,ind appreci,ition of the pioblenis of others) ; the next three
which represent achievement, risk-taking, and stability; and the last,
endurance.
OART project managers agree with OSSA project managers that
Doniinarice is the nlost iniportant single ch:lracteristic for :i project
manager, and that Change and ()ider rate in the top five. However, they
see both Aggression and Altiliation :is consideral)ly less significant, and
,give greater importance to lntraception ,ind Endurance. OART pioject
managers also tend to group these daaracteristics into four clusters--
though they vary substantially froni the OSSA project nianager clusters.
OART project nianagers riink 1)oniinance as the niost iuiportant fol-
lowed by a cluster of four: hltr,iception, Change, Order, and Endurance.
These represent the most important five; they are considerably set apart
froni the others. The third cluster consists ot Autononiy, Aggression,
Achievenlent, and Stability, and the least ilnportant duster consists of
Affiliation and Risk-Taking.
The ditterences between the top five selections of the OSSA project
managers and those of the ()ART project managers appear to reflect
the ilnportant institutional ditterences also evident in their respective
views of the project manager functions and skills. The organizationally
less form,d and more personalized style of nlanagement in OART
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could lead to zl highel value's being pl;tced on :_ char:a teristic like Intra-
coptJoil. II is more ditlitidt to explain the stll_,l,tlltJal ditference in the
lanking ol F.ndur,lucc. In lhe inter\ lows, both ()SSA alld OART project
manilgers emphasi,,cd the need hn ph_sital clltltn;m(e which their role
requires---intense involvement lor sustained 1)cti,>d_ and a willingness
to sul)ortlilmte ])etsonal and tamily intmests t_J the Inoject. The rela-
tively sholter /htlalioll o| most ()ART l)ro.jc_ls mzt_ develop a greater
inten_its <_[ personal in_ohcmcnt compared to the rcse:trch and de-
velol)ment activities flora which many of the (LtRT project managers
canle.
"/'lie relati_eh: low r;iting of Risk:I'.lking. +m the surface, appears to
be at odds with the risky natttre o[ projctt manaoement. Itowever, a
close view of how project managers ;ictually g_) at)out conducting their
responsibilities reveals that, with tcw cXtel)tions, they make decisions
abottt various trade-offs on the basis of what will ciitt,,e the least disrup-
tion, what is most workable, or what altcrn;,tive will require the least
additional funds, review, or approval. Thzts, although the projects in
which tDcsc ##l<'#zarc c'Hgaged have co11,siclcrccbtc tcc /¢slic'ctl and managerial
risks, pro/cot managers tend to be c'onscrvativc it_ their approach to
Uecision-maki_Jg.
Project managers tend to see themseh'es us tlc_isi_e, but rarely are
they in a position fully to make final de(isions on ;t unilateral basis.
Proje(ts are so nmch a system of interacting elemtq_ls, the responsibility
for which tends to be dispersed, that project man',_gers are more likely to
make derisions in concert with others, rather than in isolation. This is
not to sity that project managers use a cotmnittcc :tl31noach to decision-
making.
The Stability characteristic is not highly latc<l. A tmmber of project
n:anagers parti(ipating in the study ol)viouslx :tit: men o[ strong opinion
and mercurial temperment. The more "har¢l-nc, sed" among them tend
to head the projectized organizations, llowexcr, pioiect staff and other
field installation officials did not cite ;in)' displztvS _f temper by project
managers which seriously altected the project. On several occasions,
senior management officials did express a pretet ence [or project man-
agers who :ire not overly abrasive.
OSSA t)rogram managers rank Aggression, I)ominance, and Change
closely together, [ollowed by Achievement, eXtfiliation, and Order. (See
tab. 14.)
Aggression, Dominance, and Change are cleatrly ranked as most im-
portant by OSSA program managers, but they rette(t their institutional
role by ranking Autonomy last. This replesents it considerably weaker
capability to act independently than that o[ project managers.
OART program managers judge Order and I)orninance most impor-
tant, followed by Change, Aggression, and Endurzmce. Order supports
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TABLE 1,t.--Perso_ml Characteristics Most Important for
Program Managers
OSSA ()ART
Characteristic program mgrs program mgrs
(N= l_) (X-_ _?)
Aggression 35 28
Dominance 35 37
Change 34 28
Achievement 29 19
Affiliation 26 7
Order 25 37
Risk-taking 21 3
Intraception 17 22
Endurance 16 28
Stability 16 17
Autonomy 6 14
tile OART program manager's role, which places heavy emphasis on
planning; Endurance suggests a logical supporting personal _haracter-
istic for the wide range of technical activities and the broad scope of
subject matter with which OART program managers must deal. Like
their OART project manager colleagues, OART program mangers see
relatively little value in the Affiliation characteristic. Although Intra-
ception is not among the top five OART program managers' selections,
it is ranked sixth.
The pattern of response seems to refle(t the genuine differences in the
organizational environments of OART and OSSA. In OART, the
less formal control and management systems, coupled with the more
research-oriented than development-oriented environment, place a
greater premium on those personal characteristics contributing to an
informal management system, and a lesser premium on those charac-
teristics contributing to the development of organizational or project
loyalty.
The scatter of choices at both the program and project manager
levels suggests that there is no single set of characteristics which can
be identified with successful program or project management.
8. Operational Style. How Project and
ProgramManagers Approach Their Jobs
TItERE ARE NUMEROt S CUES ill the overt actions or statements of project
and l)rogrmn lnanagers which provide keys to thei_ operational styles.
The tive cues _onsistently sought ill tllis stud} ale: (,1) how the man-
ager says that he spends his time on the principal hmctions; (2) how
tile project or program manager collects and uses ke_ inlormation on
the status of the project, and his p_incilml mean_ ol control; (3) how
the manager selects, organizes, develops, ,rod uses Hlc project team; (4)
tile manager's personal orientation in approa(hing ( crtain general classes
of problems; imd (5) the managel's view on tht s_stems by which he
is evaluated and rewarded.
HOW THE MANAGER SPENDS HIS TIME
Tile relative amount of time the project manager spends on each of
the four principal proiect [unctions varies considerably depending upon
the stage of the project. For example, in Phases .k through C (which
enco))lpass the early stud),, feasihility, and design stages,), greater time
is spent on functions of project planning and technical consultation.
Once the project moves into Phase D (execution). the emphasis tends
to shift toward project int0rmation and control, and to motivating and
directing the lnoject te',un. All but a few of flw proje( ts included in this
study were in the execution stage. But where a proiect includes a series
of tlights, one flight might be in the late stages ,fl exe(ution, while an-
other is in tile very early stages where design modifi(afions based upon
flight expericme tan cause a reemphasis on the planning and technical
consultation tunctions.
OSSA project managers, on the average, spend relatively more of their
time on tile project team tunction (30 per(cl)_), (losely followed by
project pl;mning (27 percent). (See tab. 15.)
The wide range in the percentage of time Sl)ent on each of the four
fun(lions emphasizes the considerable differeme Jrom project to project,
and the la(:k ol any strong (onsensus except thai l)roiect Team generally
rates nlost ilnportant and Technical (]onsult:_fion least important.
OAR'I' project m:magers generall) opclate 1mu h less formally and
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TABLE 15.--Percent o[ Time Project Managers Devote to Each o]
Four Principal Functions
OSSA OART
project managers project managers
Functions
Average Range of Average Range of
time spent, time spent, time spent, time spent,
percent percent percent percent
Project team 30 15-73 25 10-60
Project planning 27 10-60 28 5-50
Project information 24 2-45 31 10-60
and control
Technical consultation 18 5-55 16 5-50
in a less highly structured organization than do OSSA project managers,
but they claim to spend relatively more time on Project Information
and Control activities, ranking this function ahead of Project Planning
and Project Team. This is the reverse ot what one might expect, in
light of the institutional diIferences. The same type of broad spread
in the range from project to project on each of the four functions is
evident for OART project managers, as it was Ior OSSA project man-
agers. Those OART projects where the managers claim to spend as
much as ,10 percent or more of their time on Project Information and
Control activities tend to be those in which there is sizable contractor
activity. One reason why OART project managers seem to spend rela-
tively more time on Project Information and Control activities than do
their OSSA counterparts is that the staff of the OART project manager
usually is very small, requiring him to handle Project Information and
Control activities, which, on the larger OSSA ttight projects, would be
undertaken hy a project staff member rather than the project manager.
OSSA project managers, because of the substantially larger project staff,
are less burdened directly by Project Information and Control activities
or Technical Consultation. They apparently find it necessary to invest
niore time on Project Team activities, in order to develop an adequate
sense of cohesion and single purpose.
Although there is some variation in the relative percentages, there
is remarkable congruity among OSSA and OART program managers
on the time spent on each of the four principal functions. (See tab. 16.)
The estimates of the program managers closely fit the relative im-
portance of the project management functions defined by the organiza-
tion as the institutional role of the program nlanager. Two-thirds or
more of the program manager's time (both OSSA and OART) is spent
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TABLE 16.--Percc_t of Time Program 31a_tage_s Devote to Each of
Four Principal Function,s
OSSA OART
program managers ptogram managers
Average Range of Axcrage Range of
Functions time spent, time spent, time spent, time spent,
percent percent percent percent
Project information 40 10-70 37 5-70
and control
Project planning 28 20-50 29 10-50
Project team 19 5-40 20 5-75
Teclmic,d consultation 13 5-30 15 5-30
on Project luformation and Control or Proje, t Planning functions.
Although the range shows sul)stantial variation trom project to project,
the ratio horn tunction to lunction is remarkaMy consistent with the
institutional role.
There is a relatively narrow range among p_ogram managers for
Technical Consultalion compared with that of pro}cot managers. This
suggests that program managers, as a group, imogf_izc' anti generally
accept a broad managerial role, rather than a role of technical leader-
ship or technital innovator.
INFORMATION AND CONTROL
Project managers place principal reliance fol Information and
Control fimctions upon a well-developed but infornlaI system of inter-
personal relationships. None relies heavily upon [Olmal systems. This
particular style of operation reflects the stag(: ol most of the projects
included within this study at the time of the interviews. The vast ma-
jority of the projects were in Phase D. The l olmal Information and
Control systems are developed in conjunction with the t)lanning stages
of a project and, from that point on, are used principally as reference
points in major tormal reviews.
In the order of frequency of use, the modes ot information collection
and exchange used by project managers are: (1) telei)hone and ad hoc,
informal person-to-person discussions; (2) formal meetings such as con-
tractor confere_ces, plant visits, regularly sclmduled project staff meet-
ings, design and status review meetings; and (3) written documents
such as letters, memoranda, special reports, the Project Plan, the MICS,
and the POPS.
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Although the formal systems tend to be stressed in descriptions of
project nmnagement, the managers make only limited use of these
means of communic'_tion. Written documents are viewed as most useful
for historical, legal, base-line, and reference purposes. Even the most
extensive computer-driven systems are unlikely to provide both accu-
racy and timeliness on tile up-to-the-minute status of a project during
the execution stage. Although such systems are capable of providing
timely information, most project managers are leary of their accuracy,
because of the human tendency to conceal problems and be optimistic
in order to buy time for problem solution. Such conceahnent is easier
on standardized forms or written reports than it is in face-to-face or
telephone comnmnications.
Another factor limiting reliance upon formal written repoIting sys-
tems for project status is the cost and effort of keeping them updated--
especially if they involve computer operations. Project managers view
most written information systems as existing primarily for the use of
upper management--field installation management and NASA Head-
quarters managemeut. Project managers resist assigning technical staff
to report writing. Frequently, on the larger projects, the administrative
support staff has the responsibility for coordinating and developing
reports.
Like written reports, formal review meetings generally are looked
upon by project managers as useful for producing information and
understanding for tipper nlanagement levels rather than the project
team. Obviously, these meetings do have some direct value to the project
managers; they provide better understanding among decision elements
in the field installation or in Headquarters, and they pave the way for
favorable decisions about the project. However, project managers hold
similar meetings with contractor personnel in the process of detailed
review of systems and subsystems. Where the design and flight readiness
review systems are highly formalized, such as on large spacecraft proj-
ects, project managers suggest that such reviews could be more fruitful
if those who attend representing higher levels are well-prepared to par-
ticipate in the review, having read the available background documents.
What kinds of information do project managers usually concentrate
on? Generally, the order of priority is: (1) unresolved technical prob-
lems, (2) systems and institutional interfaces, (3) resources, (4) sched-
ule, and (5) personnel problems.
The project manager can be inundated with technical information
and advice. The term most frequently used by the project manager in
describing how he goes about evaluating the advice, particularly where
he lacks first-hand experience, is "engineering intuition." Where the
project manager has confidence in his own background and knowledge
in an area, he relies upon that. When the project manager respects the
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person offering the advice 1)oth personally and prolessionally, obviously
he is less inclined to question the advi(e. _Iost plojcct managers con-
sciously or tmconsciously pass tecfinic,d advice tin ough tour filters which
hel t) them to weigh its adequacy and (Oml)oncnls, These :ire: (1) an
evaluation of the man proposing the action, to, using upon the indi-
vidual's competence and what are judged to be his motives in proposing
this specifit advice: (2) an assessment of the l._gi_ oI tim proposed
action and its consequences; (3) a comparison with the project man-
ager's own knowledge and experience even though it ma,v be peripheral
--here the project manager tends to reason b s analogizing; and (4) a
comparison with the re(ommendations of others whose expert judgment
the project manager respects based their past expc_ien(e and reputation.
These seem to be the princil)al components o[ what project nlanagers
c,dl engineering intuition.
Aside from the specific assignments of responsibilit 5 and resources
made in the Project Plan, control over the project team by the project
nlanager may vary considerably depending on whether tim organization
is projectionized or matrix organized. Even tho,gh principal project
personnel may not be assigned adntinistrati_ely to the project manager,
he may exercise authority over these project pels_,mml as far as project
responsibilities and tasks are concerned, hrcspc(tivc of the type of
projett olganization, project managers emphasize motivation of the
project teaul; they keep its importance tonst;tntlv ;it the lorefront of
their consciousness. The project manager has to keep the project sold
both to the 1)roject team and upward to the fiehl installation manage-
inent and to NAb:\ tleadquarters. One must lecognize that a project,
by its very nature of concentrated focus upon a major task, carries a
signifi(ant degree of motivation at the outset. Project managers seek
to reenforce _uch spirit as an important means of accomplishing the
project objectives.
Most proj¢xt managers encourage the free flow of information on an
informal basis laterally and vertically throughout the project team, and
to related or interested organizational components, lIowever, they closely
control the outward flow o[ such written inforlnalion ;is conespondence
with NASA tlcadquarters, contractors, other field installations, or the
field installation lnanagement. Linliting this (,itward ttow through
well-defined and recognized points redutes cmllusion on the part of
these outside elements ;is to who can speak with authority on what
aspects of the project. Even verbal communication with _ontractors that
involves technical, resource, or schedule changes tends to be carefully
controlled in order to prevent confusion and misunderstanding.
The principal differences between OSSA project managers anti OART
project nlanagers center upon the size and COmlAexity of the project.
Most OSSA projects are more formally organized, they more frequently"
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use formal control s)stems. For example, OSSA has institutionalized
the MICS for all its tlight pJojc_ls. This Infornlzttiou and Control sys-
tem is used by fewer than half oi the O;\P,T projects covered--only
flight projects and the large ground-base l)rOOl-of-concept experiments.
Another example is the rather extensive reliability and quality assur-
ance review and control system on space flight projects. Although
many project managers believe that this tunction is overdone, NASA
managen_ellt supports strong l)rogr_lnls of testing and documentation
as the base from which to remedy faihncs or inadequate performance
when su¢h occur. OART tlight projects and large proof-of-concept ex-
periments tend to follow the same pattern. However, ntost aeronautics
projects do not use an extensive reliability and quality assurance control
system. One OART aeronautics p,oject manager criticized the extensive
OSSA control systent by observing "I monitor results, not procedures."
Prog,am managers follow mudl the same pattern as do project man-
agers on Information and Control activities. Although they are within
the forntal systent inore than project managers, they also tend to rely
upon intormal sources and methods for obtaining the most up-to-date
information on project status. A Program manager depends more on
face-to-face discussiott and telel)hone conversations with his project
manager and project staff than he depends on regular written reports
forwarded from the fiehl installation. Even where written docuntents
provide the b:tsis tor the latest information on project status, these
frequently come through informal channels. For instance, where the
relationship between the program manager and the project manager
is excellent, the program ntanager usually receives a copy of the weekly
or ntonthly PM R as it goes to the field inst,,llation Director. The project
ntanager sends this report directly to the program manager, not tltrough
the lormal line channels.
Program managers spend most of their time on the same classes of
problems and inl'ormation as do project managers. Program managers,
however, emphasize systems and institutional interfaces, resources, and
schedule problems ahead of unsolved technical problems, since technical
problems are the province of the project manager aml Iris team.
Program managers are not in a position to do ntuch motivating or
even technical problem-soh, ing at their level. The control system varies
considerably among program managers; it is based essentially on the
project manager's (and the field installation director's) estimate as to
how accurately,' and with what authority the program manager speaks
for NASA Headquarters managenient. It is upon this base that the
program manager makes his influence felt in the myriad of formal and
informal contacts--from major project reviews to informal telephone
conversations--in the process of exchanging and collecting information
and exercising NASA Headquarters' project-control responsibilities.
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THE PROJECT TEAM
In tile broadest sense, tile project team in_ltuh:_ :ill ot those in the
field installation, in NASA, and tile contractols winking directly on tile
project. It is npon this group lhat the l)rojcct managers focus their
attention during project execution. In tile more limited sense, the
p,oject team reters to the staff of the Project ()trice and other members
of the field installation responsible to the project manager for particular
tasks or functions, l)efined in this more limited way, a project team
will vary lrom abottt ten or twelve to several humhed members. Even
a relatively small in-house project may have a slat[ ol several hundred
at the point in time when spacecraft integration and testing is in prog-
ress. The staff in the iinmediate otfice of the project manager will vary
from one or two on sm:dl matrix-organized proje{ts to as many as 70
oll a large observatory satellite with a projectized olganization.
Most project managers prefer to have theil project staffs assigned
directly to them, or at least moved into (lost: physical proximity to
them. Among the few stat[ members in the oI]i(c ol :ill in-house matrix-
organized project, the project engineer and the p_in(ipal systems man-
ager usually are assigned on a functional basis---th;_t is, assigned to the
project manager lor technical task supervision hut not for pay, promo-
tion, or disciplinary purposes.
Project managers have limited opportunit? to select project team
members, since stat[ availability and project needs ralely coincide fully.
On the larger projects, the manager may have ;m _pportunity to select
the principal systems managers from several alternative candidates. On
the in-house matrix-organieed projects, howevm, team members usually
are selected by the heads of the supporting divisions. Generally, division
directors do not pass off mediocre staff on the p_ojects, especially in the
initial staffing. Their divisions are being represented on a highly visible
project, and it is to their credit to assure that keen, competent people
are assigned to the project.
Project managers are in close, daily contact with the team members;
they recognize the need to take the leadership in keeping team members
fully informed and encouraging a team spirit. ']'he_ also believe in the
clear identification of authority and responsit)ilit_, though project staff
do not always corroborate that this belief is c at_ied out in practice. Most
project staffs believe that they receive generous support and attention
flora the project manager. Most also acknowledge that their project
manager is vigorous and fair in bestowing recognition on team mem-
bers and in rewarding them to the best oi his _.apability within the
constraints ot the management system and the field installation practices.
Those project managers who seem to have dme]oped closely knit proj-
ect teams decentralize problem-solving, emphasizing technical problem-
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solving at the level where both the problem and the most experience
reside. Tile project manager or major systems managers are expected to
enter into the problem-solving process only to resolve serious conflicts
with impact on related components or subs),stems, or on schedule or
cost. Project team members are encouraged to feel a sense of responsi-
bility for problem-solving at their respective levels, within the assigned
guidelines of performance, resources, and time.
When unresoh, ed problems do come for decision to the project man-
ager level, the better managers seek quick decisions. This does not mean
that tim ahernatives have not been thoroughly investigated. The alter-
natives usually have been well threshed over as the problem moves up
the line. "/'he purpose of quick decisions is to ensure that the human
energy in the project team is directed toward implemeutation of deci-
sions rather than in protracted and contticting advocacy.
NASA presents a mixed picture on the question of top-level manage-
ment support for the projects. Nearly all the project managers acknowl-
edge a good rapport with their field installation management, though
the degree of support--in terms of resources, not moral support--varies
from project to project according to the project manager's perspective.
The more large tlight projects there are in a field installation, the less
the project manager views the installation management as supportive of
his particular project.
There is considerable variation among the field installations on the
use and understanding of priorities either among projects, or between
projects and other fieht installation activities. Project managers at ARC
and FRC attest that the installation director clearly assigns priorities
among the major projects and other principal activities in the installa-
tion. At both ARC and FRC, the director frequently reviews the pri-
orities in order to shift support in accordance with project status,
special problems, and ad hoc tasks. An informal priorities system is
acknowledged at the LeRC, and one is "understood" at LaRC, although
the director does not establish specific priorities among projects, except
for Viking which is the largest unmanned project assigned to Langley.
Both installation management and project managers at GSFC acknowl-
edge that no particular priority system exists among projects there.
Program managers are virtually without staff. An OART program
manager is fortunate to have a full-time secretary. Fewer than half of
the OSSA program managers have any professional staff assistance. Gen-
erally, it is a one-man operation, with occasional help from functional
or discipline-oriented experts located within the Headquarters division,
but not answerable to the program manager.
The program manager's perspective on the project and the project
team is several levels removed from that of the project manager. Even
more than the project manager, the program manager depends upon
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an ad hoc, but carefully developed, int0rmal system o[ interpersonal
relationships, ttis role requires him to see the p_oiect in the broader
terms o[ its relalionship to NASA program goals...\lthougll both project
managers and project staff acknowledge a cordi:d lelationship with their
respective program managers, the program numager's role as the Head-
quarters nlonitor and enforcer of project constraints and program goals
places him in :t position outside tile intimate ciI_ leo[ the project team.
There are some notable exceptions, where the axis of relationships
between the program manager and the project man:tger is so close with
respect to project goals that the program mauagc_ is acknowledged as
a member of the project team.
Most project managers see the program manager as the project rep-
resentative in tieadquarters, helpful in keepin K the project sold and
in obtaining necessary resources, but usually }taxing little technical
impact on the projett. This viewpoint is more representative o[ the
execution stage ot the project than ol the plamfing period, when the
program manager plays an especially critical _ole in developing and
coordinating the Project Plan and the PAD. Both OSSA and OART
project managers tend to view the program malHRcl's lole ill tiffs light.
in OART, the shorter duration of projetts and l}lc: broader scope of
technical responsibilities within the purview ot p_oject mauagers oc-
casional[) result in the project mzmagel's ,,kllowlcdgment that the
program manager has had a technical impact on _hc ]_roject. All project
managers acknowledge the importance o[ the p_,oram manager in
working with su(h external groups ;ts interested aocncies outside NASA,
the Olfice o[ Management and Budget, and Con gvc,s in the authorizing,
funding, and coordination o[ principal proje{ts.
PERSONAL ORIENTATION AS A CUE TO OPERATIONAL STYLE
In order to bring further evidence to I)ear on the operational style
of t)roject and program managers, information was collected about their
personal orientation on four aspects o7" dimensions of their jobs. These
dimensions were: (1) profession,d--that is, technical versus managerial
orientation; (2) vocational--task, interaction, or self-oriented; (3) or-
ganizational--upward-, peer-, o, downward-olieuted; and (,1) time-
perspective--short-range versus long-term.
These particular dimensions were selected because the literature sug-
gested that, generally, project managers are p,ofessionally managerially
oriented, vocationally task-oriented, olgani/.athmally downward- or
employee-oriented, and usually have a sholt-vangc time perspective.
Data o11 protc_sional and organizational olicntati,m of project managers
were collected by Dr. Keith Davis in his study o[ industrial project man-
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agers. 1'_ Bass attd Dunteman used a similar technique in collecting infor-
mation on tile vocational orientation ot: engineers. 1_;
Tile qttestionnaire, completed by the participating project managers,
presented a brief series of hypothetical circumstances used as the back-
ground fox" answering four lorced-choice questions, one fox" each dimen-
sion. The questions were put to the project managers in the following
manner:
Your tlight project has been hampered by an inability to get tim Center's
q'eclmical Division to be fully responsive to your schedule for pro',iding
tedmical assistance. The Divisiou Director has agreed to meet with )ou late
this afternoon to resolve the problem. About 30 minutes before the meeting
you are uotilicd that the flight model has encountered an electrical s)stem
failure during en_iromnental tests, and the cause seems to be a number of
bad t_ansistors. You have control of the test facility for live more days.
Without higher level intervention, your next access will come in another
three months, Which would you do?
-42ancel the meeting and innnediately t_y to pinpoint the difficulty via
teleplmne to the test facility, and decide on further action or alterna-
tive test plans.
--Go to the mcetiug as plmmcd, relying upon project and test staff to
pinpoint and _ontirm tile cause of the failure.
You have recently been promoted to Deputy l)ircctor for the Center. During
)'our last week on the project, you are to work with the individual who is to
take )'our place as Project Manager. He is an engineer with good qualifica-
tions and background experience, but has never managed a project. You
have only this week to help him and offer guidance. Which of the following
do you think should be stressed? (Choose one in each category--a, b, and c.)
a
--The importance of getting the job done
--The necessity of maintaining harmonious
interrelations
--The opportunities for personal satisfaction
which the job entails
--Current flight objectives
--Program goals
--Project success depends most upon his
relations with Center management and
NASA Headquarters
--Proiect success depends most upon his
relations with his fellow Project
Managers
--Project success depends most upon his
relations with the Project Team (those
at the Center, in the Agency, and
contractor working directly on the project)
86 PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN NASA
The results tend to cox_firm tile inference_ dlawn from the project
management literature that project managers tend to be managerially-
oriented, task-oriented, project-team oriented, but they do not neces-
sarily have a short-range time perspective. (See tab. 17.)
About 60 percent of the OSSA project managers _esponding indicate
a long-term or program-goal orientation, rather than a short-range,
current-obje_ctivcs orientation, OART proje_t managers are evenly di-
vided. The relatively longer life cycle of an OSSA project may cause
OSSA project managers to lean more heavily toward program goals
than OART project managers.
Both OSSA and O,\RT project managers plol)ably are more task-
oriented than the questionnaire resuhs suggest, t'r,_jccl: managers con-
sistently exhibit a "getting the job done" ptlilosophy in interviews. Quite
possibly, task orientation is so much secom[ nature to the project
managers that this choice was not seen as realistic by those who opted
for harnmnious relations or personal satisfaction. There are no clear,
TABLE 17.--Personal Orientations of Prolcct Malingers Along Four
Dimensions: Professional, Vocational, Time-Perspective,
and Organizational
Orientation
Number of Number of
OSSA OART
proje_t project
managers managers
(N -: 2_I) (N ----16)
Professional:
Technically oriented (cancel meeting)
Managerially oriented (attend meeting)
Vocational:
Task-oriented (getting the job done)
Interaction-oriented (harmonious
relations)
Self-oriented (personal satisfaction)
Time Perspective:
Short-range (current objectives)
Long-term (program goals)
Organizational:
Upward-oriented (toward superiors)
Peer-oriented (toward fellow project
mgrs)
Downward-oriented (toward project
team)
2 4
16 11
1t 9
7 5
2 2
8 8
12 8
1
19 16
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consistent differences between OSSA and OART project managers along
these four dimensions of orientation.
Program managers were asked these same questions, altered only to
provide greater contextual meaning for them. A review of the formal
responsibilities of the OSSA and OART program managers suggested
that the), would share the same principal orientations as project man-
agers--except Time Perspective, where program managers would have
a long-term or program-goal perspective. The questionnaire results par-
tially bear out the suppositions. (See tab. 18.)
There is very strong consensus among OSSA and OART program
managers; OSSA program managers do vary, however, on the question
of Time Perspective. A bare majority show a short-range or current-
objectives type perspective--just the opposite of what was expected, and
a relative turnabout compared to their counterpart project managers. A
closer examination of the kind of program managers who select current
objectives over program goals shows that nearly all of them are program
TABLE 18.--Personal Orientations of Program Managers Along Four
Dimensions: Pro[essional, Vocational, Time-Perspective,
and Organizational
Orientation
Number of Nun_er of
OSSA OART
program program
managers managers
(N = 13) (N = 12)
Professional:
Technically oriented (cancel meeting)
Managerially oriented (attend meeting)
Vocational:
Task-oriented (getting the job done)
Interaction-oriented (harmonious
relations)
Selboriented (personal satisfaction)
Time Perspective:
Short-range (current objectives)
Long-term (program goals)
Organizational:
Upward-oriented (toward superiors)
Peer-oriented (toward fellow project
mgrs)
Downward-oriented (toward project
team)
1 1
12 I1
12 12
12
1
11
11
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managers ol large observatov_ satellite projects. 'lhese projects usually
lun OVCl it peri_)d of se_en to ten }e;us when multiple flights are iu-
volved. ()he lnoglatn lll;lllJAgel plob',d)ly pu! his linger on tile explana-
tion to this unexpetted lestl]t W]ICII he ;,knmrtedged that short-run,
c tlllellt pl()l)lelllS [ve_.ltlelltl )" o'_elwhchll ;i l)lq)gl_lltl Hl:.lll;IgCl', since he
has rather broad leSlumsilfilit} ,uld little ol no _,ta[l suppolt, lie nhlv
tcnd to totus almost extlusi_e[) on tile llt'xt ttiti_:Jl t:_ont sudl as
])lel);llillg tol it lll:ljol latluth, ptlllill- tt)getht'l xll;tt,'lial lof ;.t 1)fidget
justili<ati,m on 1ol a Congression,d healing. _n tl }in,e to obtain admin-
istvatixe t lealame tor a conttatt change, . l>,cg;u_llc,s <_t whether this
parti{ular assessment is corrett, the [;let lhat :, m;,.i_lil } ol ()5SA pro-
gram managers select the sho_t-range time pe2spe< l i_e a_ most inlpovtant
is indi{ative that tile long-term ov plogvanl-g<_a] l_<l>pe<ti_e may 1)e
short{hanged at the very level where it should lit' emphasized--NASA
[ [e,tdqtt;ll tcrs.
OART pv,)glant managers opt 11 to 1 tot the l_)ng-term l)erspective.
Sinte nlo_t (),\R.'I program mttnagels ale resl_onsible for one or more
plojetts, as well :1_ It>l-a substantial vzuietv o[ :td_anted research tasks,
the breadth of responsibility ma)entorce a btoadel, longer-term pro-
gram pelspective.
THE SYSTEM OF EVALUATION AND REWARDS
Evaluation of Proiecf Managers
Projvtt managers agree that tile sinole mo_t i]ll})t)ltallt (iitel_ion
used to e_aluitte their perlorlnance is tech,tital su<tess: Did the flight
or experiment pmlorm its tun(lion s;iti_lattorilx and retutn usable
data? Like tile man,tger of a losing baseb;dl team. the manager of a
project whose llight fails to rettun any useful data is a candidate for
replacmnen t.
Next to techni(,d stte(ess, most pl<)jeft nlana_vls believe that they
;ire judged b) whether ov not a ptoje<t is c_mq>ieted more or less on
schedule and without substantial increases ill <osl. "lhcse per{eptions
by the ploje<t ntan;igers are an a(cmate _etlecti<,n ol what the field
installation nl:m;igcnlent expects. _la,t} ptoieet m:magers, however,
underestimate tile _alue that senior olti(ials ])lac_' up<m organizational
setentry. Top lnanagelnent wants ptojett sinless, it wants projects to
be {ompIetcd on time and within co>t estim,tte_, but it also wants the
projects to be canted out without serious disluption to organizational
relationships, iuclutlin.g personal ones, or those between the field instal-
lation and NASA t leadquarters or othel olgalli::.ltions. The project
manager who athletes su{cess :.tt the expense o[ serious organizational
disrttption is unlikely to advance.
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Several proiect mana,_cvs suggest that a smoothly nun project may
not receive the same acclaim as one whi(h expmiences serious ditficulty
and then le<overs, The point was made that tile lnoje_t which goes
along without serious difficulty rarely comes to tlm ,mention ol senior
lUallHgCllle11[ ol evokes intense interest. This suggests that "management
by exception" may not be an adequzite appro,lch to take to project
m,magement,
Because senior ol[icials look 1o1' more than technical smcess ;ind stay-
ing within schedule ;rod cost, it is worth citing at least two sets of
critmia used at different fiehl installations. The Director of the Langley
Research Center uses the tollowiug to evaluate proie_t manager per-
forma nee:
1. Does he meet pro}ect milestones?
2. Does lit imrfoHn quality work?
3. Is he et[ective in organi_ing the ])rojett team-
•t. Does he anti_ipz_te problems and seek to head them ott?
5. Is he willing to push himsell?
Tile Director of lhojects at (,SF( ] uses it similar set of criteria:
1. Has [lie spacecratt been a success in orbit; it not, is the failure or
p,irtial failure excusable (th,,t is, did the project manager ask for the
resources he needed when he needed them, even i[ he did not obtain
them) ?
2. ttas the l)loject been on schedule?
3. Itas tim project been accomplished within costs (based npon com-
parable expericme with other projects)?
4. Has the project ,n,ln,lger been sensitive to the future of the pro-
gram? Has lie demonsnated ire'entireness in improving it technically or
in program planning tot the future?
5. tlas the project manager been successful at the expense of intra- or
inter-installation relationships, or has he been a technical and financial
success at the cost of seriously disrupting tile organization?
6. Has the project manager facilitated an open-management and
information environment which accepts reasonable criticism and useful
exchange o{ technical information?
Program managers also believe that technical success is the most
important criterion by which they are judged, though they are less
likely to be replaced in the event of a tlight failure. There is close
agreement between the program managers and their superiors that the
successful technical performance, and cost and schedule considerations
are important, but that of equal importance are organizational serenity
and a system of etfective, open communications. Headquarters senior
officials are particularly conscious of the delicate balance between the
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Headquarters and field installation organizations, and they become un-
happy ill any heavy-handedness on the part ot a program manager tends
to disturb that balance. They expect program managers to resolve most
ditIerences with the project team informall) without having to resort
to the formal management system and the intcrxcntion oI the Head-
quarters division director.
The program manager is expected to look ahead and to anticipate
potential troubles so that neither he nor his supmior, the Division
Direttor, is caught unawares. Headqu:uters division directors expect to
be kept i,flormed without being deluged with unne(essary information.
Division directors and program managels agree that this "doctrine of
no surprises" works in both dilections--th,_t i_, upward for project
inlormation and downward to the project team on program decisions
and problems.
Rewards of Projecf Managemen÷
Most project managers are attracted to their jobs by the technical
and managerial challenges that a major flight or aeronautical project
offers. Project management poses a test of their technical skills, their
capacity to learn new things, and their ability to organize and manage
a large endeavor. Once they become project managers, most enjoy the
project responsibility, its fast pace, and its excitement. To lead the
development of a project from its concept through a successful flight
gives them a sense of fulfillment. The project managers oversee the
hardware design, see it take shape, plan and monitor the testing, and
play a key role in the actual flight antl return o| data. Being the head
of such an endeavor produces great personal satisfaction in spite of the
intense mental, emotional, and physical demands.
The great majority of those project maIlagers interviewed--and
particularly those on the larger, more projectized elIorts--desire to
remain in project management at tim conclusion of their current
projects. When confronted with the hypotheti{al choice of taking over
the leadership of a new project or moving up in the field installation or
NASA mauagement which would take them out of active project man-
agemeut, most unhesitatingly choose a new project.
Many of the sante attractions motivate the men who enter program
management. Rather than in the daily challenge of directing a major
project, however, program managers find their rewards in broad tech-
nical and managerial responsibility, a variety of contacts, and re-
sponsibility that covers greater scope than proje{t management. Program
managers obtain satisfaction from the opportunity to influence broad
decisions at the NASA Headquarters level. "l'he_ are not unaware of the
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potential opportunity to move up to positions of greater authority
within NASA management.
Generally speaking, the financial return for either program or project
management is good--usually commensurate with senior technical
management positions. Project or program management also provides
an opportunity to broaden one's area o[ competence, but at some risk
of losing both technical edge and technical identification. Program and
project managers are highly visible and thus in a position to receive
substantial organizational recognition when the project is successful.
9. Project and Program Managers.
A SummaryProFileof the Men and Their
Operational Style
"I_IfAT PORTION {)F TIIK LITERA.TURE {)n proje{t lllalla_el]lenl, which ad-
dresses tile l_erson'al skills, attributes, or ch,_ractc_isti{Ts of ploiect man-
agers tends to l}ro(h_ce such an impressive list as to make one wonder
whether or not stii/l giants o[ virtue really exist, iv In NASA, though the
criteria tor project (}r program managels me imlnessive, there is wide-
spread agreement /hat all the qualities needed l{}r 1}roject or program
managenlent are rarely if ever, to be found in a sinote individual. The
emphasis is ut}on building a pro/ect team within whi{h the key members
pla) {omplementary ;rod balancing roles with ]{>pect to the presence
and strength {}[ personal skills, experience, and {hal;t{:teristics.
No single, though composite, protile {an lelJ_esent the variety of
NASA project and program managers. The signiIi{:ant differences in
the respective roles o[ the project and proglam managers require a
somewhat dil[ment emphasis nl){m even {:onnn{m :tttrit}utes. Similarly
tile character of t}roject (}r t}rogram lnanagement generally varies
enough between OSSA and OART to justily de_elibing them sep-
aratel).
Before a protile o[ NASA project and prog] am managers, it is useful
to sketch the elements of an ideal manager as described by NASA
project and plogram managers, and by tieht installation and Head-
quarters senior otti{ials. Irrespectivc ot organi_ation there is agreement
among NASA otticials on the key {ha_a{leristic_ or attributes that a
project manager should possess.
First, he should have demonstrated techni(al competence, have
relatively broad experience, preterably as an engineer with some sys-
tems experience. The strong technical backgiound is needed for two
reasons: (l) lie nlust be able to comprehend d_e inter-relationships of
the many comi}lex technical elements tllat make u I} his project; and
(2) he must be in a position to command the teclmical respect of his
staff, h'respective of his other attributes, a project manager who does
not command the technical respect of his stait will have serious diffi-
culties, if not outright failure.
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Second, all agree that the project manager must have the ability
to work effectively with a wide variety of people, to build a cohesive
project team.
Third, he should have demonstrated management capacity; he
should have successfully organized and managed a task or operation of
a magnitude permitting some comparison with the project that he is to
direct.
In seeking project managers with these characteristics, officials at the
various NASA field installations follow a variety of practices. Most
seek project managers [rom those people who have served as principal
members of a project staff_an assistant project manager, project engi-
neer, or major systems manager. Project managers rarely are sought
outside the field installation, as a knowledge of the installation or-
ganization, both formal and informal, and the pro[essional staff is of
great value to the manager of any project whether or not it is organized
along projectized or matrix lines.
Program managers shouhl possess the same characteristics as do suc-
cessful project managers, although they are expected to be less aggres-
sive and to have a broader organizational perspective. The program
manager needs to recognize that his is a staff, and not a line, position;
he is not expected to run the project but he has a responsibility to see
that the project contributes to broader program goals and to help it
succeed in reaching these goals. He must support the project in every
way he can without becoming a captive of it and losing his capability
to be critical.
Both field installation and Headquarters experience help program
managers to achieve a balanced perspective and to understand the
critical problems at both levels. Most OSSA program managers are
recruited from program staffs. Most of the OART program nlanagers
come from project management posts in NASA field installations or
in industry.
Because his role involves considerable liaison and the interpretation
of the project to a wide variety of organizations, the program manager
must have the ability to communicate well both verbally and in writing.
A number of NASA senior officials express the opinion that project
and program managers should complement one another. Conscious
consideration should be taken of this at the time o[ their selection--
preferably selecting them in tandem.
Generally, OART program managers deal with a wider range of
small projects and advanced research tasks than do their colleagues in
OSSA. This suggests the need for greater emphasis on technical breadth
and knowledge, if they are to perform their dual roles as leaders of
projects and coordinators of broad technical programs.
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THE PROJECT MANAGER
The typical NASA project manager is in his midq0s, outgoing, self-
confident, aggressive, articulate, and generall) _}ptimistic. He has more
than three years of project management experience in addition to
about 15 years ot engineering design, research aml development, or
testing experience in NASA, industry, or the militaly. 1[ he is managing
an ()ART project, more likely than not he glow up in the NASA (or
NACA) engineering system.
He sees his two most important functions as: (1) organizing, di-
recting, anti motivating the project team: and (2) maintaining an
awareness of, evaluating, and acting to control (litical factors in project
progress. The OART project manage places project planning above
either project team or project information and _ontrol functions.
Although he brings an impressive array of per_,mal skills to his job,
the project manager places greatest import:race on human skills such
as the ability to coordinate group effort and mediate differences, the
communication of ideas, including advotacy, and the ability to work
with others 1)y generating enthusiasm and winning their respect. Even
though his job involves a ntajor technical undertaking, he views
managerial and conceptual skills as relatively mine important to him
than technical skills, which are available in abundance on his staff.
It is probably because he, personally, has considerable technical skill
that he values the other skills more highly, lie would not have been
considered for the job had he not demonstrated excellent technical
ability. The OART project manager fits mmh thi_ pattern, though he
ranks conceptual above managerial skills.
The project manager is not a lonely man. The great bulk of his
working day (he often averages ten hours a day. six days a week), is
spent with other people--members of his tnojett staff, Headquarters
officials, officials from supporting divisions at his field installation or
other NASA installations, contractor representatives, or visitors having
some interest in the project. The antount of paper generated in the
course of a project is mountainous. The projctt manager finds face-to-
face and telephone exchanges the most valuable means of staying on
top of the many activities involved in managing a project. The highly
touted formal systems for information attd (mmol are used for his-
torical, legal, base-line, and reference purposes--not for timely decision
making. Much of the information he re¢ei_es is filtered through a
project staff member. An OSSA flight project manager may have a staff
of more than 50 people assigned directl) to him. This encourages him
to spend considerable effort in organizing the project team, learning
their strengths and weaknesses, and molding them into a real team.
By contrast, the OART project manager usually has a small staff and
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may find himself involved in more of tile management paperwork
than his OSSA colleague, in spite of OAR.T's less extensive and less
formal management system.
Regardless of how the project is organized and the organizational
authority associated with it, the project manager tends to rely most
upon the authority of knowledgeIhiS personal technical knowledge,
his capacity to make the complex NASA organization serve the project
needs, and his ability to lead his project team tlirough a labyrinth of
frustrations and challenges. To the project manager it seems as though
everyone wants to get in on the act. Higher management at both the
field installation and NASA Headquarters is viewed as too frequently
restricting alternatives, creating additional checks to the project man-
ager's capacity to maneuver, and incessantly requesting more and more
detailed information. Technical obstacles multiply while technical sup-
port and financial resources seem to dwindle. Some managers meet
these challenges with quiet patience, others with vociferous, if not
aggressive, determination to beat down bureaucratic obstacles--but all
do it with a self-confident command of the facts and alternatives in
each case. The project manager is careful--almost to the point of
being conservative--about details involving major points of decision
in order to reduce risks and perturbations in both the technical and
management systems. Ite relies upon his team to work out problems
and to present him with alternatives which are well thought out and
well documented. He tests the team's advice against his own experience,
the advice of others, its own internal logic, and the evaluation of the
man offering the advice; this is collectively termed "engineering in-
tuition." Then, in conjunction with his team, he decides. But no
matter how broad or extensive the consultation, there is no question
about who has the final decision.
Virtually every project manager must overcome the temptation to
deal with technical problems in too great a depth. Most overcome this,
effectively delegating responsibility and accepting the role of manager
rather than technician. The project manager has a single-minded drive
to complete the project successfullyi"see it fly" as planned. He is
acutely conscious that the project team, not NASA Headquarters or the
field installation management, is the key to making the project a
success.
In terms of personal perspective, the project manager considers him-
self a manager and not a technician. He is most interested in getting
the job done with personal satisfaction or team harmony, and he culti-
vates his project team as the most important organizational element in
project success.
What attracts a man to project management? Most join because of
the challenge of an important task, technically and managerially,
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combined with the potential satisfaction of seeing a complex piece of
hardware progress fronl paper to success[ul 1)eltolmance under one's
guidance.
The OSSA project manager looks forward to new project assignments
upon completion of his current project. For him, 1he thrill of project
management i_ stronger than tile pull of the laboratory or deeper
immersion in a technical specialty. In tontrasl, about half or more
OART project managers seek a return to more technically detailed
development or research. For many of them managing a project is an
interesting but transitory diversion.
THE PROGRAM MANAGER
The typical NASA program manager is ill his late 40s--about three
years older than his counterpart project nlanagcr, lte exhibits many
of tile same personal characteristics as tile p_oj_:_t manager; he is self-
confident, articulate, outgoing, achievelnent-orientcd, but usually less
aggressive. He has had twenty years of engineering or research experi-
ence, at least hall of that in sotne supervisoly o_ management capacity.
If he is an OSSA program manager, tile chances ale good that he has
had either military o_ industrial resear(h and de_ehqmmnt management
experience. If he is an OART program man'locr,_ , lie probably has
managed a project in a NACA laboratory.
fie sees his two most important functions as: (1) maintaining an
awareness of, evaluating, and acting to contlol critical lactors in project
progress; and (2) project planning.
The program manager places greatest importance upon such man-
agerial skills as the capacity to operate within tlle olganizational system
(its goals, structures and procedures), the cap:t_itx to operate within
the control system (scheduling, quality control, technical reliability),
and tile capacity to operate within the tinaucial management system
(budgeting, cost control, accounting). The p_ogram manager views
human skills as ranking closely to managerial skills in importance, for
his stat[ role requires him to put cousiderable emphasis on developing
;.ill informal network of personal contacts. The ()ART program man-
ager puts greatest emphasis upon human and _on_el)tual skills, as his
organizational authority is even more tenuous than that of the OSSA
program manager, and he e,rgages in a broadel span of program
planning activity.
The program manager, as the principal Headquarters official re-
sponsible for monitoring the day-by-day progress of a project, but
lacking a still[, spends over two-thirds of his time on project informa-
tion and control, and project planning functions. Like the project
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nlanagcr, he relies more upon /ace-to-face and telephone exchanges for
receiving and passing along vital information on the status of the
project, but l)ri,r_ipally in tire di,ection of the project manager, not
trpward to the l lc,.hlu;ulers division director. The program manager
does make greater use o[' written documents th:m does tile t)roject
managcr_ ,c_pcciallx. I)MRs and reports or nlemoranda re(luested by him
of the project stall, l te also reports up the tteadquarters chain of com-
nland tlnol,gh documents and formal reviews more often than through
inlormal discussions. While OSSA consistently uses the MICS for
general formal reviews in NASA ttc:.[quarters, OART does not have so
complete and [ormal a system. Generally, tile OART program nlanager
is less involved with standardized reporting and control s)stenls.
The program manager tends to function as an individual. His position
carries little authority so he must nurture an authority of knowledge
and dependability even more than tile project manager_ . Tile system of
relationships that lie constructs is so personalized that his successor
virtually has to start from scratch. To succeed, the program nianager
must demonstrate to his superiors in NASA Headquarters that lie has
his finger on the pulse of tile project and retains the trust of the project
staff; he must demonstrate to the proiett manager and his team that
he has the confidence of NASA Headquarters management and can
speak for them, though he does not have that responsibility formally.
He acts as a coordinator ira dealing with tile project teant and laterally
throughout the NASA organization. He performs as a staff specialist
when working with other agencies and in preparing project justification
for the budget, authorization, and appropriations processes.
The l)rogram ntanager enjoys tile arena of managentent and policy
struggle. He wants to get the project completed, but he is more in a
position to facilitate it than to command it. He associates himself
closely with tile project and tile project team, and their success becomes
his success. Generally, he has a longer-term perspective than the project
manager, who tends to be most concerned with the next launch. OSSA
program managers are sometimes more caught up in immediate prob-
lems; this reflects a close concern with the day-to-day progress of the
project and the periodic, sometimes unexpected crises that develop at
higher levels toward which a program manager must react. This pre-
occupation with short-range time perspective by OSSA program man-
agers may retlect an institutional shortchanging of the program goal
perspective, a critical responsibility at the headquarters level.
The program manager has clearly chosen a career in management. He
seeks his rewards in the satisfaction of having close access to the levers
of influence, and to having a relatively greater voice in agency policy
on programs in his area. His participation in technical success must
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be one of distant ,dfiliation. He is in a position to _oordinate, to stimu-
late new ;litioll illl(l _onlbinations: to be a (ill;llxsl, but not the builder
or "boss." Yet, in the NASA project management _ystem, his is a vital
roteia critical lin/hpin between project cxe_tttiot_ and program con-
trol.
PART III. PROBLEMS AND STRENGTHS
IN THE NASA SYSTEM OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT

10. The Most CriticalProblemsin the Project
ManagementSystem"The ProjectanclProgram
Managers'View
TH_ 61 PROJFCT AND PROGRAM 5_ANAGERS interviewed during the course
of this study were asked what management problems tile)' consider pose
tile greatest obstacles to successful project performance. They replied
with candor and deliberatio,l, producing a list of over a dozen prob-
lems, most of which are subsumed here within five categories: (1) the
increasing complexity and time lag in the decisio,l process, (2) the
need for gleater responsiveness from divisions providing support to
matrix-organized projects, (3) absorbing or reassigning project staff
upon project completion, (4) the lack of project control over experi-
menters on flight projects, and (5) technical obsolescence among the
project staff.
THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY AND TIME LAG IN THE
DECISION PROCESS
NASA program a,ld project managers identify growing red tape as
the most important problem for project and program management.
The), recognize that it is largely the result of two circumstances: (1) the
increasingly restricted resources available to NASA, and (2) a con-
current pressure for no failures in the launching and operation of any
major flight project. Both project and program managers are aware
that contributing to this restrictive Inanagement environment is the
frequently critical view t;_ken of the space program by centers o[ power
in the Federal government--such as the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent and key congressional committees--and public apathy or an-
tagonism toward NASA's programs.
Program anti project managers see this trend borne out in: (1) a less
people-oriented, more formal management system, (2) requirements
for increasingly detailed reports, and (3) a more time-consuming re-
view process at e:_ch point in the life cycle of a project. The require-
ments for additional documentation increase the workload at both the
project and program levels, neither of which is permitted to have new
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people to handle tile additional paperwork. ,Nlost irritating to project
managers is tile ration,de given lor the increasing formality--to provide
better decisions at lower cost and to imlnmC ploject performance.
Project man,tgels pointedly deny that the} have c,bsmved any improve-
ment ill project performance and declare that tosts actually have
increased because of the extended delays in the decision process, and
the cost of keeping people and tacilitics idle during the decision
process.
The more elaborate review process is viewed by many project and
program tnanagms as an erosion of Iheir at.thoritv. They see their
capacity to art seriously hedged. Most pLojcct illanagcls lay the blame
on N:\SA Headquarters, ahhough some acknmvledgc that restrictions
are added by field installation management a_ well. They see both
levels of management as more hesitant to takc risk_ and less eager to
act with dispatch in making decisions.
The managers of small in-house projects are cspccially sensitive to
the longer decision process. Many of these projects are completed in
less thal/ two years. These managers observe that the ploject approval
process frequently takes longer than the execution oil tile project, This,
they believe, tends to inhibit innowttive research ideas' being developed
in the fiehl installations, because researchers become less inclined to
fight an extended battle with the bureaucracy when tile chances for
success seem slim..\n increasing number of people appear to be able
to delay or intluence a decision, ahhough they ma} have little under-
standing of the project's relative value or of the data it will produce.
Progxam managers agree that the increased reporting aud review
requirements prodt, ce an air of distrust between tile t leadquarters anti
field installations, tending to reduce both inm,xatio.t anti creativity.
This intrudes uI)on the project manager's informal system, critical in
the performance of his role. The level of detail is pushed at least one
step higher in the otganization, tending to inuml:_te senior manage-
ment with data and myriad decisions that ])r()g)am and project man-
agers believe should be resolved closer to the working level. This forces
the program manager to put more etnphasis on maintaining the ttow
of inforntation in the formal system, and less on the development and
maintenance ol the informal system, which usuall_ is much faster and
more accurate.
One N:XSA senior official describes tile process of increased reporting
and review as "one which tends to protect everyone, obfuscate responsi-
bility, and cost a tremendous amount of time." Another, speaking with
particular reference to the ever-lengthening procurement process, sug-
gests that thcqe is "a need to be more intelligent rather than perfect."
Closely related is the view that, because of the trend toward greater
formality, the program manager role requires suonger organizational
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or formal authority. This concern is expressed by program managers in
both OART and OSSA, although it was cited by fewer than half of
the program managers interviewed in either organization. In OART
this observation is made most frequently by those program managers
who came to NASA from industrial project management. A particular
complaint by the program managers in OART who desire stronger
organizational recognition is that field installation directors, under the
new RTOP systenl, have the authority to reprogram funds within the
RTOP. Several OART projects are subsumed along with other activities
under a single RTOP. The program managers are especially distressed
when an installation director reprograms ftmds from the program man-
ager's project to another activity deemed more important to the field
installation.
Most of the program managers in OSSA who believe that program
managers should be accorded greater formal authority have less tenure
on the program than do the project managers with whom they work.
These men had to pick up the responsibility from a predecessor and
faced the difficult task of developing new and refurbishing old informal
relationships that were disrupted when the previous program nlanager
left.
THE NEED FOR GREATER RESPONSIVENESS FROM DIVISIONS
PROVIDING SUPPORT TO MATRIX-ORGANIZED PROJECTS
The problem of enforcing project goals, as well as cost anti schedule
limits, is endemic to the project system of organization. By definition,
the matrix project organization depends upon the positive cooperation
of people or organizations; the project manager has no ultimate au-
thority to hire, promote, or fire the members of the matrix-organized
team.
Three principal types of support are furnished to various matrix-
organized projects in NASA. They are: (1) the assignment of people
to a project on a full-time basis and under circumstances where these
people will be located physically in the project office (apart from the
individual's parent organization); (2) the acceptance of the manage-
ment and execution of a specific task such as the design, fabrication, or
test of a component or subsystem to be accomplished within the sup-
porting division's own organization, or under contract, without locating
division personnel in the project office; and (3) the temporary assign-
ment of division personnel to a project for troubleshooting purposes,
varying from a few days to several months.
Divisions do not support matrix-organized projects solely because they
are so directed by the management of an installation, or out of gener-
osity. Usually, the division receives R&D funds beyond any direct costs
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incnrred by tim division on the project work. These funds come from
the Advanced Research and Technology (ART) or Supporting Re-
search and Technology (SRT) budgets assigned to the project. This
gives the supporting division an opportunity to support indigenous
research otherwise not possible.
There are three general categories of "deficiency" cited by project
managers. First, supporting divisions may put their most experienced
and most highly skilled people to work oll the inoject during the earl),
definition and planning stages (as one projtxt manager suggested, to
"sell" their participatioll in the project), and quietly replace them with
other staff members at some point during lnOjcct execution. Second,
supporting divisions fail to meet schedules because of a proclivity to
refine a component or subsystem beyond projc_t requirements, or be-
cause those engaged on the task are temporarily diverted from it by
tasks of greater personal interest or by direction of the division manage-
ment. Thi_d, supporting divisions lnay riot acspond quickly and with
their best people to emergency requests from the project manager to
troubleshoot a test failure or other critical cvcnl.
These problems of responsiveness ale not found equally in kind or
intensity in all field installations, though most haxe experienced them
at one time or another. Some field installations have had more difficulty
than others. There are two underlying differences between those in-
stallations whkh have few problems with the matlix project organiza-
tion and those which have more. One difference is in the number of
large projects which divisions are called upon to support, if a division
nmst support too many projects, scientists and engineers principally
assigned to do advanced or applied research are required to turn their
attention to a project rather than their own rcsc:mh interests. (Of
course, ideally, project responsibilities and pelsonal interests agree.) A
second difference is the existence of an explicit priority system by which
division directors and project managers know the degree of support that
can be expected and when to expect it, coupled with a policy of fre-
quent review of these priorities. In those field installations where such
a system exists and where it is enforced by the top management, there
is considerably less difficulty in the support of the matrix-organized
projects.
Responsiveness will remain a key i)roblem in those installations where
top managenlent fails to emphasize its support of project activity and
where priorities are vague or reviewed infrequently.
ABSORBING OR REASSIGNING PROJECT STAFF UPON
PROJECT COMPLETION
Clayton Reeser, in his study of human problems connected with the
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project t Olin o[ olganiz,_tion, made three observations about project
personnel <ompared to those in functional organizations with respect
to project completion or ternlination. TM First, project personnel sutfer
Inore anxieties about the possible loss of employment than do members
of ftmction,d organizations; second, tile}' tend to be more frustrated by
wllat they perceive to be nlake-work assignments than do nlembers of
functional organizations; and, third, they worry nlore about being set
back in their _areers.
Many ot tim project stall members on the larger projects surveyed
wouhl agree with R.eeser's observations. Tile problenl is not particularly
acute lor project statfs on tile smaller in-lIouse projects, since they are
involved witll a particular project for a sllorter pmiod of time and tend
to move from task to task whether or not they are on a forinal project
team; tile>, remain in an applied research setting and are only infre-
quently physically removed lronl their parent organization.
The problem o1 absorbing project staff is especially troublesoine on
the larger projects duling a period of retrenclmlent, and is nluch more
noticeable in those olganizations wllich are pro.iectized. Until the late
1960s, neitllcr OSSA nor OAI?,T llad lnu_h experience with the closeout
of large projects. Generally, project staff have had the opportunity to
nlove to a new project or to a project feasibilit,/ study. For example, at
LaRC, much of the I,unar Orbiter project stag nloved to the Viking
Project. At GSFC, when the A-OSO was cancelled and the OGO conl-
pleted, project stall moved to new proje(ts or to those receiving renewed
emphasis such as the OAO, :X_TS, and ERTS. This occurred at a time
when retrenchment was not so great as it has been in the 1969 to 1971
period, yet there were some significant problems. A number of project
staff were left lloating without a specific assignment. Others had to take
positions considerably subordinate to the ones they previously held or
felt that they were elnployed in make-work tasks. Periods of temporary
assigmnent lasted for periods of six months to a year in some instances.
Project staff who experienced or observed this dislocation attest to the
low morale that it produced. They report that tile dislocation fostered
feelings that career progress was being severely stunted, and that tech-
nical competence was being dulled by seelningly meaningless assign-
ments.
Presumably, one of the advantages of a matrix-organized project is
that it provides greater flexibility in tile use o[ technical staff--the most
critical resource in project managenIent. Theoretically, engineers and
scientists working within the matrix system are in a relatively good
position to be reassigned, at the conclusion of the project, to the
technical organization from which they came. In many cases, they
continued to be carried on the roles of that organization. In actual
practice, and with the exception of the smaller in-house projects, this
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reabsorption by tile technical divisions has not occurred. Project man-
agers and project staff as well as senior installation otficials attribute
this to two factors: (1) tile individual has been so intensely involved
in a specific system ol the particular project thai Ire has not been able
to kee l ) pace with his laboratory colleagues on the research front; and
(2) the individu,d enjoys tile project environment And its pace more
than those ot the applied research laboratory so Ihat he remains on a
project staff where that is possible.
With [ew new starts being made on space flight projects, the problem
of al)sorbing p_oject stall or reassigning them upon project completion
is more critical. Perhal)s what is needed is an agency-wide prograln of
technical upgrading ol project stall in order to tacilitate their return
to tile laboratory or to technical managenlent.
THE LACK OF PROJECT CONTROL OVER EXPERIMENTERS ON
FLIGHT PROJECTS
The integration o1 tlight expeliments with the spacecraft which will
carry them is a technical and managerial leat. The experiments carried
by a space,raft represent a major system arc:.t in which project man-
agers have very limited control. The experilnentcl_, ol primipal investi-
gators, are selected by a special NASA tleadqu'artels committee which
reviews proposals horn university, industrial, and governmental labora-
tories. Decisions on which experiments are t{_ llx :no based on an ex-
amination of their s¢ientific excellence, their engineering and opera-
tional feasibility within the technical and schedule parameters [or the
proposed tlights, and their relative compatibility.
The project manager's chief COnlplaint is that he is not able to
exercise tile same management or technical _onttol over tile design,
fabrication, test, and integration of the experimt:nts that he exercises
over tire spacecraft and other major systems ot the mission. Project
nlanagers frequently conlplain that experimenters do a poor job of
nlonitoring costs and schedules for the fabricati_m and testing of their
experiments, and that experinlenters' refusal or rclu(t;mce to modify
their experiments to :tccommodate minimum or desired performance
among other sut)s}stenls of tile flight causes undue delay in tile project.
One factor which contributes to this tension between project man-
agers and experimenters is that most project managers are oriented
more toward tile spacecraft and its pertormance than tire)' are toward
tile instrument payload.
Several project managers described circumstan(es in which a uni-
versity experinlenter circumvented the proje{t manager, and appealed
to program scientists in N,\SA Headquartels. lwo p_ogram managers
in OSSA agree that a principal problem is the genclal lack of manage-
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mcnt competence on tim part of ln,uly experimenters. One wryly ob-
served that npo,_ completion of the detailed design stage, he can
estimate accurately the total proje{t cost within two per cent "except
for the experiments, which usually overHm cousiderably." Some project
statf went so tar as to suggest that the selection of experiments should
be placed in the h:utds of the project lnanager. This probably is not
feasible for scientific satellites, since it would hinder Headquarters'
determiuation of scientific prograln goals.
The Viking Project is seeking to ameliorate this problem by having
the Viking Project responsible for the formal manageinent of the
experiment fabrication and test contracts. The project office will also
retain managelnent oversight and responsibility for all experiments on
the lander system of the project. This will provide added strength to
the management portion of the experimental subsystems, without sig-
nificantly disturbing the responsibility for the teclmical requirements
that necessarily remain with the experimenter.
TECHNICAL OBSOLESCENCE AMONG THE PROJECT STAFF
Project managers and senior installation managers want to see project
statf members kept in the best technical form possible, not only from
the viewpoint of personal development of the staff members, but also
its a nleans of inlusi,lg new and innovative technical ideas into the
projects. Project managers of the smaller in-house projects do not con-
sider this a problem--probably because the time pressures are not so
intense, perlnitting project team members greater opportunity to keep
up on their professional reading, and because of their closer involvement
with the flight hardware. Greatest concern is expressed about the large
project whose life span runs five to ten years or more (e.g., Viking,
Pioneer, Nimbus, and the launch vehicle plojects). The problem is
recognized as a potentially serious one, and apparently is discussed
frequently although no field installation has taken concerted action.
Potentially, the launch vehicle projects are the most vulnerable; they
tend to be nmre operational than the space flight projects, where there
is considerable change fi'om flight to flight and where the life cycle
usually is shorter. Development never fully ceases on a launch vehicle
since small improvements are being made continually, but a signifi-
cantly smaller proportion of resources is devoted to increased develop-
ment on launch vehicles than on flight projects. As time passes, the
launch vehicle project team has less and less technical challenge. The
uhimate resuh may be that launch vehicle project team members be-
come less able to move to other development projects, and the project
manager has difficulty attracting replacement personnel because of the
relatively unattractive technical environment.
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Some attempts have been nlade o_ planne<l to exchange staff between
operating divisions anti a project team, but Ibis has been limited to
only one o_ two people and is not consideled to be the solution. Project
olgallizatiolls are lean and hesitant to lose ,tn CXl_mienced engineer
even if only for a period of six nlonlhs lo a )cal. Some believe that it
takes longer than this tor tile project team metnbel to gain his technical
stride in :m operating division, and that su{h exchanges for anything
less than two years are not worthwhile. They also le_ognize that such
exchanges in,t',: result in the loss o[ personnel. 1 he problem still re-
mains to be ad<hessed in a cohetent and lol{etul ma,mer.
11. Strengthsof the NASA ProjectManagement
System.Observationsand Conclusions
ONE CANNOT CONCLUDE a review of NASA's project management as it
was organized and conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s without
a strong sense of admiration for its innovative character and the solid
achievements of the men who made it work successfully. The general
system comprises three elements: (1) competent persons on the project
teams and in leadership positions as project and program managers, (g)
a concept of project organization flexible enough to be suited to tasks
of great variety and scope, and (3) a general organizational structure
and management environment, in the agency and in the field installa-
tions, which support project-type management. None of this was acci-
dental. The system was deliberately conceived by NASA top manage-
ment, based on its NACA heritage, the lessons gained in defense weapons
acquisition programs during and following World War 1I, and the
fundamental concept of centralized planning and control but decen-
tralized project execution.
This study suggests that much of the project management literature
overemphasizes, in terins of successful project management performance,
two components of project management: (1) the formal management
system used, and (2) the skills and attributes of the project manager.
The NASA experience reveals these to be important, but, in com-
parison with other important elements in the project management sys-
tem, these components probably have been given undue recognition
because of their high visibility.
Another conclusion is that inadequate notice has been taken of a
unique and particularly innovative aspect of NASA's project manage-
ment system--the program manager. This position is institutional evi-
dence of top management's recognition that NASA Headquarters has
critical functions and responsibilities to meet with respect to successful
project management, but that they are dilferent from those of the field
installations. NASA appears to be the only major agency which uses
project-type organization to make this distinction in its formal or-
ganization. The first major study of general management within the
Defense Department for the acquisition of major weapons systems
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describes no organizational entity comparable to NASA's t)rogram
nlailager. *
In the pages that follow, these three point,_ ot mcreml)hasis or over-
sight are dis(ttssed, l:our related issuc_ ;ue cx:_mincd in terms of what
NASA experience suggests about pml)lcms and al)pli(ations of project
m;tn,_gement: (I) managitlg large projects t,sing a matrix project of
ganization, (2) the eltects of "l)ureat. ratization" upon project m.tnage-
ment, (3) the relationship between organizatiomtl tontinuity in an
agen¢y and its use of project-type m,lnagement, and (t) applying NASA
project management in other agencies.
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Nearly all the |)rojects suixeyed in this stud', wc_c in the Phase D,
developtnent and operations, or exetution stage..'\lost ]nojett managers
nlake only limited use o[ the [ormaI tonnol aml intormation systems.
Their staff members use thetn more hequcntl}. Ptin(ipal reli:tnce is
placed t,pon infornizd, ttnwritten, lace-to-face or tc, lephone discourse.
However, fOllllal y;ystelllS selve at least fotlr i)url)oSes.
First, wlittcn teports (e.g., I)MR, MICS, POP) dotument actions and
decisions for legal, historical, in[ormation cxthangc, and review pur-
poses. The} provide a basis [or le¢all of how te{hnical sohttions were
reached, as well as the assignment of action to spe(ific people or of
ganizations. In conjunction with critical te(hni( a l _ex lows, configuration
and test reports trace the lite history of subs}stems. (omponents, and
parts st) that failure or inadequate per[ormance can be traced to its
cause. This level of detail rarely enters the management systeln except
where a tnajor faihtre is reviewed.
Second, the formal reporting and control doctmtents provMe a refer-
ence point or base line when pas_ing along additional, more up-to-date
inforntation. Such a referente point is especially usetul in communica-
tions with sotneone who is not in daily touch with the progress of the
project.
Third, the general infortnation and control s_stctn establishes critical
points for periodic review by senior nlan,lgen/ent and associated staff.
Many o[ these reviews are technical (reliability, testing, configuration
*Sec Comptroller General of the United States, Acquisitio_ of Major Weapons
Systems, Department of De[ense, Report to tile Congress 15 163058, March 18, 1971
(Gentqal Accounting Otlice) . This GAO repmt reveals that ;t principal weakness in
DOD proje(t managemtnt is the burden of many disparate dt|l ies upon most project
lllatl-ggcrs, {HIe of the nmst burdensome being a ((mstant deluge of requests, com-
ments, and quasi-orders from headquartels, resulti,xg in a tangled web of time-
consuming relationships.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 111
changes), but frequently the), require col_sidcring modifications ill
schedule or resource allocation.
Fourth, the requirement of periodic reports forces a ¢ert:,in discipline
upon the project manager and his stall. They must explain clearly
to others what they have ac(omplished, how they have solved problems,
and what they foresee. Most of the data for the lormal s)stem originates
at the contractor level, with Consolidation, ev:thlation, and additional
data prepared by the project man;Jger's stall'.
All of those interviewed recognize the value ot the formal informa-
tion and control system in these four uses. Nevertheless, program and
project managers do not rely upon it to kee l) informed, or to make
critical decisions, in the short time frame within which most of them
operate. The reasons why they do not rely more upon it are: (1) since
it is a writteu system, it is larely up to date with events and therefore
has little value as an alerting system, especially on technical problems;
(2) aside from timeliness, it may poltray problems inaccurately because
of the reporter's desire to kee l) the problem to himself tmtil he solves
it_this is more likely to occur in the context of a written report than
in a face-to-lace meeting; and (3) the amount of detail may obscure
critical issues--for ex,tmple, one field installation official cited a specific
case of "deluging" tleadqualters with a mz_ss of detail in an attempt
to divert attention lrom major diilerentes in projet t man:lgement poli(y.
The formal system is useful for providiug standard information to
all who particil)ate in a project and lor recognized points lor review
and control. It is especially critical iu setting the definition o[ the project
during the planning and design stages, l.'ollowing that it becomes a
useful reference and confirmatiou process. But it is _ot the heart of
project manageme_t. No formal arrangement can replace the dynamic
system ot personal and informal relations developed by key members
of the proje¢t team to meet that project's particular needs.
WHAT MAKES A SUCCESSFUL PROJECT MANAGER?
An important objective of this study was to determine the extent
to which success as a project manager can be captured in a profile of
personal characteristics, skills, and management perspectives. No simple
answer emerged. Although the project manager can be viewed as the key
man in the system, he symbolizes the project team and represents its
collective capacities. The breadth and variety of skills needed to manage
today's complex aerospace projects are beyond the capacity of any
single person. What is needed for project success, assuming adequate
resources and agency support, is a project team capable of working in
harmony and exhibiting a balance of the skills needed--technical,
managerial, human, and conceptual.
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"File 1)erlormance criteria for a project lnzmagel seenl to be related
more to team l)erfolm,mce than to team leadership. The most important
is tile tec/mical stacess of the project: whether the llight or experiment
perfornls ade(tu;del ) and returns useful data. Bolh _enior officials and
project managers acknowledge this is tirst in impolt,mce, followed
closely by meeting the project's goals in trams el s(hedule and cost. The
best man;]ger ostensibly is the one who acllie_cs highest technical per-
fornla]lce, a]ld who conies closest, relatively, to meeting the cost and
schedule estimates. But a project can meet thc_e three criteria, and
the m,mager no! be considered lully smcesshd. Agcm y leadership looks
for a mininuun of organizational ov personal tutlmlence--they expect
project managers to anticipate problems and head them off, and they
expect project managers to h,tve sutlicicnt pclsl)c(tive to avoid undue
clashes with broadel program or agency goals,
Those responsible for selecting project mamagers attest to seeking at
least three prin(ipal qualities: (1) a strong te(hnical background per-
mitting the lnOjeCt manager to command the te(hnical respect of his
stall/ and to comprehend the inter-relationships a_mmg tile many tech-
Ifical elements o[ the project, (2) the abi]it? to Imild a cohesive team
by working et[ectively with a wide variety el people, and (3) demon-
strated management ability.
An attempt to analyze these qualities in gleatcv detail (such as tile
discussion el management [unctions, skills, personal (haracteristics, and
perspectives [ound in Chapters 7 and 8) leads t. no single profile oI
tile successtul project manager. 'lhe directms of NASA field installa-
tions and their senior stall, when asked to name the most successful
project managers, ,. (:ould not agree,, declined to make _uch a differentia-
tion. or fotmd it ditticult to explain the reasons for their choices. A
review of the questionnaires el those named revealed no pattern of
responses with respect to personal skills or (hal,a leristics.
The attempt to find some (tuantitiltive v,diditv to a particular set o[
characteristics failed--possibly I)ecause they were applied too narrowly
(only to lhe project manager, not to the 1)rojctt team).
Perh,tps the more revealing question is "Why do i)lo](!cts fail?" None
of those reviewed in this stu(ly couh[ be considered tailures, although
several encounterc(I serious difficulty which, apparently, resulted in the
cb;mge of projett managers. In those instances, the change in managers
was accompanied by a dedication of additional _esouvces aud an im-
t)roved t)riority--which may well have saved the l,Oic(l lrom difficulty
in the first place. Several project managers observe tfial the surest rule to
follow it one wants to be successful is "never be the fi,st manager of a
project."
Since no profile of personal characteristics and skills is verifiable,
the most useful indicators o[ a successful project manager are: (1) a
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past record ol extraordinary a_hicvemcnt ill mauaging technical proj-
ects, (2) ;t well-dcveh)l)C([ sense of cngineming judgment or "intuition"
((lis(ussed in thai)to) 8), and (3) a mature sense of risk-taking--i.e.,
the best solution is that involving least risk in terms ot the lotal system
(tcchni(al, schedule, tinancial, "l)olitical"--Chapter 7).
Sin(c mcu ol such dillering di,_positions, experience, and qualities
ha_e proved su((esstul in m;maging NASA 1)lojects, it is understandable
that the ;tgcn_v has made only limited etIorts to train generic project
managers,. In the early 1960s, NASA contratted with a m:magement
tirm lot a short tt,tining {oursc in project managenmnt. It was not
repeated. The wide xaricty of projects and project organizations within
NASA probably luakcs a single course of instruction unrealistic. A
program ot special nolo is the one developed by otlicials at the Goddard
Space l;light Center lot its own use, but subsequently enrolling lnem-
bers ol 1)rojcct teams hom other installations its well. Termed
(;I_,EMEX, /or (;oddard Research and l:ngineering Management Exer-
cise, it stimulates the time l)rCssures and decision-making with limited
information which ;t lnojc_t manager must fa{e. :\lthough limited in
scope, the exercise helps those new to project management tt) begin to
al)lneciate the environment in which the,v nlust work.
THE ROLE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER
In his stttdy of N,\SA t)rogram and project managers, and industry
managers on NAS,\-tunded projects, Robert Mandeville revealed
enough overlap in the functions pertormed by industrial project man-
agers, NASA project man;tgers, and other Headquarters elements to
recommend t urther study o[ the NASA program management struc-
ture.e()
This stttdy suggests that the program manager role does not duplicate
that of the project ntanager, l towever, if the program manager tends
to delve too deeply into the details of project management and fails
to concentrate his et[orts on facilitating review and decision at Head-
quarters on project matters, coordination with other government agen-
cies, and the informal development o[ points of influence both within
and outside NASA Headquarters to promote project goals, he is not
fulfilling his role. The program-project manager axis is a sensitively
balanced one; it can provide benefits over other management structures
if both participants work together in filling their respective roles.
Ideally, the project manager is free to concentrate on the demanding
task o[ executing the project, as long as it progresses satislactorily,
while the program manager protects and promotes the project interest
in the NASA Headquarters and with the external environment.
In spite of the recognized value of the ideal relationship between the
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program and [)roic¢t m,m:tgcrs, tile most positive b,dan¢c has several
obsta_lcs. ()no is that lhc l_rojc¢t manager does not alwa)s accept tile
[)lOgl"zttll t11;111:11,_('1 it'_ hi>, peel. Pro}eft ttlittl;l_('tS ',_)lltClilllCS view plo-
glare manaxt'ts a,, h'ss than thcit equals xvhcn it <,llltCs to the tcchnic,d
aspc(Is ol the ])t<_}ctt, and thb, tcntl,, to tnakc lhciJ _¢:lationship morc
distant. In Ihc tn,wc cxttctnc instal_¢c+, lhc ])lotz, i;im ntilllltgur is barely
tolclatt'd and {onsitlctcd a "llciulqtlattut_, ¢lcrk."
It is not clts; tO thiulgc suih ;t pclspc_tivc, l'w<_ pcttcntial solutions
have l)cctl stlg_,e.,Icd. ()ttc is I()l :.,ctliol ollit ials in NASA tleadquarters
to make a grcatct cttort ill lhc sc[ctti<m _>1 pto_raun managers to obtain
those who arc tcthnitally rc¢ognizetl, in addition to ha',ing the other
talents required. Second. both lle:tdqu,utcr+, tti_ision dilectors and
program managers gem'rally agree that ]nogtatn I;qatlagcls alld pr0iect
111allat.P,ClS should I)e scle¢tcd ill t_.tlldclll to coutl)Icntcnt one another's
strengths in both skills and personality. This has I)ccn attempted con-
sciously on several programs.
One (hatacteristic of the pl'Ogl';tl+ll 111[tll;tgctll,t'ltt s\stelll found in
OSSA and ().\R.I' is the allnost total dc])etldcntc on the informal sys-
tem which each ])roglatn manager exolvcs in orttcr to meet his responsi-
bilities. When a (hange is made in cithct the ])_o._lam manager or the
projeCt manager, that patti(ular [ntornlal s_stcm c_aporates and the
progr:m_ manager must reconstrt,ct the sxstem. 5mh a cha,_ge disrupts
the progtam matlagcnmnt system. Thc inlotntal ,,'+stem is especially
ditficuh to rc¢onstt-uct if the project mattagct ,tl the field inst,dlation
has |ollg tCllttle in the project and there have hcc_ one or lllOrC changes
in the program manager at lleadquavtcls..ks {me tormer program
manager expressed it. +'The new tn:m ¢annt>t lint ,m the old ln'ogra,n
inan:.ttger's unJlorlll, ca_h has to t:filov his own."
There is no pat solution. :k progratn lllltll:tgCl at(t.+tlcs to some un-
specified authority by virtue of his position. But, as a staff member, he
acquires authorily only as rapidly and to the extent that he gains the
confidence of his division director and the proicct tnanztger--and each
recognizes the tonfitlence placed in him by the othcr.
In spite ot these limitations, the position ot pto<r:ml manager is an
important elctncnt in the success of the NASA proie{t management
system. It trees the project manager of much liai,,tm work with func-
tional _t,ttt otliccs in NASA Headquarters and with outside agencies. It
helps clear the way l-or needed resource support, l, ovides a "friend
inside tteadquarters," and fiequetltly provides :1 source of needed
leverage when dealing with field installation manzlgcment. When awards
are made, the progranl manager usually is considctc+d a member of the
successtul project team.
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MANAGING LARGE PROJECTS WITH MATRIX ORGANIZATION
Project organization is detelmined by: (1) tile type of project--i.e.,
observatory class spacecraft project, launch vehicle project, small scien-
tific space flight project, large ground-based experiment, o1" aeronautics
project; (2) the managenmnt environnlent of the installation where it is
located; and (3) the operating style of the project manager. Observatory
satellites and launch vehicle projects exhibit a projecti/ed organization,
witll concentration 055 monitoring and in;luaging contractors ill tile
execution of the project wo,k. Most other projects are conducted within
at matrix organization because a substantial portion of the work is
accomplished in-llot,se--systems design, integration, or testing.
The Ames Research Center has managed its two large satellite projects
through proje(tized organization. The Lewis Research Center projectizes
its launcll vehicle l)rojects, but did manage a large satellite, the SERT-
II, through a closely controlled matrix organization where much of the
tal)rication was perl;oruled in-house. The Langley Research Center man-
aged the Lunar Orbiter through a partial matrix organization, using a
relatively large project stall assigned full time, with supporting assis-
tance from tile operating divisions. Most of those assigned full time to
Lunar Orbiter did not return to operating divisions at the conclusion of
the project, but moved on to the Viking project. Viking is being
operated much like Ltmar Orbiter--a large project staff assigned full
time, about half of whom are retained on tile rolls of operating divisions
but who may spend ),ears on the project. The Goddard Space Flight
Center uses a modified matrix system similar to Langley's for large
projects. Some personnel from operating divisions are assigned full time
to the project stall:, others remain with their respective divisions, but
are assigned subsystems or major components for which they monitor
and manage contractor execution.
In none of tile large flight projects where a matrix-type organiza-
tion was used to manage a contractor operation has the organization
worked ideally according to the theory. The projects thenlselves have
been successful, but the classic matrix eventually is modified. Those
people assigned to the project staff rarely return to operating depart-
merits to refurbish their technical edge at the research bench.
D,"here operating divisions are assigned project tasks, the results
have been mixed, depending upon the project and the division and their
respective leadership. On some projects these assignments have worked
out satisfactorily for both the division and the project. On others the
project manager retrieved active management of the subsystem or called
upon a contractor for assistance when the division embellished its task
or gave it insufficient priority.
Project managers point to industry and observe that companies go
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through cycles, swinging from an eml_hasis on [,vojectized management
at one time to the matrix form at another. "lhc _t_atrix form requires
delicate balaming oi resources and authority, j)lus at congenial 1hatch
of key personalities. 1[ an installation, or a _ompany for that matter,
must condtat ,several large projects silnuhancouslx, the balancing and
matching become much more dillicult. A 1)ro.jcttized organization is
lnuch casier to manage during the life ol a ptoj,:tt, but presents re-
assignment problems at its conclusion. It also lcquircs more staff, in
terms of total people working on the project, than the matrix.
A matrix organization lor project managemem works best in the
following t xpcs of projects or circumstzmces: (I) where the projects are
relatively small and much of the work, such as ssstems design, testing,
and even sonic fabrication, can be done in-house; (2) where the dura-
tion of tile project is no more th:m two ycal> so that those temporarily
assigned t() tile project can shift ba(k to theii Jcspc_ t[vc specialties with
reasonable ease Ul)Oll completion of the p_ojcct: (3) where a field
installation undertakcs no more than one or two major projects and the
assignments to the teclmical divisions lcplt:>cJll ,;lily a small part of
their total work load; and (J) where a field installation has a sub-
stantial llu(tualion from no project activity to l lute ,n more projects,
including not more than two large projects.
In any cirttunstlmce, the mau-ix organization will work best if the
installation director clearly enuntiates a pli()litx system within which
the projects will be handled. Another fattor that tontributes greatly to
a sttccesslul matrix organization is where 1lie l_iutipal managers in-
volved know and _espect one another, tor the m,ttlix is a loose con-
federation bollnd together by coilllllOil ctmut_itHlent, with resource
control being the major tool ot the l)loject manager for asserting
dircction. 1i the project manager has been l)lottght in from outside the
inst;dlation, lit! is at a disadvantage.
This t)pe oi organization is least likcls t,) wolk where an installation
has a constant llow of large projects and dw te, hnical divisions are
called upon to spend a substantial portion, it not the majority, of their
capability on 1)roject st, pl)ort. Ahhough the ma,llix tan be used for
large lnojctts, it tends to lose its tlexibilits it the project runs for eight
or ten years since--those people assigned hom the divisions lose their
division identities and more of a projectized o_ganization results.
THE EFFECTS OF "BUREAUCRATIZATION" UPON PROdECT
MANAGEMENT
Many of the program and project managms interviewed expressed
serious reserxations about being al)le to retain the advantages of project
organization in the face of increasing pressures to institutionalize in-
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tormation and control processes. The tendency has been to increase
detail, and push decisions one o1 more steps higher iu tile organizational
chain. This, they say, delays decision, ditfuses responsibility, and re-
dt,ces the authority of the project manager and the influence of tile
program manager.
It would be premature, based on the data collected through this
study, to conch,de that NASA's successful plogram and project manage-
ment system is going to be rendered ineflective t)y administrative ossili-
cation, tlowever, the interviews with proje(t managers, t)rogram
managers, project stall, installation senior otticials, and Headquarters
division directors reveal many symptoms of degenerative bureaucracy.
Several managers of large projects admit to a sense of despair over
pressure for "no failures" in the face of restricted resources and diminish-
ing supt)ort from field installation management and NASA Head-
quarters. More documentation is required, more detail, more reviews
with expanded participation; the result is a sense of diminished author-
ity and frustration of the project manager's capacity to act. If this
proceeds to the point that it seriously interferes with the project
manager's control of project execution, it will fundamentally alter the
system upon which NASA's project success has been buih: centralized
planning and control, but decentralized project execution in the hands
of a responsible project manager.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTINUITY
AND THE USE OF PROJI:CT MANAGEMI:NT
In its t0rmative years, NASA leadershil_ built a management system
that emphasized quality performance and individual competence within
a pragmatic, non-bureaucratic stru{ture. Its purpose was to provide both
focus and tlexibility in the organization. This resulted in a dependence
upon people located at key points and their relationship with each
other. Structure was achieved through a well-developed information
and control system and the establishment of review processes termi-
nating in well-defined decision points, sepalately determined for each
major program or project.
The NASA t leadquarters organization and tile NASA-wide manage-
ment systems were structured largely to support the major _tight projects.
There was much less emphasis on broad program planning or on
developing continuity of institutional relationships such as between
Headquarters and the field installation, or among the major Head-
quarters program ol'fices (OMSF, OSSA, OART, and OTDA).
This type of project-oriented organization provided focus for major
operational tasks (e.g., Apollo and major unmanned ttight projects),
flexibility, and quality performance in its most important undertakings.
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But one weakne._s ol this type ot organization may be a lack of organiza-
tional contilauitx,. The concentration upon time-limited tasks and op-
erational relationshil_s built Ul)On personal ties al)pt:ars to weaken an
agency when those tasks are completed or curtailed and when key people
leave. New purposes and uew relatiolaships have to l)e structured. Tiffs
can be seen in lnicrocosm when tbele is a (hange in proglam managers.
The new program manager must establish his own network of relations
with the key people in the system (some of whom ma} also change)--his
division director, the project manager and his stalI, principal points
of contact in other offices o[ NASA Headquarters, attd with representa-
tives of other agencies.
When restricted resources and public apathy ov antagonism reduce
the psychological rewards derived from the intensity ol project focus,
will the informal structure be able to provide (:Olnmon agency goals
in the face ol strong coml)etition among proje(t-(,_iented interests? Has
the overriding task orientation weakened NASA's c;,pacity to survive
as a viable olganization?
It is doubtful whether the informal structme (an plovide the neces-
sary institutional cohesion tluoughout the agen(x. The tormer NACA
field installations are best prepared to meet this organizational crisis
because each is a relatively close-knit technical (ommunity. Each has
remaiued small enough to 1)e able to plan and o_ganize a coherent
group of technical efforts without the typical [,)rmal infrastructure.
Other NASA installations are larger and, typicall 3, have been organized
around a few major projects. More of the agency's etfort will have to be
devoted to pl:mning and program development activities which can
replace the focus that is blurred when major projects terminate. Addi-
tionally, greater emphasis probably is needed upon advanced research
and technology to sustain technical continuity and to stimulate a
concomitant organizational continuity.
If an agency is treated to accomplish a single task rather than a
continuing function, it makes sense to organize it around project-type
structure. Then, when the task is accomplished the organization can be
dismantled, though at some cost in human energy and dislocation.
APPLYING NASA PROJECT MANAGEMENT TO OTHER AGENCIES
Project management has been suggested as the way to organize when
facing difficult problems in domestic programs, qhe usual argument is,
"If we can land a man on the Moon, why can't we .... " The usual
rejoinder is, if the goals can be defined in detail and agreed on, and if
the method for reaching those goals can be detined and agreed on,
project management can be useful.
This overstates the difficulty of applying projc<t organization. Some
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elements of project management can be applied even where there is
not agreement on a set of highly defined goals. Small or modest-sized
tasks are worthy candidates for project-type organization. One does not
need complex reporting or control systems to reap benefits fiom project
organization--the small matrix projects conducted in-house by NASA
demonstrate that.
The key elements are: (1) senior management commitment to focus
on a well-defined and time-limited task, (2) strong support by agency
senior ollicials of the project manager, (3) the authority to act across
organization lines, (4) a basic but simple system for keeping senior
management and those atfected by the project informed, (5) a system
for periodic review by senior management at points in the life cycle
keyed to reporting and nianagement decision, and (6) relatively easy
access to senior managenlent by the project manager.
When a number of simultaneous projects is contemplated, it is
necessary to develop a linking process which facilitates integrating
projects with more general, ongoing agency activities. In NASA this
process is accomplished through the program manager. The OART
model, where the program manager acts both as the Headquarters point
of contact for one or more projects and as tile staff man for planning
and monitoring a nlajor program area of agency activities, suggests itself
as a feasible point of departure.
Although many refinements can be made, these elements have been
basic to the NASA project management system and can be adapted to
other agencies. Of course, a critical element is the project manager,
his competence in the field involved, his capacity to lead and to work
with others, and his ability to attract and organize a good project team.
Any project organization must be adapted to the agency management in
which it is located, and the project mnst be treated as a team effort. No
amount of detailed reporting, exquisite charting, or computer-derived
reports can replace top management support and the commitment of
adequate resources.
CONCLUSION
The principal hypothesis at the outset of this study placed undue
emphasis on the personal skills, characteristics, and management style
of the project manager as determinants of project success. The success
of NASA in managing its many complex, risky aerospace projects has
been due not to any "star" system of superhuman individuals directing
these projects, but to the concerted effort of the entire agency through
teamwork and mutual support. The driving force was the excitement
of the particular task at hand, its importance and innovative nature.
It is true that NASA was able to appoint extraordinarily capable men
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as project and progranl managers, but none couhl claim all the virtues
usually listed as necessary. 1:o2- the most pair lhey led teams whose
nmmbers were highly committed to the project and who derived great
satisfaction from seltiessly contributing to the team's purpose. The
project was the focus--organizational lines and personal ambitions
were submerged in the common el[ort by contractors, l Ieadquarters and
installation otficials, university experimenters, and project staff. This
was the driving force of NASA's success.
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